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The aim of the thesis is to describe and evaluate the transformation of urban 
form in the Pearl River Delta (PRD), China, with a particular focus on the 
relations between social processes and spatial forms in the context of the 
regeneration of urban-villages in Guangzhou. Referring to in-depth interviews 
with key practitioners and actors in the regeneration process, this thesis explores 
three specific relationships and/or processes.   
 
First, it examines the discursive and structural conditions surrounding the 
“production” of governmental regeneration programmes relating to the 
urban-villages, within a restructured and increasingly neoliberalized system. I 
develop the argument that it is through this production that the concept of 
urban-village is defined and deployed by government to label and problematise 
places which may not be problematic in the ways defined. Second, this thesis 
discusses the development and implementation of institutional reform policies that 
are at the heart of government-led regeneration projects in Guangzhou. As I argue, 
in seeking to develop a more coordinated approach to urban-village regeneration, 
local government officials, and other power-brokers, have created new 
subjects/objects of intervention that are structurally, discursively and deliberately 
9 
excluded from the dominate discourse of what urban regeneration is or ought to 
be. Third, I examine local people’s reactions to urban-village regeneration, and I 
develop the argument that they are not as powerless as has often been suggested 
by the dominant society. Instead, in exerting control over their lives and actively 
shaping their relationship to the so-called “dominant society”, they are engaging 
in a variety of strategies and deploying various tactics to resist and/or alter a range 
of policy decisions. It is their “present oriented” strategies, to safeguard their own 
individual self-interests, that are reshaping the outcome of the institutional reform 
policy. 
 
This thesis seeks to make a number of contributions to debates about 
urbanism and urban change. Drawing on empirical evidence about the 
urban-villages in Guangzhou, this thesis (re)considers the contested nature of 
urbanization within the context of China’s economic reform, and, in particular, 
how far one can understand processes of change through the filter of western, 
received, models, such as growth coalition and regime theory. In particular, this 
thesis explores the interrelationship between urban change and urban planning 
strategies and discusses how far the instruments and rationale of the latter are 
implicated in contributing to unequal distributive effects in relation to the 
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transformations of the urban-villages. Such discussions contribute to broader 
debates about the social impacts of urban policy programmes, and the thesis 
concludes by suggesting additional and/or alternative mechanisms or instruments 
for social intervention and engagement, and outlining some practical possibilities 
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Neoliberalizing Chinese Urbanism. 
 
“The right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the 
right to information, should modify, concretize and make more practical 
the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of 
multiple services. It would affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to 
make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in the 
urban area; it would also cover the right to the use of the centre, a 
privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for 
workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the ‘privileged’) 
(Lefebvre, 1991a; in Kofman and Lebas, 1996: 34).” 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
The commencement of China’s open door policy in 1978 began the process of 
a market economy replacing the centralized planning system that had been in 
place since 1949. This has precipitated rapid urbanization in which China is being 
transformed from a predominantly rural-based society to one that is increasingly 
urban. Under the slogan of xiaokang (a slogan proposed by Deng Xiaoping, the 
State Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in 1978 to convey the 
concept of an ideal society that provides well for all its citizens), certain levels of 
inequality were well understood as a reasonable corollary of the open door policy 
and something that would inevitably arise and need to be tolerated (Harvey, 
2005a). Thus, low production and wages, high state welfare provision and state 
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expenditure, scarcity of urban services, lower inner-city urban density, and less 
social/spatial segregation – the characteristics of “less urbanism” associated with 
an egalitarian socialist society under Mao – has been replaced by mass production, 
high wages, lower state welfare provision and state expenditure, and the growing 
diversity, heterogeneity, inequality, and marginality that characterize modern 
urbanism and a marketized society (Fan, 1999; Lee and Zhu, 2006; Lin, 2007; He 
and Wu, 2009). 
 
In the process of transformation, two contradictory categories of new urban 
spaces can be seen. On the one hand, based on the politically legitimized 
growth-first strategy (as Deng Xiaoping, the State Chairman of the CCP, said 
“development is the hard truth”), cities in China increasingly take on a stance 
referred to by Harvey (1989) as “entrepreneurialism” and market themselves by 
adopting a series of place-making strategies to compete with other localities, with 
their aim to attract capital to promote economic development and position 
themselves in the national and global economic landscape. New forms and spaces 
of wealth such as offices, retail spaces, malls, luxury hotels, gated communities, 
up-market residential development, and large-scale development zones – the 
outcomes of privatization and commodification of public services, drastic inter- 
16 
and intra-urban competition and radical urban social-spatial transformation – have 
brought about a frenzied spate of physical changes and have had a major impact 
on the visual dimension of urban life. 
 
On the other hand, while the rapid growth of China’s cities, especially under 
the market-driven economic restructuring, has brought about the belief that China 
is racing to be globalized and to “catch up” with the West, the uneven land reform 
and urban sprawl of cities accompanied by rapid population growth have led to a 
major set of urban problems with which China is arguably ill-prepared to cope 
(Kojima, 1987; Chang, 2002). These urban problems, such as rural to urban 
migration, the polarization of social strata, crisis of public security, deterioration 
of human settlements, shortage of public funds, and the imbalance of public 
policies, have underpinned the emergence of large numbers of village enclaves. 
These village enclaves, especially those in the economically advanced provinces, 
are labelled as “urban-villages”, and can be seen in every large and middle-sized 
city, even in the political capital Beijing and the economic capital Shanghai.  
 
While the terms “socialist transition” and “socialist market economy” have 
become popular notions to describe the coexistence of the state apparatus with the 
market mechanisms of China’s economic transformation since the late 1970s, the 
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emergence of new urban spaces in China again raises the important theoretical 
question of Chinese studies in the Cold War field, “whether the post-socialist 
Chinese city has become or is becoming capitalist in form” (Cheung, 1982; Ho, 
2005:41; Sigley, 2006: 488). These new urban spaces – the physical consequences 
of the process of accumulation in capitalist societies – also provoke the pondering 
over “how to best understand the nature of cities in one socioeconomic system 
undergoing structural transformations from socialism to post-socialism (Ma and 
Wu, 2005: 11).” 
 
For decades, urban growth in China has been understood as demonstrating 
unique Chinese characteristics, with its incomparable political, social, and 
economic contexts, distinct from the cities of the Western world (Xu and Li 1990; 
Chan 1994; Fan 1999; Zhang, 2004). In recent years, it has been seen as a process 
strongly influenced by global capital. From the point of view of “global cities” 
and other such hierarchies, the city unbound is a phenomenon of the recent period 
when China became increasingly part of the “global space of flows” (Sassen 1991; 
Castells 1996; Logan, 2002; Friedmann 1986, 1998b, 2005; Lin and Wei, 2002; 
Yeung and Lin, 2003; Ma and Wu, 2005; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2006; Wu 
and Ma, 2006; Lin, 2007). It is seen as one that is driven by broader 
18 
socio-economic and governance processes seeking to modernize Chinese cities in 
ways commensurate with interlocking into global flows of finance, employment, 
and wealth. The opening up to foreign trade and investment ends China’s isolation 
from the world market. Resonating with its western counterparts, the 
political-economic restructuring in China has also increasingly engaged with the 
impact of neoliberalism on contemporary cities by economic globalization, the 
parallel shift of institutional arrangements, and fast policy transfer (Peck, 2002).  
 
The concept of neoliberalism has been employed to refer to the macro 
political and economic restructuring that mobilizes a range of policies intended to 
extend market discipline, competition, and commodification throughout all sectors 
of society (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Harvey, 
2005a). Based on this, while scholars in the 1980s and 1990s mobilized a variety 
of concepts such as globalization, marketization, and entrepreneurialism to 
characterize the ongoing attempt to reconstitute the urban spaces in China, a 
growing body of literature has emerged in the mid 2000s in which these concepts 
have been complemented by the employment of the concept of neoliberalism to 
(re)scope and (re)interpret market-based institutional shifts and policy realignment. 
In this literature, urban redevelopment in China has been characterized as 
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neoliberal for its increasing market operations and private investment, as well as 
constant state intervention that rationalizes and promotes a “growth-first” 
approach.  
 
Neoliberal urbanism has been adopted by the academics as a generic category 
to describe the post-reform policy programmes characterized by the adherence to 
market-based policy options in China. For instance, the accompanied shifts of the 
practice and objects of government in China’s post-1978 transition from “socialist 
plan” to “market socialism”, especially the devolution in which vertical 
decentralization towards sub-national forms of governance and decision-making 
shifting downward to local state authorities (municipal level and below) (He and 
Wu, 2009), have been subsumed by adopting the term “neoliberal policy 
paradigm” (Pow, 2009). Urban spaces such as malls, private “middle-class” gated 
communities, and suburbs, resulting from land reform (in the form of the urban 
land use right leasing system) and housing reform (such as the housing 
monetarization policy of 1998 which replaces the longstanding in-kind welfare 
housing system) (Lee and Zhu, 2006), are thought to resemble those to be found 




The rapid growth of Chinese cities creates many contrasting subjects that draw 
the attention of urban scholars. Yet, following the dominant pattern in 
contemporary urban studies, the emerging literature on the neoliberalization of 
Chinese urbanism focuses more on new forms and spaces of wealth (cf. Candan 
and Kolluoğlu, 2008). While mentioning new forms and spaces of poverty, they 
are seen as epiphenomenal (Jie and Taubmann, 2002; Taubmann, 2002; Jiang and 
Anthony, 2005; Lin, 2007; Zhang, 2008). However, if the phenomenon of village 
enclaves in China, with the term “urban-village” as their label, is not 
epiphenomenal to the neoliberalization of Chinese cities, but one of the very 
context-specific forms that neoliberal urbanism has taken place in post-1980s 
China (especially in the late 1990s as a period during which neoliberalization in 
China not only became more visible at the macro and meso scales, but also 
deepened and became more entrenched into local economic, political, and social 
processes), then, in what ways can we understand this particular “Chinese urban 
formation”, to the extent that it can be seen as a timely test case for emerging 
modes of governance and/or governmentality within which state form, political 
strategies, and governmental programmes are “enmeshed, blended, and imbricated 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002a: 14; Peck and Tickell, 2007: 31)” in a way to 
canonize the so-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics”? 
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In order to address this theorem, this thesis explores the phenomenon of the 
urban-villages in China and the ways in which they have been conceived of as “a 
problem”. In trying to unfold both the phenomenon of the urban-villages, and the 
theoretical issues at stake, the thesis is also seeking to pose normative questions 
concerning the (re)distribution of power in society and the policy making 
processes involved in the regeneration of the urban-villages – the subject matter of 
this thesis.  
 
Chapter One justifies the use of the concept of neoliberalism in seeking to 
understand the phenomenon of the urban-villages in China. The remainder of this 
chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the emergence of 
the urban-villages in China in relation to the contemporary restructuring of urban 
form. It evaluates how different scholars have sought to understand, and explain, 
the phenomenon of the urban-villages, and extends to the question of how the 
right to the city is interrelated with hierarchical forms of citizenship in the context 
of the urban-villages regeneration controversy. This leads the second section to 
review the broader socio-cultural shifts of local and national configurations 
relating to the phenomenon of the urban-villages. It outlines how the rural-urban 
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dichotomy, a spatial order that has dominated and shaped urban change since the 
1950s, has been blurred by various processes of neoliberal restructuring in the 
general context since 1978. This has led to the emergence of a new set of 
“lifestyle” groups based on identity politics which are at the heart of the 
urban-villages regeneration controversy. The third section outlines changes to 
Chinese urbanism with reference to the emergence of neoliberalization and new 
forms of governance based on facilitating the market expansion of property 
markets. The fourth section concludes by outlining the research questions and the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 The Emergence of the Urban-Villages in China. 
As outlined in the introduction, this section will provide readers with a sketch 
of the phenomenon of the urban-villages in China. How, then, should the 
emergence of the urban-villages in China be described? This question involves the 
theoretical and methodological debates of the “new” regional geography and the 
problems in abstracting from time and space in social science (Sayer, 1989). In 
other words, it brings into question the relationship between analysis and narrative, 
and between law-seeking or nomological approaches and contextualising 
approaches, while the problem of writing texts which construct geohistorical 
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syntheses has raised the issue of the composition of narratives (ibid. 254). The 
simplest way of doing this is to compare the phenomenon of the urban-villages in 
China with the contemporary restructuring of urban form more generally. In the 
territorial expansion of Chinese cities, in order to reduce the amount of 
compensation and avoid the costly relocation of residents which may bring about 
disputes and protests, the municipal governments have taken a piecemeal 
approach to acquiring land for development from local villages, i.e. requisitioning 
cultivated land, rather than residential land, which are both collectively owned by 
rural communities.  
 
In the process, on the one hand, rural villages which are seen as old and drab 
are spatially encompassed or annexed by urban territory and surrounded by 
skyscrapers and modern transport facilities. On the other hand, villagers, who 
pursue individual self-interest, are motivated to make use of the relative locational 
advantage of the land assigned to them for housing. By rebuilding and expanding 
their houses from low, red brick houses with adjacent pigsties to concrete blocks, 
they lease out a portion of their house as working and/or living spaces to the 
massive number of migrants who have drifted from relatively poor provinces into 
cities to find jobs but are ineligible for urban housing, which in any case, they 
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cannot afford. As all villagers pursue this strategy, the land of the villages 
becomes overexploited, and overcrowded with migrants.  
 
The increasing density and congestion costs, in turn, lead to difficulties in 
maintaining the club-like provision of commonly used and owned goods and 
services, such as sewage disposal, security devices and so on. In this sense, the 
emergence of the urban-villages in China has many parallels with the 
contemporary restructuring of urban form, in that it fits Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy 
of the commons” in which rational action by individuals (that is, self-interested 
utility maximizing behaviour in dealing with common pool resources) produces 
collectively irrational results. At first glance, these villages are similar to the 
overcrowded industrial towns with poorly built housing (e.g. back-to-back houses) 
which emerged in response to migration from rural to urban areas in Europe in the 
late nineteenth century, as described by Henry Mayhew and his contemporaries. 
They are also similar to the informal settlements (often internationally referred to 
as squatter settlements, shanty towns, or slums) in contemporary developments in 
Europe, Africa, South Asia, and North and South America, which are common 
features of developing countries and are typically the product of an urgent need 
for shelter by the urban poor. Much like Majengos in Kenya (Majale, 1998), 
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fevelas in Brazil (De Sampaio, 1994), and gecekondus in Turkey (Malusardi and 
Occchipinti, 2003), they are typically dense settlements comprising communities 
housed in self constructed shelters under conditions of informal or traditional land 
tenure, known for their deterioration of the urban environment and intensified 
social disorder such as violence, sexually immoral activities, burglary and robbery 
(Lewis, 1955; Kuznets, 1966; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; Smith and Scarpaci, 
2000; Todaro, 2000; Dixon-Gough and Molobeng, 2006).  
 
These villages in China are seen by the municipal governments not only as 
eyesores and areas of criminality and backwardness that must be urgently 
eliminated, but also hindrances to municipal governments who wish to create 
“resources” to make cities more attractive to investors. When capital accumulation 
through property-development booms made the land that these village enclaves 
occupy increasingly valuable, governments launched clearance programs to 
“eliminate” the village enclaves. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the municipal 
governments used powers to displace low-income populations who might have 
lived for many years on what had later become premium land. Their 
neighbourhoods were invaded by high-rise towers, condominiums, or box stores, 
which showed no trace of the brutality that permitted their construction. Peasants 
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who were assigned cultivated land and residential land in accordance with their 
family size were deprived of their land and properties without being able to 
address their unfair treatment in a social system which “allows little else in the 
way of opposition (Scott, 1989: 15; in Tang and Chung, 2002: 57).” Migrants 
were evicted brutally by police or armed forces organized by the authorities. In 
the initial programs, governments further took advantage of political events to 
undertake sudden clearances of unsightly constructions in the village enclaves 
which had long been tacitly approved.  
 
One of the most egregious examples is Shenzhen municipal government’s 
sudden undertaking to clear up such constructions and exclude a large number of 
illegal immigrants in celebration of the return of Hong Kong to China in July 
1997 (see Tang and Chung, 2002). These clearances of village enclaves are similar 
to the slum clearances in the contemporary urban processes in Seoul, Delhi, 
Mumbai, even New York, which are described by Harvey (2003; 2005a; 2005b; 
2008) as “’accumulation by dispossession”. It was common in many Chinese 
cities to write-off these village enclaves. The social cost of displacement of 
residents and the wholesale demolition was not seen as an issue by the 
governments (see figure 1.1). 
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(Photo courtesy Xu Peiwu) 
Note: These two photos were taken by Photographer Xu Peiwu in 1998. As Davis 
(2004: 104; quoted from Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008: 21) suggests in his 
discussion of various “beautification” projects in the Third World: “In the urban 
Third World, poor people dread high-profile international events – conferences, 
dignitary visits, sporting events, beauty contests, and international festivals – that 
prompt authorities to launch crusades to clean up the city: slum-dwellers know 
that they are the “dirt” or “blight” that their governments prefer the world not to 
see.” This has also exactly been the case in these village enclaves in China.  
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However, governmental clearance programs found themselves under 
increasing pressure to act. In some cases, especially those at the level of local 
municipalities, they were seen by the central government as masking the land grab 
for environmental and social reasons in the manipulation of the ambivalent rural 
land ownership (see Ho, 2005). In some other cases, notably the “urbanized 
reconstruction campaign” in the early 2000s, they triggered institutional crises and 
unpredictable political consequences
1
. Furthermore, the cost of social conflicts 
and polarization on the national scale, such as the issues of uneven distribution of 
wealth and the large number of landless peasants, were seen by the central 
government as contradicting the national urban policy which was more concerned 
with societal stability and harmony (later in 2005 further concretized by Hu Jintao, 
                                                 
1
 The “urbanized reconstruction campaign” launched by the Shenzhen Municipal 
Government in October 2003 can be an example par excellence. By bypassing 
and redirecting the Clause 5 Article 2 of the Regulation of Land Management, 
Shenzhen Municipal Government redrew the municipal boundaries by 
upgrading Baoan County and Longgang County, the two rural areas outside the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, as two districts in the urban ambit (Some 
Suggestions about the Speeding on the urbanization of Baoan County and 
Longgang County, Shenzhen Municipal Committee and People’s Municipal 
Government, 2003). By the end of 2004, approximately 956 km
2 
rural lands 
were transformed into urban lands, with 270 thousand villagers in 261 villages 
and 21 towns being transformed from peasant status into urban resident status. 
The episode of “urbanized reconstruction campaign” in Shenzhen was not only 
an exceptional case. Since 2002, there were 70,000 more or less the same 
“campaigns” in China which “stole” peasants’ collectively owned land by 
transforming peasants into residents (Report of Ministry of Land and Resources, 
2004). 
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the General Secretary of the CCP, as “building a harmonious society”, and heavily 
promoted by the Sixteen Central Committee of the Communist Party in 2006 as a 
normative political guideline aiming for “basically well-off” middle-class oriented 
society). Especially after some violent riots and the death of an unknown number 
of villagers and migrants in “eliminations” of village enclaves by local 
governments, central government started to take the issue of village enclave 
clearance into consideration and ordered local governments to set aside as much 
as possible of the city’s financial budget in order to “regenerate” village enclaves 
smoothly” (cf. Zhang, 2002: 489).  
 
It is in this context that the term “urban-village” and “regeneration” rapidly 
became used all over China. The English term “urban-village” is a translation of 
the compound Chinese word “cheng-zhong-cun” (城中村). Created by combining 
existing words, i.e. “cheng” (city), “zhong” (in), and “cun” (village), literally, it 
means “village in city”. The term “cheng-zhong-cun” was first used in southern 
China, or the Pearl River Delta, especially Guangdong province close to Hong 
Kong, where the open door policy began and whose population is the most 
mobile of all the provinces in China. Sometime between 1997 and 1999, it 
entered common usage through word of mouth and the mass media, e.g. 
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newspapers, magazines, internet, and TV. It is of unknown origin and is difficult 
to trace back to a single source. 
 
Different from the connotation of the “urban village” in the UK, which is 
seen more or less as a marketing concept promoted with slogans such as 
“villagizing city” and “Tooting village”, or the rather political meaning in Prince 
Charles’ flagship Poundbury Village scheme in 1988 and various new town 
experiments such as those at Highgrove which promoted a village-like quality of 
urban life as a direct response to the problems of alienation, social isolation, and 
placelessness of suburban sprawl and modernist architecture
2
, the term 
“urban-village” in China is more similar to the term “inner-cities” in the USA, 
UK, Ireland, and Canada, or the French working class banlieue (Dikec, 2007b; 
Wacquant, 2007; 2010). These terms are used in a pejorative sense in the 
                                                 
2
 Chung (2010) uses the term “village-in-the-city” (chengahongcun) to describe 
the subject matter of this thesis, as a way to highlight the contrast between 
“village-in-the-city” in China and the “urban villages” in the European cities, 
especially those in the UK. He criticizes that the casual use of the term “urban 
village” to describe village-in-the-city in China leads to what Sayer (1984: 
126-127) regarded as “chaotic conception”. On this issue, I felt constrained to 
keep balance between simplifying the complexity and ambivalence of this 
subject matter and embracing the whole field by inventing a new spatial 
metaphor. In order to draw out the complexity and ambivalence in the course of 
analysis, I suture the term “urban village” as a single term “urban-village”, to 
describe the subject matter of this thesis. 
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dominant society as a euphemism for an area, perhaps a ghetto or slum, where 
residents are less educated and more impoverished and where there are problems 
including disinvestment, urban blight, the image of an unsafe and unhealthy 
environment. As a social construct, it is a way to give meaning to an ambiguous 
social circumstance, i.e. the existence of those old and shabby villages 
geographically located in the newly developed modern urban territories and 
undergoing condensed processes of urbanization (rural-urban transition). It is 
especially used with its Chinese sense of sarcasm to label those old shabby 
villages in modern cities which should have been eliminated by government.  
 
The urban-villages as an urban problem have gained increasing recognition 
from both society and government in China. Since the 1990s, almost every major 
city in China started to claim that they had an “urban-villages problem” in their 
cities. For instance, it is claimed that there are 138 urban-villages in Guangzhou, 
241 in Shenzhen, 231 in Beijing, 187 in Sian, 71 in Nanjing, 83 in Taiyuan, 52 in 
Hanchan, 227 in Shanghai, 147 in Wuhang, and 55 in Chunching. Similar to the 
negative symbolic connotations of the inner city (Pickvance, 1990; also see 
Atkinson, 2000), the term “urban-village” not only refers to particular locations 
but also connotes chaotic, poverty, disorder, backwards, and crime. These 
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perceptions are presented in the public mind to the extent that city governments 
cannot afford not to have an urban-village policy of some kind. Whilst the exact 
extent and magnitude of the problem of these villages was often unclear, city 
governments quickly immersed themselves in “ 改 造 ” (gai-zhao) the 
“urban-villages” in their own cities. “Gai” means “to change” or “to correct”, 
“zhao” means “to build” or “to make”. Literally, the term means “to change 
something by building something” or “to correct something by making 
something”, and should be translated as “revamp” or “modification” 3. Except for 
the term “regeneration”, the term “transformation” and a series of counterparts 
with a common prefix – “renewal”, “reformation”, “reconstruction”, and 
“redevelopment” – are also adopted loosely by scholars as the translation of 
“gai-zhao”. These terms have their own different contexts, introduced at different 
times to mean different things (Cochrane, 2007). In the Chinese context, 
especially in governmental actions devoting to “城中村改造” (“cheng-zhong-cun 
gai-zhao” or its literal translation adopted in this thesis: the regeneration of the 
urban-villages), however, relatively little attention has been given to the meaning 
of the term “gai-zhao” and its implication for urban development. While the 
meaning is ambiguous and vague, left undefined, it is used as a normative concept 
                                                 
3
 In academics, the term “modification” is used more in the discussion of issues 
concerning natural science (without human will) such as freezing-rain events. 
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to imply that the urban-villages are a problem and the regeneration of them ought 
to occur.  
 
“Urban regeneration” is commonly accepted to refer to the physical, 
economic and social renewal of areas which have been subject to the problems of 
urban decline, including a movement of people out of the city, resulting in the 
physical, social and economic decay of the inner areas (Pacione, 1985; Parkinson, 
1989). While “regeneration” metaphors offer an almost infinitely inclusive canopy 
under which highly varied social and political values are sheltered (Furbey, 1999), 
this “elastic term” (Healey, 1997: 106) is often used loosely and uncritically by 
neoliberal advocates to refer to a desired re-emergence of cities as centres of 
general social well-being, creativity, vitality and wealth (Shaw and Porter, 2009: 
3). However, from time to time, the critique is that the response seldom matches 
the diagnosis, resulting in poor, negative impacts or unintended consequences 
(Lawless, 1989; Kleinman and Whitehead, 1999; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; 
Stone, 2002; Atkinson, 2004; Hughes, 2004; Parry et al., 2004; Diamond and 
Liddle, 2005; Raco, 2005; Robert and Sykes, 2005; Thomson et al., 2006; Fuller 
and Geddes, 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008; Thomson, 2008; Rae 2009). It is in light 
of these debates that this thesis adopts the term “regeneration” as the English 
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translation of the term “gai-zhao”. 
 
Because the redistribution of population means not only change in spatial 
locations of people but also differentiation among different social groups in urban 
space, urban-village regeneration is not only an issue of managing physical urban 
space, but a political, economic, and social issue. It is a disputed process which 
raises questions of “whose place?” and “what kind of place?” These questions 
relate to who should be identified to be empowered and who should participate 
and to what degree in decision making. At the level of elite groups, such as 
experts and politicians, it is unclear how to deal with the arduous problems of the 
urban-villages in the Pearl River Delta. Owing to the ambivalent causality of the 
problem and the lack of identified priorities and defined issues needed to be 
solved, the causes and consequences of problems are also hard to access/foresee. 
In particular the scoping of the problems of illegal land use and construction, 
collective ownership of land, the census registration system, shabby landscapes, 
informal economy, floating migrants, and crimes are still conflicting and 
contradictory. In debates involving multiple social actors, such as the state, capital, 
and grassroots, one is confronted with contesting definitions about “public 
interests”, so one is far from a consensus regarding the mechanisms involved in 
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regeneration. It is in this context that the term “gai-zhao” was initially popularized 
through government propagandas. It is used as a euphemism which rhetorically 
makes government’s intentions sound bland and inoffensive to local residents. It 
implies that it is possible to solve the problem without radical changes. It suggests 
minor changes or the absence of radical changes.  
 
There has been a broad spectrum of researches both in Anglophone Chinese 
studies and Chinese-language literature, about the phenomenon of the 
urban-villages in China
4
. These studies can be classified in two categories in terms 
of whether or not they use the term “urban-village”. On the one hand, those 
researchers who explore this phenomenon without employing the term 
“urban-village” draw heavily in their analyses upon spatial metaphors such as 
“rural-urban transition”, “urban fringe”, “spontaneous urbanization”, 
“peri-urbanization”, “informal urbanization”, “irregular urbanization5”, “in-situ 
                                                 
4
 For a review of the array of the literature concerning the urban-villages in China, 
see Chung, 2010. 
5
 Although it is well-established that “irregular urbanization” in the city is hardly 
a matter concerning the urban poor and the spaces they occupy, and that many 
middle- and upper-class residences and production and consumption spaces 
have been part of that process, it is very common to represent the urban spaces 
occupied by the poor as examples of “irregular urbanization” (cf. Buğra, 1998; 
Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008). 
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urbanization
6”, and “desakota7” (e.g. Liu and Wei, 1997; Tian, 1998; Zheng, 2000; 
Gransow, 2002; Leaf, 2002; Tang and Chung, 2002; Liu and Yang, 2004; Zhu, 
2004). While deploying the theories and methodologies rooted in the experience 
of market-based capitalist economies, they imply an allometric growth model, or a 
proportionate growth model based on a biological analogy – a mode of thought 
which has been carried over into urban sociology, economics and geography, 
which are the three fields possessing a common basis in the theoretical 
dependency (see Osborne and Rose, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, those researches who employ the term “urban-village” 
(chengzhongcun) or sociospatial synonyms, such as “peasant enclaves”, “ethnic 
enclaves”, “migrant villages”, “migrant enclaves”, “semi-urbanized villages”, 
“suburban villages”, and “inside-city villages”, take the term “urban-village” as a 
normative concept, simply to describe the subject matter they study (e.g. Ma and 
Xiang, 1998; Jie and Taubmann, 2002; Deng and Huang, 2004; Guo and Zhang, 
                                                 
6
 The term “in-situ urbanization” refers to the phenomenon that rural settlements 
and their populations transform themselves into urban or quasi-urban ones 
without much geographical relocation of the residents (Zhu, 2004: 207). 
7
 The term “desakota” is coined by McGee (1989: 96) from the Indonesian word 
“desa” (village) and “kota” (town) to denote integrated zones which have “no 
clear cut division between rural and urban relations”.  
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2006; Siu, 2007; Li, 2008; Lin et al., 2011; Zhao and Webster, 2011)
8
. In their 
functionalist or etiological perspective, they simply assimilate social problems 
into functional analysis to emphasize the impact of objective conditions and social 
arrangement of dysfunctions and disorganization. However, the effect is that such 
research underplays, even neglects the subjective processes that lead people to 
hold that a condition is problematic and is in need of alleviation (Spector and 
Kitsuse, 1977). 
 
While the reliance on the spatial metaphors in the former category is 
problematic, the settlement definitions in the latter category are equally 
inadequate. Furthermore, the adequacy of their normative stance is arguable. In 
their analyses offering pathology and solutions to the “urban-villages problem”, 
                                                 
8
 Within Chinese-language literature, the term “城中村” (chengzhongcun) has 
been translated into English in several ways, e.g., “metropolitan village (Zeng, 
2000)”, “rural residential island”, “village within urban”, “city village” (Lee, 
2002), “urban village” (Lan, 2005), “village amidst the city” (URBANUS, 
2006). While each term shades with subtle difference of meaning, they are 
nothing more than a result of trying to translate the term “chengzhungcun” (城
中村) in a proper academic way, rather than “borrowing” or linking to the 
debates or concepts of the terms in their original context (such as borrowing 
the term “urban village” in the context of European cities, particularly in the 
UK context). Since the Berlage Institute in 2005 published a book, VIC: 
Unknown Urbanity in China, the English term “village-in-the-city”, with its 
acronym “VIC”, has been adopted by some researchers in Anglophone Chinese 
Studies (Uehara, 2005; Chung, 2010; Lin et al., 2011). 
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what prevails is a problem-solving oriented conceptualization of the urban-village 
and a linear model of development and modernization dominated by approaches 
based on positivist and deterministic assumption. According to this model, the 
village enclaves are rural remnants of a past era; their backwardness will be 
eliminated with the passage of time and urbanization. Villagers will change their 
ways and be absorbed into modern city living (Siu, 2005). While treating the 
urban-villages as a sui generis phenomenon “emerging” in the process of urban 
development in China, these two categories draw more on the non-discursive 
(material) realm (the Real), ignoring or downplaying the importance of metaphors 
in informing understanding about space, as well as conditioning what Lefebvre 
(1976) calls “the politics of space”.  
 
Some accounts recognize the economic contribution of low-wage migrant 
workers, and argue that without whose cheap labour, service-based development 
could not proceed or only take place at greater cost. Following this, they argue 
that the urban-villages, in providing low-income rental housing and jobs for the 
low-income population during rapid urbanization, do function as a buffer for those 
experiencing difficulties adjusting to urban life and promote a city’s profile as an 
affordable and competitive city (e.g. Chan et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2003; Bach, 
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2010; Wang et al., 2010). In local newspapers, magazines, and formal and/or 
informal conferences and meetings, some polemists also echo this viewpoint. 
However, such alternative or counter-discourses have been relatively muted in 
governmental policymaking processes and are easily offset by ever-present 
discourses. This points my attention to the idea of “the right to the city” and 
derivative issues, such as why are alternative or counter-discourses relatively 
muted and easily offset by ever-present discourses, why these discourses are 
treated in the mainstream discursive space as a noise rather than a voice, and why 
these discourses are not related to a broader context and some critical issues such 
as social safety net and affordable housing for migrants.  
 
While political and economic restructuring in cities is not producing, as it 
often promises, better social integration but ironically reinforcing already existing 
geographies of exclusion, violence, and conflict, one popular trend responding to 
the irony of neoliberal urbanism has been appealing to the idea of the “right to the 
city” as a way to bring out the outcry over the affecting enfranchisement of urban 
residents and seek for better empowerment of the hitherto excluded or 
marginalized social groups (Harvey, 1992; Peck, 1998; Tickell and Peck, 1996: 
Ward, 2000; Appadurai, 2001; Dikec, 2001; Mann, 2001; Chatterjee, 2009). Back 
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to the intellectual roots of the idea of the “right to the city” – the writings of 
Lefebvre, the right to the city is “a transformed and renewed right to urban life 
(Lefebvre, 1996: 158).” In Lefebvre’s conception, enfranchisement is for those 
who inhabit the city. Because the right to the city revolves around the production 
of urban space, it is those who live in the city – who contribute to the body of 
urban lived experience and lived space – who can legitimately claim the right to 
the city. The right to the city is designed to further the interests “of the whole 
society and firstly of all those who inhabit (Lefebvre, 1996: 158).” 
 
For Lefebvre (1991a), the right to the city involves two principal rights for 
urban inhabitants: the right to participation and the right to appropriation. The 
right to participation maintains that not only those with certain membership or 
identity, normally those with national citizenship, but those who inhabit the city, 
are eligible to participate in various decision-making processes that contribute to 
the production of space in a city. The right to appropriation includes not only the 
right to occupy already-produced urban place, but also the right to produce urban 
space so that it meets the needs of inhabitants. In line with this view, if land is the 
most valuable asset of cities, and if land policies should be firmly anchored with 
ethical concepts and be beneficial to all inhabitants, should it not only be villagers 
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but also those who could be affected by the outcomes of policy that have the right 
to participate and appropriate? On this question, I feel that the abovementioned 
alternative or counter-discourse can easily lead to passionate yet somewhat 
over-romanticised accounts of the regeneration of the urban-villages.  
 
To advocate Lefebvre’s call for a radical restructuring of social, political, and 
economic relation, both in the city and beyond, is also somewhat 
over-romanticised and may only lead to an ending of do-gooderism. Nevertheless, 
the questions addressed here remain. And there is a theoretical reason to suppose 
that probing the discrepancy between the actual scalar structure and that imagined 
by Lefebvre’s right to the city offers an approach to brush the strong discourse of 
neoliberal urbanism against the grain. Scale is not an objective reality; rather it is 
socially produced and negotiated through a process of political struggle. The 
degree of empowerment and its character are contingent on the agendas of the 
political actors who prevail. The question of whose right to the city, in the 
political sense of the term, is deprived (and whose is not) is determined on the 
question of how the right to the city articulates with hierarchical form of 
citizenship (Smith, 1993; Agnew, 1997; Marston, 2000; Brenner, 2001; Purcell, 
2002). Given this, what is the current scalar structure of the right to the city in the 
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case of the urban-village regeneration?  
 
1.3 Rural or Urban? Identity, Place-Making, and Urbanism with Chinese 
Characteristics 
The discussion of Chinese urbanism revolves predominantly around the 
socio-geographical and political concept of a rural-urban dichotomy which is 
embodied institutionally in three closely interrelated control systems: hukou 
(census registration), danwei (work unit), and land. In the socialist era, the social 
and spatial mobility of the population was rigidly confined (Chan, 1994). One 
either had an urban registration (non-agricultual hukou) or a rural registration 
(agricultural hukou); one was either an urban dweller or a rural peasant. Everyone 
belonged to a danwei, be it in an urban area as state owned enterprise (SOE), or in 
a rural area as commune. Land was categorized as either urban land owned by the 
state, managed by the danwei, or rural land owned by the collective, managed by 
the commune. Agencies, e.g. governments, universities, military, SOEs, and 
factories, could be granted land use rights for workplaces, worker housing, and 
social infrastructure. Under an administrative allocation system, land could be 
transferred between state agencies in what has come to be called the “primary land 
market”.  
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Land ownership in China by the state and collective was an ideological given. 
It belonged to all people, had no price mechanism and could not, as a commodity, 
be transferred (Ho, 2001: 394-421; Ho and Lin, 2003: 681-707; Lin and Ho, 2005: 
411-436; Walker and Buck, 2007: 46). In other words, individuals in an urban area 
were urban dwellers with urban hukou. They were assigned jobs in a danwei and 
provided with apartments. Individuals in a rural area were peasants with rural 
hukou. They were allocated communal lands to cultivate and live on (according to 
the Constitution, each household a piece of arable land for production and a piece 
of housing base land (HBL) with a size of 80 to 120 m
2
). The separate rural and 
urban systems demarcate the population clearly. Though evolving and changing 
over time, depending on the political atmosphere, as particular forms in which 
capital organizes and expands through production, circulation, consumption, and 
distribution for a period of time, with some degree of stability, these two different 
time-space systems functioned separately and kept a social safety net under a 
significant sector of the population for many years. Each one had its own bundle 
of institutions and regulations of governing, in which individuals were bound up 
tightly in a family-centred system that helped allocate housing, foodstuffs, and 
employment through collective organizations.  
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“Agricultural” and “non-agricultural” hukou are not only geographical labels, 
they also connote one’s identity, citizenship, opportunities and socioeconomic 
status, and hence are essential for every aspect of daily life (Yang, 1988; 
Christiansen, 1990; Cheng and Selden 1994; Fan, 1999; Guldin, 2001; Ho, 2005). 
As Friedmann (2003: 750-751) says: “The ‘rural’ in China is generally perceived 
as a category diametrically opposed to the ‘urban’. It is one of China’s famous 
yin/yang binaries. […] Urban and rural are thought to be distinctive ways of being 
Chinese.” The rural-urban dichotomy plays an important role in the sociological 
and geographical imagination in China. Urban residents were entitled to more 
social benefits in the form of housing subsides, medical care, and pensions than 
their rural counterparts. Rural areas are seen as containers for the poor, the less 
privileged and political incorrect members of society. Thus, an ideology was 
formulated that urban populations are more privileged than rural populations, the 
former educated and sophisticated, the later uneducated and boorish. 
 
In the socialist era, the three state-created systems not only weaved an 
all-pervasive web of social control, but also comprised the regime of 
accumulation. Nevertheless, in the reform era, hukou, danwei, and land, these 
three control systems, which worked together as pillars to bind people and things 
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in a totally administered society, have been eroded by the implementation of 
various reform policies. Firstly, the state owned enterprises (SOEs) which were 
long maintained as the stable centrepieces of state control of the economy, became 
less profitable, to the extent that the security and benefits they conferred on the 
urban dwellers were whittled away over time. The exploding town and village 
enterprises (TVEs), which were transformed from the reintroduction of the 
household responsibility system (HRS) in 1978 and the dissolved communes in 
1980, became centres of entrepreneurialism, flexible labour practices, and open 
market competition. Secondly, the introduction of the market and the relaxing of 
employment restrictions in the reform era lead to a dramatic surge of internal 
migration. Especially when rural migrants in 1984 were allowed to stay in urban 
areas by obtaining “temporary residence permits” (Shen, 1995; Liu 2001), this 
dramatic surge of internal migrants led to a strong polarization between 
indigenous populations and outsiders, coining the terms “peasant floods”, “blind 
flows”, “tidal waves”, and “human avalanche” (Liu, 1991; Gong, 1994; Solinger, 
1995; Wan, 1995; Tyson and Tyson, 1996; Robert, 1997; Fan, 1999). The 
emergence of, and the fast increase in, the floating population makes hukou no 
longer a useful criterion for defining the rural-urban populations. 
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Thirdly, this was furthered by the land use right (LUR) reform in the 1990s, 
e.g. revising of laws such as the revision of the Constitution and the amendment 
of the Land Management Law in 1998. By separating the right to use land from 
ownership of the land, i.e. the right to use land is commercialized, but the 
ownership of the land still ideologically belongs to all the people (Li, 1999: 56), 
the price mechanism of urban LUR was created under a “valued use system” 
(youchang shiyong zhidu). Housing monetarization policy and the creation of the 
“secondary land market” abolished the old in-kind welfare housing system and 
changed governments of different levels into enthusiastic protagonists in gaining 
economic benefits from the commodification of land and accelerated the 
commercialization of real estate. In these circumstances, not only has the 
boundary of these two separate systems (rural and urban) started to become 
blurred and traversed, but also the taken-for-granted boundaries of state-market, 
illegal-legal, private-public, etc., have become obfuscatory, to the extent that, to 
quote from Harvey (2005: 126), “the whole economy moved towards a neoliberal 
structure.” 
 
In heterogeneous alignments of people and things, the rural-urban dichotomy 
is nonetheless a crucial ordering device in the social life in China. It continues to 
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provide grammars and vocabularies to shape much of the debates surrounding 
urban change, and constitutes the taken-for-granted context for policy 
development. Its ideology is inculcated and perpetuated in the built-up-area-based 
dichotomous approaches to public policy and is firmly lodged in the public mind 
(Guldin, 2001: 126). It functions like litmus paper to verify Chinese urbanization 
and its derivative constituents, e.g. the houko, land system, household 
responsibility system, house reformation movement, and rural to urban migration. 
As some Chinese studies literature has already pointed out, this ambiguity has led 
to an unprecedented range of problems and a great deal of confusion. In these 
circumstances, how are we to assess the floating/transient/temporary population 
and the ratio between the registered and those without any registration in cities, 
since, as Harvey (2005) points out, the hukou system of residence permits is on 
the verge of becoming ineffective as an instrument of migrant control, to the 
extent that the gradual reform of the system seems inevitable? How are we to 
measure the level of urbanization by the congregation of population in urban areas 
and the concentration of non-agricultural development, since, as Friedmann (2003: 
745-758) observes, rural areas may be heavily industrialized, with local 
populations living in multi-storey apartments, while urban areas may contain 
significant numbers of people who, even though they work in urban occupations, 
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are counted as peasants, because their residence permits (hukou) locate them in 
rural areas? How are we to demonstrate from official statistics the transformation 
of agricultural land into urban and industrial uses which has forced many 
suburban peasants to lose their traditional livelihoods and change to other 
economic activities, since, as Taubmann (2002: 81-82) writes, in his research 
about urbanization in Guangzhou, the actual figure varies considerably, depending 
on the source? Most important of all, how are we to deal with the confusion of the 
unaddressed and mystifying basic definitional questions of the Chinese 
terminology, though these terms have been rendered into English and steeped in 
literature, in the classifying of Chinese cities, since, as Guldin (2001: 129) claims, 
rural and urban in China are administrative rather than sociological categories, 
depending on different administrative levels, and hence frequently shift on the 
ground and may not necessarily reflect social facts in statistical records? 
 
These are the very questions that amount to the urban-villages controversy. 
The rural-urban disparity in policies regulate the land market, shaping the 
urban-villages’ built environment, and furthermore actively shape the social 
structures through exclusionary redefinitions of whose space the urban-village is. 
Firstly, under the ideological rubric of a “socialist market economy with Chinese 
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characteristics”, the central government subscribes to an alternative model of 
development that ensures long-term economic growth without abandoning the 
Marx-Leninist tenet of state and collective land ownership. For this reason, the 
“socialist market economy” was realized by separating the right to use land from 
ownership of the land, i.e. the right to use land is commercialized, but the 
ownership of the land still ideologically belongs to all the people. While the rights 
to land use and lease were commercialized under the 1988 Land Management 
Law, the scope of the valued land use system was restricted to state-owned (in fact 
urban) land
9
. As for rural, collective, land, it was, and still is, excluded, outside 
the scope of the valued land use system. The pricing of rural land is still an 
ideological taboo which inhibits an economically efficient exchange of land use 
rights (Li, 1999: 56; Ho, 2005: 38-39). 
 
                                                 
9
 The Constitution of People Republic of China was amended four times since 
1949 (1954, 1966, 1975, and 1982). Each amendment has its own specific 
purpose. For example, the amendment in 1975 was with an aim to legitimize 
the People’s Commune movement and the Cultural Revolution. Not until the 
Constitution enacted in 1982 was the dichotomy of nationally owned land and 
collectively owned land being set up. It is defined in the Article 10 of the 
Constitution (before the amendments of Agrarian Law in 1988): “Urban land 
belongs to the state. Land in the countryside and in suburb area is under 
collective ownership unless the law stipulates that the land is state-owned. 
Moreover, housing base land and family plots, reserving the mountain for one's 
own use, belong to collective. No organization or individual is allowed to 
occupy, sell, lease or illegally transfer land in any way.” 
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Secondly, in the economic reform process, a great deal of ambiguity in the 
land-related institution is intentionally sustained by Chinese central leadership. As 
Ho (2001, 2005) argues, by formulating unclear policies and laws, the institutional 
ambiguity is assumed by the central government to give spaces for political 
manoeuvre to control the potential property conflicts in the reform process, 
especially those conflicting claims to land by various collectives (the natural 
village/villagers’ group, administrative village, and township/town) which would 
rise disproportionally in the course of socio-economic and legal development. It 
also provides grounds for trial and error grassroots experiments by local initiatives, 
especially local grassroots cadres who can avoid the confrontation with power 
centres in Beijing (also see Harvey, 2005a). This institution ambiguity leads to the 
vague definition of the collective ownership in law. In the Revised Land 
Administration Law, the “collective economic organization”, “villagers’ 
committee”, and “villager’s group” are three keywords for the entitlement of the 
right of management and administration of land, with “Farmers collective” as a 
keyword for the entitlement of land ownership. However, “farmers collective” is 
de facto a vague term. It is unclear which organization actually represents the 
“collectives”. There is no law that makes clear whether the institutions that 
manage and administer land also hold ownership either. 
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Thirdly, citizenship in China has been concentrated more on substantive 
issues of welfare entitlements than on formal citizenship which emphasizes formal 
rights of freedom of expression (Twohey, 1999; Keane, 2001; Tuner, 2001; Smart 
and Smart, 2001). Citizenship requirements obviously obstruct people’s 
movement in China. There are institutional constraints on mobility. Because of the 
peculiarities imposed by the hukou system, rights to citizenship are provided in 
part by provinces or even cities rather than by the national government. Access to 
certain forms of welfare benefits, including medical care, low-cost college tuition, 
public housing and unemployment compensation are often contingent on 
satisfying residence rules. Rapid development has enhanced social welfare, but 
only those able to claim indigenous status possess the full citizenship rights that 
allow access to these enhanced entitlements. Welfare benefits are elaborated for 
the locally born while excluding migrants. This makes citizenship a concept with 
multiple levels and limitations, rather than an all-or-none situation (Faist, 2000; 
Isin, 1992; Ong, 1999). Welfare and economic policies discriminate between 
citizens according to their geographical and workplace affiliations, resulting in 
intense inequalities in entitlement between urban and rural residents (Solinger, 
1999a; Zhang, 2001).  
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Whereas the inferior status of rural residents during the reform era has 
labelled them as “secondary citizens” in Chinese society (Zheng, 2005), the 
pattern of inclusion, exclusion, and redistribution is labelled by some researchers 
as “local citizenship” (Smart and Smart, 2001; Smart and Lin, 2007). The idea of 
“local citizenship” combines recognition of the way in which China’s distinctive 
system of household registration, with the collectivist/exclusivist elements of the 
key social institutions of the danwei (enterprise) and the village, and produces a 
system in which entitlements of citizenship are determined locally (Smart and Lin, 
2007: 286). It sees processes of belonging, entitlement, and exclusion as 
accomplished locally rather than through a national-level framework, with one 
result being exacerbation of local differences and inequalities (Smart and Lin, 
2007: 281). Entitlement and exclusion from citizenship rights have clearly been 
determined by local institutions and practices (Smart and Lin, 2007: 294). From 
this point of view, permitting spatial mobility for peasant migrants without the full 
rights of urban citizenship results in them becoming second-class citizens (Smart 
and Smart, 2001:1867). 
 
While a certain degree of experimentation by local cadres is allowed, the 
retained institution of communal property as the foundation for land use leads to 
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a great deal of ambiguities about the officially condoned land-tenure 
arrangements. In the participation structure of the urban-villages regeneration, 
migrants are explicitly excluded from the enhanced redistribution; those who are 
villagers are eligible to participate in decision-making, since land-tenure 
arrangements are linked tightly to local citizenship. However, this is these very 
ambiguities of land-tenure arrangements resulting in a great deal of confusion 
about who should benefit, who should take responsibility, who has power, who 
should be identified to be empowered, and to what degree.  
 
1.4 Neoliberal Spaces and the Spaces of Neoliberalization. 
Scholars are fascinated, if not entranced, by the phenomenon of the 
urban-villages partly because its scale is completely out of proportion to anything 
remotely considered "human" scale. Its issues cut across different disciplines. It 
concerns hundreds of thousands of urban-village dwellers and migrants directly – 
and it indirectly concerns all the local and national economies and societies in 
which the urban-villages exist. This issue has prompted discussions of quite 
diverse questions. Some address, for example, the question of the land-use 
patterns and living conditions of these settlements by the physical settings (Wei, 
2000; Zhu and Gao, 2001), the conflicts with current planning procedures (Li, 
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2008), or the changes in social structure (Lan, 2005; Li, 2004). These differences 
are simply permutations on a more general theme – stressing, for example, the 
comparison between the urban-villages in China and physically similar 
phenomena (such as slums) in other countries – an approach grounded in the 
literatures explored herein would stress the specificity and “uniqueness” of the 
subject matter.  
 
The analytical treatment of differentiation and its depictions of the 
urban-villages and their spatial patterns have continued to prove immensely 
appealing, in part because they seem so readily to make sense of social reality. Yet 
their common flaw is that “they have tended to naturalize and exogenize their 
object of study – be this in the form of an all-powerful globalization process or the 
all encompassing politics of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 383).” In their 
analyses, these approaches use “language to perpetuate and expand the existing 
inequality, without challenging the underlying social structures and institutions 
that construct them and reproduce them (Gounari, 2006: 90).” They distance 
themselves from discursive issues of social transformation and ignore that the 
problematic is a mix of the analysis of language texts, discourse practices, and 
discursive events, or, as Fairclough (2005b: 76) said, “to give accounts of the 
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ways in which the extent to which social changes are changed in discourses, and 
the relation between changes in discourse and changes in other, non-discursive, 
elements or ‘moments’ of social life (including therefore the question of the 
senses and ways in which discourse ‘(re)constructs’ social life in processes of 
social change).”  
 
Though the social sense of the term “urban-village” has been developed in 
academia, the tendency to see the issue in literary rather than political terms is still 
pronouncing. While empirical analysis was offered as the sole way of doing so, 
the urban-villages and their conditions (or problems) were adopted as objective 
facts to be discovered rather than pathological causalities to be constructed. Most 
researchers and analysts generally give too little thought to the possibility that the 
urban-villages and their larger city-region might be negotiated understandings; 
that the real issue and the most perplexing problem might be contingent on how 
we represent “the data” (cf. Beauregard, 1993). If so far in the established 
academics the emphasis is on the spatial metaphor to represent the phenomenon 
rather than on the “urban-village” as a social construct, then this is as it should be. 
If not, moving the researchers to the centre of the stage, and pushing the 
assumptions that underpin their empirical endeavour to the forefront of analysis 
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pose an implication of a “discursive turn” which shifts the emphasis of the study 
of the phenomenon of the urban-villages per se to the highlight of this study 
recognized as a social phenomenon in its own right and turns attention to matters 
of epistemology and ontology. In terms of this, can it be argued that the 
emergence of the urban-villages in China is integral to these emerging discourses 
of urban change in the PRD that are de facto a set of constructive activities of 
whose who declare the urban villages to be a problem and seek to propagate, first 
and foremost, large-scale property-led regeneration? 
 
Harrison and Livingstone (1980: 25) have constructed a comprehensive 
conceptual framework for viewing “the pervasive influence of presuppositions in 
all scientific and philosophical thought” with special reference to geography. 
From their framework, the academic research and discourses of the urban-village 
is a “problem cycle”. Having stated their commitment to “changing the world” 
through an interdisciplinary approach to social problems, the urban-village is 
perceived to be a problem only in the light of the investigator’s presuppositions 
and subsequent orientations. The problem is formulated and then evaluated as to 
its significance. For the investigator to conclude eventually that a solution to the 
problem has been found involves an evaluation just as much as does the decision 
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that the problem exists. And, as Harrison and Livingstone point out: “recognizing 
that the perception, formulation, evaluation and solution of problems are stages in 
an attempted reorientation of social patterns to some desired suture state, any 
proposed solution is more a reflection of the way of looking at reality than of 
reality itself (Ibid. 29).  
 
Associating with the neo-Foucauldian literature on governmentality, the 
literature of post-structuralist theorization of neoliberalism makes a useful 
distinction between government and governance, and it is this distinction itself 
that becomes an object of study. It argues that while neoliberalism may mean less 
government, it does not follow that there is less governance. Rather, it is 
characterized by developing indirect techniques for leading and controlling 
individuals without at the same time being responsible for them. While 
neoliberalism problematizes the state and is concerned to specify its limits 
through the invocation of individual choice, it involves forms of governance that 
encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market 
(Barry et al., 1996; Burchell et al., 1991; Rose, 1999; Larner, 2000; Lemke, 2001). 
The theoretical strength of the concept of governmentality consists of the fact that 
it construes neo-liberalism not just as ideological rhetoric, as a set of free-market 
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economic policies or a political-economic reality that dismantle the institutions of 
welfare states, but above all as a specific form of “political rationality”, a specific 
kind of “normative political reason that organizes the political sphere, government 
practices, and citizenship (Brown, 2006: 693).” It not only aims to govern society 
in the name of the economy, but also actively creates institutions that work to 
naturalize the extension of market rationality to all registers of political and social 
life. It is in this social-spatial account of neoliberalism that the material 
transformations are not understood as the Neoliberal Real, but rather as spatially 
embedded strategies by which neoliberalism – as a constructivist political 
project – endeavours to create the a social reality it claims already exists. 
 
It is in this post-structuralist theorization of neoliberalism that the concealed 
double link between neoliberal spaces and the spaces of neoliberalization has been 
identified as the internal logic at the heart of the neoliberalism and 
neoliberalization of cities (e.g., Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001; Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Dikec, 2007b; Leitner et al., 2007; Addie, 
2008; Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; see especially Clarke, 2008). Neoliberal 
space is based on the premise that neoliberalism has a spatial dimension to it, and 
that one can observe and analyze various forms of neoliberalism manifested in 
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space. Spaces of neoliberalization shift focus from the spatial manifestations of 
neoliberalism to structural dynamics that produce and reproduce the ideology of 
neoliberalism through space. Different from neoliberal space, which refers to the 
spatial effects or consequences of neoliberalism, spaces of neoliberalization refer 
to the more active neoliberal (de- and re-)articulation/appropriation of a 
pre-existing site, process, or practice – the “neoliberalization of things” (Clarke, 
2008: 139) which involves with the “internal” (re)composition (innovative ways 
of thinking and doing, with new ways of ordering, legitimating, and exercising 
power) and their “external” (re)configuration with other institutions, policies, and 
politics, in particular neoliberal conceptions of urban space which renders 
individual subjects and collectives ”responsible” (Bennett, 1998; Peck, 2001), the 
“neoliberal understandings and representations of the urban deprived, e.g. the 
form and function of the inner city, which do much to discursively naturalise this 
class project, as well as the mechanisms and outcomes of social exclusion (Addie, 
2008: 2689)”, and the “transformation in local governance which have been 
enabled and legitimized through a set of legal changes wrapped in neoliberal 
languages (Candan et al., 2008: 12)”. 
 
In light of Foucauldian social theory, which has attempted to go beyond 
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studying policy merely in terms of an unproblematic ‘tool’ to be employed to 
address ‘given’ problems (see, among others, Rose and Miller 1992; Hajer, 1995; 
Osborne and Rose, 1999; Atkinson, 2000; Cochrane, 2000; Raco and Imrie, 2000; 
Lemke, 2001; Griggs and Howarth, 2002; Huxley, 2006; Dikec, 2007b), the 
urban-village problem is not self-evidently defined. Rather, it is constructed as a 
policy problem that is ipso facto part of the policymaking process. It is 
constructed in a particular way that is congruent with the activities of a dominant 
discourse coalition in which a story is told about its genesis that entails a 
“solution” which complements the existing thought and actions of the discourse 
coalition. In other words, what presents within the narrational genesis of a 
particular problem is an immanent solution which complements the story of how a 
problem was created and specifies answers to questions such as “Who is 
responsible? What can be done? What should be done?” (Hajer, 1993: 45) 
Following this, what is significant is how, and in what particular ways, the 
urban-village problem is constructed. This question involves asking why, how, 
and in what ways, the urban-village comes to be defined as a problem. As Stone 
(1989: 282) argues: “Problem definition is a process of image making, where the 
images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility. 
Conditions, difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent properties that make 
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them more or less likely to be seen as problems or to be expanded.”  
 
As a consequence, what is embedded to the derivative operational definitions 
of academic research, media rhetoric, and policy tools is in fact a process of what 
Rose and Miller (1992: 181-183) refer to as a “problematizing activity” of 
government which first makes the “problem” of the urban-villages “visible”, then 
“controllable”. It is engaged in an on-going process of “framing” to determine 
what goals are just, what means are legitimate, what counts as evidence, how 
contradictory information is interpreted, and how problems are defined; they 
therefore “guide actors down certain paths rather than others (Griggs and Howarth, 
2002: 106).” In this process, institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics amount to what Foucault (1991b) defines as 
“governmentality” – the production and management of the conduct of the others 
and of the self. For Foucault, governmentality refers to the rationalities and tactics 
of governing and how they become expressed in particular technologies and 
procedures for directing human behaviour (Foucault, 1997: 82).  
 
According to Rose and Miller (1992: 175-176), the problematics of 
government can be analyzed in terms of their intricate inter-dependencies between 
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political rationalities and governmental technologies. Political rationalities are 
“the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is 
conceptualized (ibid.: 175)”. They are characteristically moral, epistemological 
and idiomatic in form. As Rose and Miller (ibid.: 178-179) say: 
 
“[Political rationalities] elaborate upon the fitting powers and duties for 
authorities. They address the proper distribution of tasks and actions 
between authorities of different types. […] [and] consider the ideals or 
principles to which government should be directed - freedom, justice, 
equality, mutual responsibility, citizenship, common sense, economic 
efficiency, prosperity, growth, fairness, rationality and the like. […] 
[T]hey are articulated in relation to some conception of the nature of the 
objects governed – society, the nation, the population, the economy. In 
particular, they embody some account of the persons over whom 
government is to be exercised, such as flock to be led, legal subjects 
with rights, resources to be exploited, and elements of a population to 
be managed. […] [They] are articulated in a distinctive idiom […] a 
kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality 
thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations. […] 
Political rationalities […] are morally coloured, grounded upon 
knowledge, and made thinkable through language.” 
 
Governmental technologies mean the complex of mundane programmes, with 
modes of perception, practices of calculations, vocabularies, inscription 
techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures, forms of judgment, 
architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices. “It is 
through technologies that political rationalities and the programmes of 
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government that articulate them become capable of deployment (ibid.: 183).”  
 
The “urban-villages problem”, therefore, appears in Foucauldian analysis as 
“tactics of government, as a dynamic form and historical stabilisation of societal 
power relations” (Lemke, 2002: 58). It is characterised by particular ways “of 
thinking about the kinds of problems that can and should be addressed by various 
authorities (Miller and Rose, 1990: 2; Raco and Imrie, 2000: 2190; Lemke, 2001: 
191),” and particular ways “in which one conducts people’s conduct” (Foucault, 
1979: 192; in Senellart, 2007: 388). In this process, shared interests are 
constructed, common modes of perception are formed, in which certain events, 
issues, social groups, and entities come to be visualized/invisualized and 
included/excluded, deliberately or non-intentionally, according to particular 
rhetorics of image or speech; relations are established, in which problems of one 
and those of another seem intrinsically linked in their basis and their solution 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 184; Agger and Larsen, 2009: 1087). It is through this 
kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus that renders “reality thinkable in such 
a way that it is amenable to political deliberations (ibid. 179; also see Osborne and 
Rose 2004: 212)”. 
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While not denying that the reality of such phenomenon is socially constructed 
an urban problem, therefore, this thesis seeks to problematize this spatial 
conceptualization of the urban-village. By exploring the relation between the 
urban-villages which are problematized and the process of problematization, it 
questions what appears to be well-ordered, rational responsible, self-evident, and 
natural in order to show the selective format of these practices and the power 
effects inscribed in the regeneration of the urban-villages. Drawing upon the 
insights of governmentality studies in ways that not only “describe” the scale and 
form of the phenomenon of the urban-villages in China, but also highlight what 
Wacquant (2007) refers to as the creation of the “new stigmatizing topographic 
lexicon” that renders these neighbourhoods vulnerable to all interventions, this 
thesis highlights how the combination of ideological rhetoric, political economic 
restructuring, and integral, neoliberalized policy implementation not only has 
negative consequences for the material living conditions of the most marginalised, 
vulnerable areas and/or groups, but also fundamentally redefines their potential 
terrains of adaptation, resistance, and the ways of searching for alternatives 
(Addie, 2008: 2689; Sun, 2009: 157). By recovering excluded subjects and 
silenced voices, it reveals the hidden agendas behind the assumptions underlying 
this urban action. In doing so, it exposes the ways in which it reproduces and 
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exacerbates the phenomena it condemns. 
 
1.5 Research Questions and Chapter Outlines. 
It is in light of the above debates that this research is situated. There are three 
main research questions: First, in the context of the urban-villages regeneration 
controversy, what would the right to the city entail? How might it address the 
specific disenfranchisement problems of urban residents associated with this 
controversy? What benefits and dis-benefits it may have for the social and spatial 
structure of the city? Second, from a Foucauldian perspective, governmentality 
more properly refers to the process of governing itself, the “mentalities” of rule by 
which governing authorities seek to shape the conduct of diverse actors and 
agencies (Foucault, 1979, 1991; Raco and Imrie, 2000; Rose and Miller, 1992). 
While governmentality is argued to take a particular form under neoliberalism 
(Larner, 2000; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 1999), how is governmentality played out 
under a hybrid socialist-neoliberal form of political rationality, and specifically in 
the context of the urban-villages regeneration? For Foucault, governmentality also 
refers to the rationality that is immanent to the micro-powers, and the analysis of 
the types of governmentality is inseparable from the analysis of corresponding 
forms of resistance, or “counter-conducts” (Senellart, 2007: 389). This brings out 
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the third question: How, and in what ways, is the combination of ideological 
rhetoric, political economic restructuring, and integral, incrementally 
neoliberalized policy implementation redefining those who are rendered 
vulnerable and marginalized their potential terrains of adaptation, resistance, and 
the ways of searching for alternatives? 
 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Whereas Chapter One has outlined 
the phenomenon of the urban-villages in China, in relation to the contemporary 
restructuring of urban form, Chapter Two turns to a review of the specificity of 
urban development and the urban-village regeneration projects in Guangzhou. I 
describe the scale and form of the urban-villages, and the broader context within 
which urban policy programmes have emerged in relation to the “emergence” and 
development of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. It concludes by identifying and 
discussing the three specific relationships and/or processes that this thesis 
explores.  
 
Chapter Three sets out the research objectives and methods developed to 
examine the discourse and practices of the urban-villages regeneration in 
Guangzhou. By discussing the epistemological and methodological issues raised 
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in the research design, and the methodological choices and strategies that were 
involved in the research process as well as its philosophical underpinnings, this 
chapter justifies Foucauldian discourse analysis, and an ethnographic approach, 
for detailed analyses of this field-based research. A reflexive account of field 
experience and positioned subject is deployed to capture actively the contingent 
methods and research act. 
 
Chapter Four turns to my empirical investigation of the urban-villages in 
Guangzhou. It examines the discursive and structural conditions surrounding the 
“production” of governmental programmes of the urban-villages within a 
restructured and increasingly neoliberalized system. In seeking to understand the 
motivations, rationales, and mechanisms of the authorities underpinning the 
articulation of the urban-villages regeneration, it explores the shaping of this 
discourse, and considers the ways in which it has led to a specific planning and 
policy approach towards the urban-villages. This focus leads to an inverted 
question concerning the system of categorization or “rationality” that has been 
pursued and mobilized to make sense of the phenomenon of the urban-villages 
and frame the urban-villages problem. 
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Chapter Five seeks to understand the form of the governance of the 
urban-villages regeneration in Guangzhou. This chapter has three objectives. First, 
it outlines and evaluates the process of the implementation of the institutional 
reform policy of the urban-villages and its associated rationale and policy 
formation problems. Second, it discusses the form of the village governance 
shaped by this policy and the dynamics that have accompanied the 
implementation of this policy. Third, it examines the characteristic/nature of the 
governing coalition shaped by the institutional reform policy in the landscape of 
Guangzhou’s urban-villages regeneration. The forms of conduct and body 
techniques are analyzed in this chapter for the ways they are shaped and give 
shape to the outcome of the implementation of the institutional reform policy of 
the urban-villages. 
 
Chapter Six shifts the focus away from the transformation of formal 
institutions based on the construction of marginality identities by a dominant 
interest group, to local residents’ self-narratives in relation to neoliberal discourses. 
Evidenced by the presence of Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers, this chapter 
examines a range of practices that I characterize as “present-oriented strategies”, 
and considers the ways these practices, in the form of marginal resistance, work as 
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counter-conducts to the governmental regeneration of the urban-villages. In 
dialogue with theoretical perspectives derived from public choice, this chapter 
concludes by arguing that local residents’ marginal resistances are not as 
powerless as has often been suggested by the dominant society. Rather, it enacts a 
process of subjectification that moulds people into certain sorts of economic 
subjects. It is this neoliberal subjectification that flattens a deeper more difficult 
question of who should be identified to be empowered, who should participate, 
and to what degree, in decision making. 
 
Chapter Seven concludes this thesis by re-visiting the three research questions 
laid out in Chapter One, about the right to the city, governance, and citizenship, 
relating to the urbanism with Chinese characteristics, and addressing how the 
empirical findings add to our conceptual understandings of the diverse and 
contingent nature of urban neoliberalization and neoliberal governmentality. In 
doing so, it suggests additional and/or alternative mechanisms or instruments for 
social intervention and engagement, and outlining some practical possibilities for 
emancipatory forms of urban renewal and change. 
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Chapter Two 
Narrating the Development of the Urban-Villages in Guangzhou. 
 
“While we inhibit a world of programmes, that world is not itself 
programmed (Miller and Rose, 1992: 191).” 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
In Chapter One, I outlined the phenomenon of the urban-villages in China, in 
relation to the contemporary restructuring of urban form. On a closer inspection it 
turns out that what is at issue is the larger city-region and not simply the 
urban-villages per se. In other word, the question of interest is “a form of 
spatialization that renders certain areas and their inhabitants socio-economically 
and politically vulnerable (Dikeç, 2002: 92).” In short, the phenomenon of the 
urban-villages in China needs to be understood within the broader social, 
economic and political processes of change within which these villages are 
situated. More specifically, it needs to be understood within the context of China’s 
economic reform and urban restructuring in which the nascent and/or changing 
urban development and planning are tending towards market-oriented operations 
and an increasingly neoliberalized system. In Chapter Two, I will contextualize 
this by focusing on the specificity of the urban development and the urban-village 




This chapter describes the broader context within which urban policy 
programmes have emerged in relation to the development of the urban-villages in 
Guangzhou. With a special focus on Tianhe District – the new city centre of 
Guangzhou since 1984 – I provide a “narrative” to the specific contingency of the 
development of the urban-villages in Guangzhou, from 1976 up to the 
regeneration of Leide Village in 2007 – the first governmental project that, under 
the banner of “urban-village regeneration”, has successfully moved from proposal 
to construction. Tianhe District is a high profile example of a location that has 
grown rapidly since the 1990s. The policies towards the urban-villages in 
Guangzhou are based on the pathological understanding of the urban-villages in 
Tianhe District. The policies of the urban-villages in other cities in China also 
“emulate” the policies in Guangzhou (see Po, 2011). Therefore, it can be said that 
Tianhe District stands as a valuable case for the study of the development of the 
urban-villages in China, pushing trends found elsewhere to their limits.  
 
The remainder of this chapter has four sections. The first section opens with a 
historical context of development of Yangji Village, from a poverty-stricken 
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village at the fringe of Tianhe District to a “billionaire village” in the CBD, as a 
way to bring out a narrative to describe how the fragmented urban landscape of 
Guangzhou, pulled between development-led planning and planning-led 
development, sparked off the development of the urban-villages. The second 
section outlines the more general public discourses and practices that have 
underpinned the articulation of the urban-villages regeneration, and examines the 
local agendas and imaginations and wider socio-economic processes of change 
within which such articulation was situated. The third section discusses the crises, 
contradictions, and tensions both external to the project itself and internal in this 
project. The fourth section concludes by identifying the specific relationships 
and/or processes that this thesis explores. 
 
2.2 “Villages in the City, the City in Villages”: the Dilemma of 
Development-Led Planning and Planning-Led Development. 
Guangdong Province has experienced intense migration and rapid economic 
development (Johnston, 1998; Fan, 1999; Li, 2000; Siu, 2007). According to an 
official estimate in 2002, the mobile population reached 120 million, of which 
42.42 million crossed provincial boundaries. The provinces with the largest 
population outflows were Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei (see 
73 
figure 2.1). The provinces with the most inflows were Guangdong (35.5 percent), 
Beijing (5.8 percent), and Fujian (5.1 percent). Guangdong’s net interprovincial 
migration in the 1990 Census was “fifty times the average of all provinces, and 
its intra-provincial migration accounted for almost 12 percent of the total in 
China (Fan, 1999: 973).” City-regions in the Pearl River Delta are characterized 
by an extraordinarily large volume of migrant population who often outnumber 
the local population by several times. Unlike Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 
which requires special permits to enter (Smart and Smart, 2001), Guangzhou, 
referred to as “the Fifth Dragon” and “Red Capitalism” (Sung et al., 1995; Lin, 
1997), has drawn more migrants, especially non-document migrants from poorer 
provinces and poorer parts of Guangdong (see figure 2.2). 
 
The prediction of the Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau for the total amount 
of urban land use in 2010 is based on an estimated 4.08 million permanent urban 
residents and 1.5 million floating population
10
. The assumed per capita urban 
                                                 
10
 The other aspect, linked to the fast urban development, is the increase in the 
permanent and floating population. The number of permanent residents grew 
by nearly one million between 1988 and 1998 (1988: 5.77 million; 1998: 6.74 
million) – almost exclusively limited to the population with an urban hukou, 
that increased from 3.26 million to 4.17 million (Guangzhou Statistical 
Yearbook, 1989 to 1999). While the number stood at around 0.5 million in 1984, 
it was 1.17 million in 1988 and 1.3 million in 1989 (Chan, 1996; Chan and Gu, 
1996). […] According to the Public Security Bureau, 1.268 million temporary 
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land use is 90 m
2 
for permanent residents and 70 m
2 
for transient inhabitants (Xu, 
1999: 133). In 1998, Guangzhou had eight districts and four county-level 
municipalities. In 2000, Guangzhou annexed Panyu County and Huadu County as 





. In 2005, after Rogan and Nanxia, the two national-level economic 
and technological development zones, were integrated as two districts in 
Guangzhou, the total area of Guangzhou became 7434.4 km
2
 (see figure 2.3).  
 











                                                                                                                                     
residents were registered in Guangzhou at the end of 1999, while the total 
floating population was estimated at 2 million (Guo et al., 1999). Another 
source calculates the weilai renkou (population in the future) in Guangzhou’s 
urban districts at 1.8 million. The ratio between registered temporary residents 
and those without any registration is very difficult to assess. A sample survey 
carried out in 8 urban districts revealed that only 45.5 percent of the transient 
population had a proper registration. If we use the data given by the Public 
































In managing to find its own way to strengthen competitiveness and meet the 
challenges of its rivals domestically and internationally, the development of 
Guangzhou, and its reconstruction of space, has been constructed in a piecemeal 
fashion, with its mushrooming of large-scale image projects dotting the landscape 
of Guangzhou. The planning of the land adjacent or surrounding to the large-scale 
urban development projects was vacant. This resulted in a fragmented urban 
fabric posing a stark contrast between the urban and the rural, the old and the new. 
This fragmented urban landscape of Guangzhou, characterized by Taubmann 
(2002: 80) as a “development-led planning rather than a planning-led 
development”, can be illustrated by “villages in the city, the city in villages”, the 
motif of the development of the Pearl River New Town (PRNT) – the CBD of 
Guangzhou in Tianhe District. This section provides a narrative to describe how 
the fragmented urban landscape of Guangzhou is pulled between 
development-led planning and planning-led development. Before doing this, 
however, a brief explanation about the historically and geographically specific 
institutions of the villages in Guangzhou might be helpful to provide some 
background. 
 
In January 2008, in her living room at the top floor of a 33-storey residential 
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tower in the Pearl River New Town, the CBD of Guangzhou, which is about 5 to 
10 minutes away from the 960-year-old Yangji Village, Mrs. Chang Jianghao, the 
leader of Yangji Village, recalled in interview: 
 
‘I burst into tears when I got the village’s bank statement from the old 
village leader. There was only 105 RMB (about 7 pounds) in the savings 
account. It was 1976, the year when I became the new village leader. It 
was also the year though the Cultural Revolution had ended, people 
were still wary of not being criticized as politically incorrect and 
denounced in public for their wrong political ideology. […] The 
People’s Commune reduced people’s work incentives. The only way to 
invoke people’s willingness to work was to implement the household 
responsibility system, which we had once implemented in 1965. 
However, it was ideologically seen as capitalist and hence not 
politically correct. It was criticized and banned. After that, no one dared 
think about the household responsibility system. […] I had to do 
something if I didn’t want my villagers to starve to death. I had to do 
something to improve my villagers’ lives. In early 1978, I went to the 
party secretary of the district government. With his support, I started to 
implement the household responsibility system secretly in our village. 
[…] After five months, it came to the notice of an officer in the higher 
level government. He said: “How dare you follow Liu Shaoqi’s 
capitalist route?” I was criticized. Nevertheless, six months later, the 
central government in Beijing admitted that the household responsibility 
system was politically correct. All the villages in China were 
encouraged to employ it. And I was hailed as a role model for other 
village leaders to follow
11.’ 
 
Owing to the major institutional and policy changes which accompanied the 
Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune launched by Mao Zhedong 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Chang Jianghao on 22
nd
 April 2007. 
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(State Chairman of the CCP), the Great Chinese Famine (officially referred to as 
the Three Years of Natural Disasters) occurred in 1958 and continued to 1961
12
. 
Due to this catastrophe, Mao Zhedong stepped down from his position, and was 
replaced by the First Vice Chairman of the CCP, Liu Shaoqi. Together with Deng 
Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi was put in charge of economic recovery. One of the main 
policies for them to deal with the famine was the household responsibility system 
(HRS). Literally, the "responsibility" means that an individual household, or a set 
of households, assumes the task of production for, and payment to, the state. 
Under the HRS, village collectives function like a contractor who sub-contracts 
the land to individual households for a period of time (it may be any number of 
years or, in principle, it may be in perpetuity). After fulfilling the procurement, 
quota obligations, or submitting the taxes, peasants are entitled to sell their 
surplus on the markets or retain it for their own use. Peasants become residual 
claimants (Lin, 1990; Chen, 1997). 
 
                                                 
12
 Whereas the Chinese government in the early 1980s stated that the 15 million 
excess deaths in the famine was largely a result of a series of natural disasters 
with some policy mistakes, unofficial documents, especially those outside 
china, recognized a considerably much higher number of death (36 million) 
was caused by mismanagement, especially the massive institutional and policy 
changes which accompanied the Great Leap Forward. See Lyman et al., 1997; 
Demeny and McNicoll, (eds.), 2003. 
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While Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping implemented the HRS policy, Mao 
Zhedong rejected the proposed reforms, accusing these leaders of encouraging 
capitalist initiatives and widening the gap between the rich and the poor among 
Chinese farmers. Mao Zhedong rebuilt his position in the Party by the mid 1960s 
and launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 as a means of destroying his 
enemies in the Party. Despite the fact that Deng and Liu advocated more 
pragmatic policies, they were seen as a challenge to Mao's power and radical 
ideas, and for that reason, Liu fell from political favour, and was purged during 
the Cultural Revolution. He and Deng, along with many others, were denounced 
as "capitalist roaders", and Liu was further labelled as a "traitor," and the “biggest 
capitalist roader in the Party." The HRS was seen as a capitalist initiative and 
banned in 1965 because it was, though scrupulously avoiding the word "private", 
de facto equivalent to the granting of private property rights through a state lease 
of land and was contradictory to the ideology of the Communist Party. The HRS 
re-emerged when Deng Xiaoping regained power in 1978 and Liu Shaoqi was 
politically rehabilitated (in February 1980). At this time, the HRS was still 
politically seen as a taboo. However, at the Third Plenum of the 11
th
 Central 
Committee of the CPC, in December 1978, which marked the commencement of 
China’s reform, the HRS was normalized by the State Council as “a great 
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invention of Chinese peasants and still insisting on the socialist modernization 
with Chinese characteristic (Deng Xiaoping, 1980).” It was soon implemented in 
villages all over China (see figure 2.4). 
 
The brief history of the HRS described above and the process of the 
re-employment of this system in the villages in Guangzhou, which will be 
described below, are very germane to the understanding of the urban development 
and the development of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. In the early 1980s, 
Yangji village was 30 minutes away from the “city centre” by tricycle – the main 
transportation for villagers. Except for the housing base land for villagers to build 
their own houses, Yangji Village had 2260 mu of arable land. Almost every 
villager was a farmer. The implementation of the HRS gradually changed 
villagers from farmers to shoemakers or workers in construction sites and other 
factories. The HRS improved villagers’ living standards and facilitated Yangji 
villagers’ committee with the ability to improve social welfare and public 
infrastructure which were not funded from the government. It also triggered 
physical changes in which the arable land of Yangji Village was replaced by 
agribusinesses and light industries, e.g. shoe factories, textile factories, and 
warehouses. 
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Chronology of Land Collectivization 
 
1949 The founding of the People’s 
Republic of China 
1950 Agrarian revolution: those who 
farmed were given their own 
private land. 
 
1954 “The right of private land is 
protected by law” was written in 
the Constitution. 
 
1958 People’s commune movement: the 
lands of villages were 
collectivized in this radically 
collective period. 
 
1962 The collectivization of land was 
institutionalized.  
 
1978 The emergence of the HRS: it was 
a secret/informal/illegal contract 
signed by 18 peasants in secrecy. 
 
1980 The HRS was admitted with 
socialist characteristic and 
promoted politically everywhere 
in China. 
 
1982 The publicization of land: In the 
Constitution in 1982, all the 
lands in China were classified 
into two categories: nationally 
owned land and collectively 
owned land. 
 
1983 The sentence of “HRS is, under 
the leading of the C.C.P., a great 
invention of Chinese peasants” 
was written in “Some issues 
about the contemporary 
economic policy of villages.” 
 
1984 The term “township and village 
enterprise (TVE)” emerged. In 
this year, the villages in 
Guangzhou adopted the HRS. 
 
1992 Township enterprise was exalted 
by Lee Pong, leader of the 
C.C.P., as “a great invention by 
Chinese peasants.” 
 
This photo was taken in 1954. The paper on 
the wall is a certificate of a privately owned 
land. The certification was enacted in 1951, 
the year of agrarian revolution. Only three 
years after, everything was collectivized, 
including lands. 
 
Photo courtesy Chang Zhudo 
 
This photo, taken in 1980, is an abandoned 
office of the people’s commune in 
Guangzhou. It was the moment shortly 
after the collapse of the People’s Commune. 
 




The physical change was further reinforced when the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government in 1984 made a comprehensive plan to gradually shift the city centre 
toward the east. Following the comprehensive plan, in 1985, Shahe Town was 
abolished at the east of the original city centre and the 147.8 km
2 
Tianhe District 
was founded, and several subprojects were made to accelerate the development of 
the new city centre. Except for the infrastructure, e.g. the 45 metres wide 
Guangzhou Avenue and Zhongshan Avenue, the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government postponed all the building permission approvals in other 
administrative districts and attracted private investments by public building 
projects such as Guangzhou East Train Station and Tianhe Sport Centre, the main 
venue of the Sixth China National Games.  
 
The arable land plots of Yangji Village were soon expropriated by the 
authorities, e.g. military, government, school, and state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
because of its privileged geographic location in-between the old city centre and 
the newly founded city centre. The compensation was paid in different ways, with 
different prices. Except for the small amount of crop fee compensation, those 
villagers, whose arable land plots were expropriated, were allowed to enjoy better 
social welfare by converting their hukou from agricultural to non-agricultural and 
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find a better job by changing the place of regular hukou registration from 
villagers’ committee to SOEs. As for the land subsidy compensation, it was 
ideologically seen as collectively owned and hence paid to the villagers’ 
committee and village economic entities. 
 
While Yangji Village was still poor in the early 1980s, the expropriation 
made more than 3000 out of 4800 Yangji villagers convert their hukou from 
agricultural to non-agricultural and change the place of regular hukou registration 
from the villagers’ committee to the SOEs. Nevertheless, when Yangji Village’s 
2860 mu arable land was expropriated with a total compensation fee of 40 million 
RMB, those ex-villagers who converted their hukou thought it was their 
entitlement to share the compensation since the money was in exchange for the 
arable land and was ideologically seen as inherited property collectively owned 
by the entire village. This substantial compensation fee not only whipped up 
demands by ex-villagers to change their non-agricultural hukou back to 
agricultural, in order to be eligible to share the compensation, but also caused 
disputes over the ownership of collectively owned land, which since 1954 has 
been kept intentionally ambiguous and vague by the state.  
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In 1987 a group of pre-agricultural hukou villagers squabbled in front of the 
villagers’ committee over what they considered to be “their fair share”: ‘We 
created this large fortune. But who owns it? It doesn’t belong to the State, 
because we are not a state owned enterprise, we are a collective owned 
cooperative. Does it belong to the street office, the government, or villagers
13?’ 
Likewise, another villager said: ‘One always says that it belongs to all people. In 
fact, this means it belongs to no one! We always say that it belongs to the 
collective. But what do you mean by the collective? How many people, and who 
are these people
14?’ Instead of accepting villagers’ suggestions to distribute the 
compensation to them directly (each villager could get around 8000 RMB), 
Chang Jianghao took a different tack by pioneering the employment of the 
joint-stock system (JSS). Such a system was established in the same year based 
on the six disbanded production brigades and production teams of Yangji Village, 
which were formerly the basic accounting and farm production units in the 
People’s Commune system before 1980. These cooperatives were aiming to 
manage the collective assets and the villagers became shareholders. 
 
The employment of the JSS drew attention to a group of investigators from 
                                                 
13
 Interview with the previous head of Tianhe district on 3
rd




central government in Beijing who a couple of months later in 1987 came to 
probe the employment of the JSS in Yangji Village, for they presumed that the 
JSS touched on the politically forbidden issue of privatization. The purpose of the 
investigation was to find out whether or not this practice was privatizing 
collective property and transgressed the Communist Party’s political ideology. 
Chang Jianghao explained to the Policy Research Institute of the Secretariat of 
the Central Committee in 1987: “Why do we have to employ the JSS? First, it is 
still not clear that who owns the collective properties, and the JSS is a way to 
solve this problem. Second, it can solve the disputes of the villagers with the 
non-agricultural hukou
15.” Six months later, the JSS, together with the HRS, was 
normalized by the State Council as “township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
policy” and began to be implemented in other villages. 
 
With the successful implementation of the HRS and the JSS, Chang Jianghao 
became the representative of the People’s Congress of Guangdong Province in 
1989. In 1991, Yangji Village became the first village in Tianhe District which 
made a profit of one hundred million RMB per year. “Billionaire village” was the 
nickname of Yangji Village in the 1990s. The village’s joint-stock system 
                                                 
15
 Interview with Chang Jianghao on 22
nd
 April 2007. 
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cooperatives, under the umbrella of the central government’s TVEs policy16, 
running the business of hotels, factories, warehouses, parking lots, gas stations, 
restaurants, and commercial housings, had made the village’s fixed assets 
increase from 600 million RMB to 700 million RMB, and was further increased 
to 900 million RMB in 2007. Each villager, i.e. shareholder, can draw a dividend 
from the collective-owned property to the sum of a hundred thousand RMB per 
year. Yangji Cooperative not only ran businesses in Tianhe District, but also 
expanded their business to other districts in Guangzhou such as Zhengcheng 
District and Panyu District . However, the land expropriation in 1978, 1980, and 
1984, made Yangji Village’s arable land shrink dramatically from 2860 mu (1.9 
km
2
) to 600 mu (0.4 km
2
). In 1992, the rest of the land was further expropriated 
for the site of the Pearl River New Town (PRNT). Since then, Yangji Village has 
become a village without arable land, with only 0.29 km
2 
housing based land 
(HBL) left for dwelling and collective use (see figure 2.5, table 2.1).  
 
                                                 
16
 TVEs policy was to promote the development of agribusinesses. However, 
with the state’s intention to connive, most of the developments have nothing to 
do with the primary sectors, but the more lucrative secondary and tertiary 
sectors. 
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Table 2.1 List of land expropriation of Tangdong Village, Tianhe District, 
Guangzhou. 
 
(Source: History of Tangdong Village, 2006, pp. 18-19) 
 
Year Authority area (m
2
) Purpose 
1958 Guangzhou Municipal Government 49950 Site for Guangzhou Monofilament Fabric Plant 
1958 Guangzhou Municipal Government 106560 Site for Chemical Fertilizer Plant 
1960 Guangzhou Municipal Government 16650 Site for Guangdong Robber Plant 
1960 Guangzhou Power Supply Bureau 799.2 Site for Tianxia Electric Substation 
1960 Guangzhou Chemical Fertilizer Plant 25308 Site for Railways 
1961 Pearl River Paper Mill 43290 Site for Pearl River Paper Mill 
1974 Guangzhou Power Supply Bureau 13320 Site for Guangzhou Power Supply Company 
1975 Guangzhou Monofilament Fabric Plant 17316 Extension of the plant 
1975 Guangzhou Chemical Fertilizer Plant 47952 Extension of plant 
1978 Guangzhou Power Supply Bureau 999 Site for power transmission facilities 
1985 Chinese People’s Armed Police Corps 46620 Site for Barrack 
1986 Office of Road Construction, Guangzhou 16650 Widening of Zhongshan Road 
1987 Guangzhou Ink Factory 9990 Site for factory 
1991 Guangzhou Freeway Co. Ltd. 76590 Site for North Ring Expressway 
1992 Guangzhou Freeway Co. Ltd. 23310 Site for North Ring Expressway Toll Gate 
1993 Guangzhou Urban Development Co. 156510 Site for real estate development 
1993 Office of Anti-Poverty, Guangzhou 176490 Site for “Tangde Garden” Community 
1993 
Tianhe Development Zone for New and High 
Technology Industries Co. Ltd. 
277722 Site for “Jungjing Garden” Community 
1994 Guangshen Railway Co., Ltd. 97236 Site for Residentials 
1994 Guangdong People’s Procuratorate  18648 Site for domitory 
1994 Guangzhou People’s Procuratorate 10656 Site for domitory 
1994 Office of Road Construction, Guangzhou 89910 Site for resettlement 
1995 Bureau of Civil Affairs, Tianhe District Government 16650 Site for welfare enterprise 
1995 Dongshan Department Store 7992 Site for warehouses 
1997 State Land Bureau, Tianhe District Government 43290 Site for Guangyuan East Road 
1997 State Land Bureau, Tianhe District Government 7992 Widening of Zhongshan Road 
2002 Pearl River Invest Enterprise 73260 Site for real estate development 
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Not only Yangji Village but also another 27 villages in Tianhe District have 
gone through such an expropriation process. In particular, the 6.19 km
2 
site of the 
PRNT was mainly expropriated from the lands of seven villages (Leide Village, 
Tang Village, Xian Village, Yangji Village, Pearl River Village, Xinching Village, 
and Jiaziyuan Village) in 1992 with the average price of 180000 RMB per mu 
(2700 RMB per m
2
, 1 mu equals 667 m
2
). Inter alia, three villages (Pearl River 
Village, Xinching Village, and Jiaziyuan Village) were requisitioned entirely, 
Territory before the 1980s 
 
Territory after the 1980s 




including arable land and housing base land, whereas the 0.522 km
2
 HBL of 
Leide Village, Tang Village, and Xian Village, were retained in the 1992 PRNT 
plan (see figure 2.6). 
 






















The PRNT was a plan following the central government’s policy in the mid 
1980s which, after the development of the five special economic zones (SEAs) in 
the coastal cities in 1978/80, i.e. Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan 
Island, expanded the SEA program to attract more foreign direct investment and 
foster economic development. Together with Beijing and Shanghai, the 
Guangzhou Municipal government in 1992 proposed the concept of “international 
metropolitan Guangzhou” and promulgated “Guangzhou New City Centre: 
Planning of the Pearl River New Town” in June, 1993. The PRNT was seen by the 
government as the central business district (CBD) of Guangzhou in the 21
st
 
century able to attract headquarters of multinational corporations. With the 
government’s investment (4.5 billion RMB from 1992 to 2000) in its 
infrastructure facilities and land servicing, this plan, which followed the 
“place-making” or “place-promotion” strategy17, played a practical and symbolic 
role to attract a population of 170,000 to 180,000 and add 300,000 to 400,000 job 
opportunities. Its overall floor space was 13 million m
2
 (30% for residential; 70% 
for commercial, financial, and recreational). 
 
The plan of the PRNT was made by Carol Thomas Planning Consultancy in 
                                                 
17
 About “place-making” or “place-promotion” strategy, see Lin, 2007. 
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Boston, Liang Bo-Sho Architectural Office in Hong Kong, and Guangzhou Urban 
Planning Institute
18
. Excepting the commercial, administrative, financial, 
residential, and recreational functions, a key feature of the plan was to retain the 
three villages (Leide Village, Tian Village, Xian Village). With the concept of 
“villages in the city, a city in villages,” its motif was to pursue a pastoral and 
idyllic urbanity by preserving the different histories of the site and build, as was 
said in the propaganda, “a CBD with the landscape of southern China.” 
 
There are several ways to explain the rationale of this motif. The year of 
1993 was the year when the average price of real estate reached 7568 RMB per 
m
2
, which led the Guangzhou Municipal Government to be optimistic about 
future economic development
19
. It was also the year that the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government needed to generate a large amount of profit from the sale 
of land use rights to improve physical infrastructure to make Guangzhou a better 
place to live and work. The Guangzhou Municipal Government assumed it would 
                                                 
18
 It was a competition. The winner was Carol Thomas Planning Consultancy in 
America. Nevertheless, after the competition, the leader of Guangzhou City 
asked the planning bureau to synthesize the winning project with other two 
projects made by Liang Bosho Architectural Office in Hong Kong, and 
Guangzhou Urban Planning Institute. 
19
 The same optimism could be seen in most of the cities in China during that 
period of time. A notable example is the development of LuJiaizui in Shanghai. 
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generate 8 to 10 billion RMB revenues from the land transfer fee of the PRNT to 
finance the subway construction in Guangzhou. In order to reduce the 
compensation and time cost, on the one hand, the planning bureau demanded the 
planners to design the blocks of the PRNT to be as small and dense as possible, to 
the extent that the government could sell the land, piece by piece, as soon as 
possible, and at high a price as possible. On the other hand, in 1995 the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government issued a ‘Regulation on Land Management in 
Guangzhou’ to expropriate arable land without paying compensation for the 
relocation of the villages in the PRNT. In order to provide incentive for villagers 
to give up their arable land for urban use, the mechanism was that villagers can 
maintain their peasant hukou, their HBL for residential, and 8% to 12 % of their 
arable land as the so-called economic development land (EDL) for profitable 
purposes operated by the villagers’ committees without being transferred or 
traded. In the final plan, the site of the PRNT was partitioned into 402 blocks, 
each with a size of 5000 to 6000 m
2
. Among the 402 plots, there were 123 plots 
for EDL, 99 plots for public facilities and open space, and 180 plots for profitable 
uses. As an official of the Guangzhou Municipal Government said: “the more the 
high-rises, the higher the level of modernization, and hence internationalization”, 
in the PRNT plan it was assumed that each block would be disposed to a 
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real-estate developer, for construction into a high-rise building.  
 
The term “CBD” was a keyword for the government, media, and real-estate 
developers, to promote urban development and the PRNT. Symbolically, it 
created new imaginations of place. “Guangzhou’s Manhattan”, as it was 
nicknamed, had been narrated on newspapers, televisions, and radios, as an image 
of an international city. However, the development was not dominated by national 
or multi-national but local investors. Furthermore, in terms of private developers, 
the PRNT was ill-planned because the size of the blocks was too small to develop 
profitable high-end communities. Together with the depreciation of the average 
price of real estate (from 7568 RMB per m
2 
in 1993 to 4787 RMB per m
2 
in 
1999), which was the consequence of the worldwide structural economic 
slowdown after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the ill-planned PRNT weakened 
private investments. According to the State Land Resource and Urban Housing 
Property Management Bureau of the Guangzhou Municipal Government, 99 out 
of the 402 blocks were sold to private developers from 1992 to 2001. Until 2002, 
69 out of the 99 sold blocks remained undeveloped. As to those 30 sold blocks, 
57.8% of them were for residential. 18% of the land was for commercial. 
However, none of the 19 buildings built in the 30 blocks were office towers or 
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commercial buildings. Contrary to expectations, the majority of the built 
buildings were residential, rather than office towers which should have been the 
main body of the CBD. There was still a big discrepancy between the planning 
and the reality of the PRNT (see figure 2.7). 
 













(Source: Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 2003) 
 
Contrary to the PRNT where there was only a trickle of investment and 
development, a flood of commerce, service occupations, and petty commodity 
production centred in Tianhe District’s other areas were flourishing (one of the 
reasons was that the land transfer fee was much lesser than that in the PRNT). 
Tianhe Software Park, Guangzhou Computer Town, shopping malls, gated 
communities, and office towers, etc., were either developed by villages’ 
95 
joint-stock system cooperatives (TVEs) or based on the expropriation of arable 
land from villages, e.g. Shipai Village, Tangxia Village, Tangdong Village, Yuan 
Village, Linhe Village, etc. Just as in Yangji Village and the villages in the PRNT, 
in a short period of time, the arable land of these villages went through a physical 
change from rural to urban, annexed by urban territory, and the houses on their 
housing base lands which remained old and drab were gradually spatially 
encompassed by and physically separated from modern skyscrapers and facilities. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Population of Tianhe District, 1953-2000. 
Year 1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 
Population 71729 159149 229276 430153 1109320 
(Source: Fifth Survey of Population, Tianhe District, Guangzhou, 2003) 
 
The physical separation of the housing base lands of villages was 
exacerbated by the large number of migrants from other provinces drawn by the 
large scale and rapid urban expansion. A fleeting glance at the Fifth Survey of 
Population, Tianhe District, Guangzhou, can give us a sense of this expansion. In 
2000, Guangzhou had a population of over ten million, of which seven million 
held a Guangzhou household registration. This meant more than three million 
were migrants. The population of Tianhe District in 2000 was on average one 
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million, 800,000 above its 1985 figure (see table 2.2). Most of its people were 
rural to urban migrants who moved to cities to feed the labour needs of national 
developmentalism
20
 but were faced with a lack of affordability and eligibility in 
urban housing. An increase in population of more than 50 percent by 2000 
fostered the renewing of buildings in villages in the 1990s. Based on the 100 to 
120 m
2
 HBL, villagers rebuilt, expanded their houses and leased out floor space. 
Given that the rental price of land and houses was soaring, many houses were 
rebuilt as big and high as possible. For example, according to Chang Jianghao, 
the leader of Yangji Village, in 1996, while the infrastructure of the PRNT was 
under construction, there were more than 30,000 migrant workers living in Yangji 
Village. In 2007, the total population of Yangji Village was approximately 15,000, 
with 9000 to 10,000 migrants and 5253 villagers. Most of the 1496 buildings on 
Yangji Village’s 0.29 km2 housing base land were rebuilt from bungalows into 
houses with four storeys. Rather than villagers, they were occupied by low-wage 
workers migrating from Sichuan and Hunan Province who worked in the service 




                                                 
20  As Deng Xiaoping said “development is the hard truth”. About 
developmentalism in China, see Ness, 1999; Tang and Ngan, 2002. 
21
 Interview with Chang Jianghao on 22
nd
 April 2007. 
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The same situation occurred in the villages in and near the PRNT. In some 
villages, many of the rebuilt buildings were even at high as six to ten storeys 
without the 50cm reserved distance between houses, and only a 1m wide alley 
reserved in front of each house, with oversized balconies covering it, creating 
places that were dark and without sunlight. In order to maximize the amount of 
space for leasing, most of the buildings have poorly maintained facilities, narrow 
stairways and pathways between rows of terraces, and a high residential density 
beyond the capacity of the infrastructure services. 
 
The physical separation of villages from urban area was seen as 
contradictory to the image of an international city and drew people’s attention. In 
March 1999, the moment that the Two Meetings
22
 were held, an article, 
headlined “Don’t let the villages in the big city become big shits,” in the Southern 
Metropolis Daily, a local newspaper in Guangzhou, argued that the shabby 
landscape of the villages in the PRNT was a problem:  
 
                                                 
22
 The Two Meetings refer to the People’s Congress Conference and Committee 
of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the former the 
Party-member (party secretaries) assembly, the latter people’s representative 
(political consultative committee members) assembly. These two meetings 
convene every year in March during which important decisions are discussed 
and approved.  
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“The planning of a 140 storey high skyscraper, which will be the 
highest tower in the world, is in reality next to Xian Village, which is 
suffused with garbage and sewage. The PRNT plan, the so-called 
“Guangzhou’s Manhattan”, has been implemented for six years. 
However, problems are everywhere, especially in the retained villages 
in the PRNT. […] Peasants in these villages make a living by leasing 
out their houses which they built illegally, without integral planning. 
Most of the people in villages are migrants or the so-called “three non 
people
23”. Because people living in these villages are difficult to control, 
these villages become problematic places of drugs, prostitutes, gambles, 
and transgression of the one child policy. […] The government should 
take control of these villages, both people and land. Otherwise, these 
villages in this big city would become big shits [sic]
24.” 
 
Rather than the pastoral and idyllic scenery described in the planning 
proposal, the retained three villages were criticized in newspaper reports, as the 
“agglomeration of illegal buildings” and the “tumours of Guangzhou”. With 
hindsight, Wang Yuan, the chief planner of the Planning Bureau, Guangzhou 
Municipal Government, said:  
 
‘The existence of Leide Village and other villages was the mistake of 
the government. It was all because of Mrs. Thomas, the wife of the 
American planner. When she was there at that moment and saw the 
small old bridge and the river, she was so excited. […] Come on! We 
have this sort of old bridges and rivers everywhere in China. What is the 
big deal? But then our leader said to preserve these villages. So we 
could only follow the leader’s instruction25.’ 
                                                 
23
 In Chinese context, the term “three non people” is synonymous to “loiterers”. It 
refers to those people without a job, ID card and proof of temporary residence.  
24
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 March 1999. 
25
 Interview with Wang Yuan on 5
th
 December 2007. 
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Whether the true reason to retain the three villages in the PRNT is because of 
the concept of “villages in the city, a city in villages”, which was allegedly 
derived from the idea of Mrs. Thomas, or because the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government was unwilling and/or unable to compensate villagers for relocation 
in the process of “crazy land liquidation”, one is unlikely to find a linear causality. 
Nevertheless, what can be seen is that in the planning of the PRNT these three 
villages were left vacant, without any further planning. 
 
In fact, in the mid to late 1980s, because of the critical demand for HBL, the 
villagers’ committees not only followed villagers’ wishes to ask the higher 
hierarchical government to levy arable land, not HBL, but also proposed a need 
for integral planning for the villages. In a villagers’ committee’s official 
document, it is said:  
 
“We earnestly ask the government to take our situation into 
consideration, to solve our practical problems. […] The lands on which 
we villagers rely for generations will be completely levied. The whole 
village is anxious and worried, even angry. Our village is a big village, 
with about 10,000 villagers. For reasons of social stability, the 
social/economical development of our village, and our future 
generations, we earnestly request the government and related 
departments help us to set up an integral plan for our village (Field 
notes, May 2006).” 
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The Guangzhou Municipal Government adopted a rather passive stance by 
intentionally ignoring this demand. The manager of the SanJun Cooperative 
(erstwhile party secretary of Shipai Villagers’ Committee), complained: 
 
‘The same as other villages, we also asked the government to give us a 
piece of land to build houses. But the government never replied. The 
government had planned those CBD areas, but ignored the villages. 
This is why the consequence of the physical form of village is like this 
now. In sum, the government doesn’t give a shit to peasants, the 
government gets pissed off every time when peasants are mentioned, the 
government doesn’t like to offer anything to peasants, what the 
government does is to condemn and disdain peasants, the government 
will not offer help to peasants. The government always condemns the 
peasants’ building “shaking-hands buildings” as illegal, without offering 
peasants a piece of land for living (Field notes, May 2006).’ 
 
Not until 1997 did the Guangzhou Planning Institute enact the regulation of 
rural building control, A Letter about the Planning and Design Principles of 
Shipai Village, Tianhe District. However, it was already at the end of “building 
movement” in Shipai Village. All the buildings in the village had been rebuilt 
without planning approval. They were done. And the planning of a modern urban 
community became paper architecture, a beautiful Arabian Nights.  
 
What can be observed is a sharp inequality compared to their surrounding 
city-regions. However, in consideration of the actual situation that has taken place 
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in the dual-structure of the rural and urban system in China, this can be explained 
as a consequence of an intentional and unintentional ambiguity of the statutory 
planning system and building control. The Urban Planning Act and Planning and 
Construction Regulations on Village and Township, introduced in 1989, and the 
Land Administration Law, introduced in 1986, and its Amendments enacted in 
1988, 1998, and 2004, have not moved beyond the urban-rural dualistic structure. 
Local government, especially municipal governments, which were endowed by 
the state with a legitimate right to retain most income generated within their 
jurisdiction by pursuing land development (Zhao, 2002a: 5), only had 
development control authority over “urban” land and only had a duty to be in 
charge of the infrastructure of the “urban” area. Within the limitations of the 
existing rural-urban dual institutional structure, villages had to finance by 
themselves infrastructure such as water, electricity, roads, communications, 
drainage, sewage, and gas pipelines.  
 
While urban planning was seen as a tool for the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government to generate wealth, the Guangzhou Municipal Government had a 
laissez-faire attitude to the development of the villages and a rather passive 
attitude towards the fragmentation of rural land policy. Only when the 
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development of the villages which may not accord with the urban planning of the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government resulted in more and more conflicts did the 
urban government considered the necessity to plan and develop urban and rural 
areas as a whole (later in 2008 was concretized as Rural and Urban Planning 
Law). During the interview, an official stressed the willingness of the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government to set up plans for these villages. Nevertheless, revealing 
a passive attitude, he said,  
 
‘At that moment, we had not envisaged that the problems of these 
villages would get critical. We lacked personnel to monitor illegal 
constructions in these villages. Who could know that those peasants 
built so fast? Besides, we already had the so-called “planning for central 
villages”.’ 
 
To be fair, this unintentional inaction was neither innocent nor politically 
neutral, and can be explained, in a post hoc discursive rationalization, as being 
more by default than by intent. Though the PRNT was labelled as “CBD”, the 
administrative institution and the trajectory for the future development of the 
CBD was still unclear. Especially when the international convention and 
exhibition centre, originally designated to be built in the PRNT, was built at 
Pazhou Island, “whether or not the CBD equals to the PRNT?” became an issue 
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in the municipal government and among academics in Guangzhou
26
. The 
problematic development of the PRNT and the ambiguity of the urban planning 
system resulted in the ensuing vacuum. As a result, though on 4
th
 February 1999 
the Guangzhou Municipal Government granted permission for the economic 
development land (EDL) owned by the villages in the PRNT to be developed in 
partnership with real estate developers (Guangzhou Urban Planning and Survey 
Institute, 2003), the planning bureau of the Guangzhou Municipal Government 
stopped issuing land use permits and building permission approvals to the HBL 
of seven villages for the reason that the planning of the PRNT was still under 
discussion (see figure 2.8). As shown in Figure 2-7, the blocks which villages 
occupied were labelled as “chengzhongcun land” (the land of the urban-villages). 
During this period of uncertainty, the plans of these three villages were left in 
blank, without any further detailed planning or clear objectives; the villagers 
were not allowed to build any new building either.   
                                                 
26
 Between 1992 and 2003, the Guangzhou Municipal Government held many 
conferences and meetings to discuss the development strategy of the PRNT. 
Not until in the Review of the Planning of Pearl River New Town in 2003, was 
the concept of CBD adopted in the official document. Nevertheless, rather 
than defining officially the PRNT as a CBD, the aim of the review was to 
detach the connection of these two, which means, “the PRNT is not a CBD, 
but only part of the CBD. See Review of the Planning of Pearl River New 
Town, 2003, Guangzhou Municipal Government. 
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Note: Since 1995, Xu Peiwu, a Guangzhou 
based photojournalist of People’s Daily, has 
spent more than ten years documenting the 
development of the PRNT by his camera. The 
photos on the right are the changing landscape 
of the axis of the PRNT from 1999 to 2006 he 
shot from his office in the building of the 
People’s Daily Guangdong Office at 19th floor, 
located on one block from axis. He described to 
me in the office of the People’s Daily: ‘almost 
every month, I took a photo at where I am 
standing now. For most of the people in 
Guangzhou, ten years after the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government launched the 
development of the PRNT, the PRNT remains an 
area delineated on maps (Field notes, May 
2007).’ 
Chronology of the Pearl River New Town 
1992      Guangzhou Municipal Government 
decided to build the Pearl River 
New Town. 
1993-06   “Guangzhou New City Centre: 
Planning of Pearl River New Town” 
was enacted.  
1997      Asian Financial Crisis. 
2000-08  Guangzhou Municipal Government 
re-evaluated the planning of the 
Pearl River New Town. 
2002-06   After two years examination, the 
modification of the planning was 
proved. 
2003-01   “The Re-evaluation of the Planning 
of the Pearl River New Town” was 
enacted and implemented by the 
municipal government.   
2007-05   Guangzhou municipal government 
re-evaluated again the development 
of the Pearl River New Town. 
2007-10  Leide Village was demolished. 
2009     Worldwide economic slowdown. 
2010     The villagers of Leide Village were 
resettled. Xian Village and Yangji 
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In sum, over a period of less than ten years, the 28 villages in Tianhe District, 
together with villages in other nine districts in Guangzhou, have gone through 
changes in the demographic and geo-social landscape. These villages, especially 
those in the economically developed areas, all implemented the HRS and the JSS 
while their arable lands were expropriated by local authorities to facilitate various 
land planning and urban constructions. The compensations were paid in different 
prices and in different ways. In the early 1980s, the land expropriations of some 
villages were even only with the compensation of a “second hand jalopy”27. Most 
of them became villages without arable land circa 1993. Their village collectives 
ran the business of hotels, factories, warehouses, parking lots, gas stations, 
restaurants, and commercial housing. Migrants outnumbered the villagers tenfold. 
While the existing social safety net only covered cities and towns and did not 
include rural areas, all their villagers who were officially “agricultural” were 
actually involved in a variety of non-agricultural activities. They changed their 
occupations from peasants to shareholders of village collectives and landlords 
who took full advantage of the housing base land they occupied by making use of 
the village’s unique location in the city, the intentional and unintentional 
ambiguity of urban planning and building control, and the legal right to free land 
                                                 
27
 See Tangdong Village Cooperative, 2006 The History of Tangxia Village 
(Guangzhou: Tangdong Village Cooperative) 
106 
for housing which is unavailable to urban residents and the huge number of rural 
to urban migrants. Buildings in villages sprouted up apace in this period of 
municipal groping for a clear development direction and strategies. The 50 cm to 
100 cm alleys, which were reserved distance between houses, became the main 
thoroughfares. These villages, though they are located in the urban area, are the 
same as countryside, still largely left to their own devices in financing welfare 
and social services, if any at all are provided (see figure 2.9). 
 


















2.3 Urban-Villages Regeneration: An Articulation with the Desire for Rapid 
Development. 
The abovementioned article of the Southern Metropolitan Daily in March 
1999 launched the public debate of the problems of the urban-villages. The title, 
“Don’t let the villages in the big city become big shits,” quoted what Chen Keichi, 
chairman of the Guangzhou Commission of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, said in the Two Meetings. Ever since Chen raised the 
“problem of these villages” to the public agenda, there were growing concerns 
amongst the planning profession, politicians and the general public over the 
problems of “these villages in this big city”. The Guangzhou Municipal 
Government in July 1999 quickly stopped issuing building permission for HBL 
and launched a document announcing that after January 2000, those buildings 
built in the villages in Guangzhou would be identified as illegal. Villagers felt 
that they had no choice but to comply and accept the implications of having past 
building activities and relating practices declared illegal. However, the effective 
date set by the Guangzhou Municipal Government was seen by the villagers as 
the deadline for issuing building permission for the HBL, and, in turn, prompted 
villagers to become hell-bent on rebuilding their houses. Villagers attempted to 
maintain their pre-existing practices in the form of non-compliance, continuing 
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the same activities in the past, in disregard of the opposing and incompatible 
demands of the new rules. This unplanned conjunction of techniques and 
conditions exacerbated negative criticism in the dominant and pervasive 
discourse such as “eliminate the urban-villages” which are “at odds with 
mainstream society” and “inharmonious with the city”. 
 
For lack of a better phrase, at that time the discussion was formulated around 
some keywords such as “dushi li de cunzhuang” (villages in the city) and 
“cheng-xiang bianyuan” (rural-urban fringe). The emergence of the term 
“chengzhongcun” (urban-village) in the early 2000s brought the potent 
connotative kick to conscious level. The use of this term in the discussion not 
only sensitized the public to the existence of the problem but also marked the 
difference that defines these problematic areas not in relational terms but in terms 
of substantive characteristics; that is, it is not a question of situational causes but 
personality-based causes. In general, the way the major local media frame 
coverage of the city reinforces an overwhelmingly negative view of the 
urban-villages. The images from the nightly news, newsweeklies, and daily 
newspapers are an unrelenting story of social pathology of the urban-villages: 
mounting crime, gangs, drug, homelessness, uncontrolled family planning, and 
109 
slum housing. The public discourses not only pointed the finger of accusation at 
villagers who make a comfortable living from the rents those poor migrants have 
to pay, but also villagers’ abuse of building and sanitation regulations. The local 
press especially emphasized the inequality of the villagers and urban residents, 
which is not the superiority of urban residents to villagers, but rather the 
opposite:  
 
“Those villagers are land speculators who became rich almost only in 
one night. However, what they have done is playing Mahjong and 
drinking tea. Compared with them, the normal residents who work hard 
every day are shabbier. The residents who live in the city are jealous 
and envy those villagers. […] We can see very often a kind of scenery: 
‘those young villagers in the urban-villages are not engaged in 
employment, education or training. They marry beautiful and 
well-educated girls in the city, and those girls in the urban-villages 
marry handsome boys who are willing to become son-in-laws and live 
in their wives’ home28.’” 
 
Another news article continues: 
“The villagers in the urban-villages are seeking maximum interests 
from land use and house renting. They are rentiers, reaping without 
sowing and become a very dangerous model for society. They 
jeopardize the spiritual lives of residents in the city; it is especially 
counterproductive to those teenagers who are still on their way to 
formulate their own world views and values
29.” 
 
                                                 
28
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 17 May 2003. 
29
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 28 July 2003. 
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The massive number of migrants not only triggered the physical change of the 
villages but also brought about issues of public security such as “hacking hand 
gang” robberies30, motor gang robberies, and backpack gang robberies. Most of 
these gangs were peasants from the poor countryside in other provinces. As 
concluded in the government’s document, around 75% of criminal cases and 80% 
of unauthorized buildings were found in the urban-villages in Guangzhou in the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s. This has received considerable attention in the 
form of debates about how government is going to solve the “urban-village 
problems” in order to solve the problems of public security. 
 
Journalists frequently fed the fears and fantasies of their public by 
sensationalized or stylized versions of stories from everyday life in the 
urban-villages. These mass media, especially anonymous editorials, which 
coincided with the government’s need to enhance the regeneration and 
management of the urban-villages, stressed the negative side of the urban-village 
                                                 
30
 This kind of robbery started in Shenzhen in 2004 and then occurred in many of 
the main cities in the PRD such as Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and Dongguan. They 
robbed people and even cut off their hands or killed them. The members of the 
gangs were almost from the same poor countryside. Some young people did 
not want to join them, but the old members would just force them to do so. So 
the organization was getting bigger. A woman fought with a robber just for 50 
RMB. The result was horrible: the palm of her hand was cut off by the robber. 
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by those stories of everyday life and criticized the “evil” of the urban-villages 
from the economic, social, environmental, and moral aspects. In their narratives, 
the urban-villages are “lawless zones” or “outlaw areas” where the socially 
pathological and undeserving group live; filth, mire, and garbage are everywhere, 
creating dirty corners; illegal factories and clinics, counterfeiting, drugs, 
prostitution, robbery, theft, and murder, happen all the time; open space and 
public services are extremely scarce; hairdressing salons, massage parlours and 
corners, bath houses, and hostels are code words for “pornographic places” in 
these villages; drug abuse and crime are not unusual. Villagers are short-sighted 
“petit peasantry”, namely, those who pay more attention to “small tradition” and 
lack the modern economic reason and entangle in unreasonable “deep games”. 
They are jobless, unskilled, uneducated, and indolent mammonists. They are 
parasites in society squandering away their money like dirt. 
 
With different policy conferences in different cities organized to point to the 
difficulties as well as the government’s resolve, the conclusion that “the 
emergence of the urban-villages is involved peculiarly with the revealing of 
historical legacies of inequalities that existed prior to the socialist city and the 
sedimented residue forged under socialism” was quickly perceived by 
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government at different levels
31
. And the objective of “accomplishing the 
regeneration of the urban-villages which are ‘inharmonious with the city’ as soon 
as possible in order to achieve the socialist modernization and the rural-urban 
integration, accelerate process of urbanization, and achieve international city” 
was proposed in the government’s urban development planning documents in the 
early 2000s. These anchored government’s direction in framing the problems of 
the urban-villages, the angle of possible political and social interventions, and the 
forms of problem solving. 
 
Ever since this objective was adopted in official documents and propaganda, 
the term urban-village
 
became not only a loosely folk term, but needed to be 
defined and translated into workable policies. In order to programmically 
elaborate this term in relation to a range of specific problematizations, colloquia, 
meetings, and conferences have been held to bring together academics, 
policymakers, officials, planners, and political actors to exchange experiences, 
expertise, and opinions of the issues on illegal land use and construction, 
                                                 
31
 For example, the conference entitled “the research of the planning, 
development, and management strategies of the urban-village” from 1999 to 
2000 in Guangzhou, and “the development and planning proposal for the 
regeneration of the urban-villages in Guangzhou” proposed in the conference 
of “the workshop of village and town development and management in 
Guangzhou” in 2000. 
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collective ownership of land, census register system, shabby landscape, informal 
economy, floating migrants, and crimes. Policies, regulations, plans, and countless 
reports have been made to tackle the problem of the urban-villages. The 
proclamation of the regeneration of the urban-villages is mounting daily. The 
urban-village misery is imagined or, in other words, socially constructed, in which 
ensembles of ideas, concepts, and categorization are produced, reproduced and 
transformed in a particular set of practices that comprise the discourse of the 
urban-village. However, in the policymaking process, how to turn this euphemism 
into a formal designation, applying the term “urban-village” to certain areas was 
still an issue for policymakers. 
 
The Guangzhou Municipal Government in the late 1990s launched an 
institutional reform towards designated villages in Guangzhou. It consisted of four 
policies regrouped as an institutional ensemble later in 2002 under the generic 
term “institutional reform policy” (IRP) as a municipal urban policy with the 
urban-villages as its main object. In conjunction with the IRP, a set of laws, such 
as regulation for rural land management, has been introduced, the constellation of 
which has enabled and legitimized the ongoing urban restructuring in the city. 
However, though the issue of the regeneration of the urban-villages started to gain 
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agenda status, it was not a top priority for the Guangzhou Municipal Government 
at that moment. Instead, the Guangzhou Municipal Government paid more 
attention and had a more active attitude to the large-scale urban development 
projects and infrastructures. In 1998 the Guangzhou Municipal Government 
initiated a three-phase urban redevelopment strategy, “a minor change every year, 
a medium-scale change every three years, and a major change in 2010”.  
 
Following this strategy, in 2000, the government proposed the “Guangzhou 
Overall Urban Strategic Plan”. The new spatial strategy was summarized as 
“expanding to the south and east, optimizing the north, and coordinating with the 
cities at the west of Guangzhou”. Based on this spatial strategy, the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government launched a number of large-scale urban development 
projects and infrastructures such as Guangzhou Baiyun International Convention 
Centre, Guangzhou Baiyuan International Airport, Pazhou International 
Exhibition Centre, Guangzhou University Town, and Olympic Sport Centre (see 
figure 2.10). The urban-villages were perceived as a problem and the issue of the 
regeneration of the urban-villages appeared on the public media or governmental 
agenda only when a social event happened (e.g. an accidental fire in Xian Village 
in 2003 and crimes at Guangzhou Train Station), or when large-scale 
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infrastructures, key development projects, international landmark events, and 
important government policies were discussed (e.g. the governmental project of 
“Constructing a National Sanitary City” in 2007 and the Guangzhou Asian Games 
in 2010).  
 
Figure 2.10 The large-scale urban development projects and the new spatial 











(Source: Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau). 
 
The agenda setting was contingent on piecemeal reactive response or “heroic 
efforts”32. The media echoed the government narrative that these urban-villages 
                                                 
32
 The fire accident in Xian Village in 2003 is a good example. When it happened, 
the government stated its intention to “solve the fire proof problem in every 
village, especially those typical urban-villages.” After a month, the government 
stated their achievement and listed those villages that built fire engine accesses. 
Nevertheless, those so-call typical urban-villages, e.g. Xian Village, Shipai 
village, etc., were not in the list. 
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were barriers to the governmental development strategy, especially the goal of “a 
medium-scale change every three years, and a major change in 2010”. The 
mass-media reiterated feverishly the problems of the urban-villages in their 
cultural-revolutionary idiom with news headlines resonant with the Great Leap 
Forward, such as “the regeneration of urban-villages will soon be implemented”, 
“all the urban-villages in Guangzhou will be regenerated in five years”, 
“Accomplishing the regeneration of the urban-villages before 2010”, “SanYuanLi 
Village becomes the first village to experiment regeneration”, “the government 
chose five villages to implement urban-village regeneration experimentation”, 
“the regeneration of Yangji Village will be accomplished in three years”, and “five 
villages in Baiyun District will be regenerated”33. Nevertheless, none of the 138 
urban-villages was to be regenerated successfully. 
 
In 2006, except the spatial strategy, i.e. “expanding to the south and east, 
optimizing the north, and coordinating with the cities at the west of Guangzhou”, 
the new Mayor, Chang Kuangning, added “adjusting the centre” as the strategy to 
the “Guangzhou Overall Strategic Plan”. Since then, urban-villages regeneration, 
                                                 
33
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 04 June 1999; People’s Daily, 12 July 2000; 
Southern Metropolitan Daily, 04 June 2002; Yangcheng Evening Daily, 15 
November 2003; Guangzhou Daily, 22 September 2005; New Express Daily, 
20 March 2007. 
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together with some areas in the old city centre, was considered actively by the 
government as one of the main redevelopment activities. In order to prepare for 
the Guangzhou Asian Games in 2010, the municipal government “sped up” the 
regeneration of the urban-villages. When all the original buildings were 
demolished in a month, in October 2007, the regeneration of Leide Village 
began
34. The regeneration was, in short, a “demolition-redevelopment scheme” 
(see figure 2.11). Similar to the year of 1993, the average price of real estate in 
2007 reached 7550 RMB per square metre. What became critically important to 
the effectiveness of the agenda was the rising land value, mainly through 
governmental investment on public buildings, to meet the commercial criteria to 
lever private sector investment. In order to raise the price of land, the government 
restarted the investment on a number of “flagship” schemes in the PRNT. 
Signature architectures such as Guangzhou Opera House, Guangzhou Library, 
Guangdong Province Museum, the West Tower, TV Tower, and publicly-funded 
infrastructural improvements such as Entrance Plaza, Plaza of Culture and Art, 
Citizen’s Plaza, and Haising Civil Plaza altered the local landscape and 
contributed to the image of the PRNT as a CBD. 
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 There are three profit-making developers joining the regeneration of Leide 
Village, i.e., Guangzhou R&F Properties Co. Ltd., KWG Property Holding Ltd., 













(Source: Southern Metropolitan Daily, 22 October 2007) 
Note: This project was divided into three parts. The west part (114176 square 
meters, building density is 6.) was sold through government’s land auction to 
private developer as commercial development. The east part was the resettlement 
of villagers. The south part was a five star hotel, the investment of village 
collective economy. The redevelopment would cost 3.5 billion RMB. All the 
funding was from the auction of land of the west part. 2.5 billion RMB was used 
as the fee of demolition and new construction. 1 billion was used as the fee for 
hotel investment. 
 
Urban policy in China has been driven primarily by the historical social 
institution/conception based on a rural-urban dichotomy. The blaming of the 
urban-villages problem on the alleged social pathology of the marginal brought 
the rural-urban integration to the fore. This mirrors the wider disciplinary 
frameworks established at the third Plenum of the 16
th
 Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party held in Beijing on 14
th
 October 2003, in which it was 
decided that the Chinese Communist Party should take actions to effectively 
accommodate the rural surplus labour force and speed up the process of 
urbanization. Within the context of China’s economic reform and urban 
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restructuring, more specifically the nascent and/or changing urban planning 
strategy, the articulation of the urban-village regeneration is a response to the 
desire for rapid development which oscillates between development-led planning 
and plan-led development, and shaped by multiple crises in an urban process that 
reconfigures from rural-urban disparity to rural-urban integration. It is this “grand 
narrative” emerged in the mid 2000s intending to foster social integration and 
promotes integrated urban-rural development that shapes the broader discourse of 
the regeneration of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. 
 
2.4 The Absent Meta-Narrative of the Urban-Villages Regeneration in 
Guangzhou. 
Yet the narrative provided above is not the only story to be told about the 
development of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. Instead, it has potential to draw 
out “little stories” about a story to make visible the hegemonic meta-narrative of 
the urban-villages regeneration in Guangzhou. By the late 1990s, journalists 
frequently fed the fears and fantasies of their public by sensationalized or stylized 
versions of everyday life stories in the urban-villages. Academics placed the facts 
of the urban-villages in different theoretical frameworks, e.g. pathology, 
sociology, anthropology, to find out the genesis of the urban-villages in order to 
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solve the urban-villages problem. Policymakers turned this euphemism into a 
formal designation, applying the term “urban-village” to certain areas. Political 
actors, together with planners, with responsibility to implement visible and 
tangible solutions to the problems of the urban-villages, drew on such stances to 
depict certain villages as shabby places possessing a poor urban image. This was 
characterised by the problems of devaluation of the surrounding lands, 
uneconomic urban land using, passive and blind mix land use in villages, lack of 
safety, complex migrant populations and incomplete migrant management and 
villager’s social insurance which have ill effects to public security and the social 
instability. In the narratives which describe the shabby villages in cities as ugly, 
dirty, chaotic, and backward, these villages are seen as an ‘improper’ part of 
urban life which should be eradicated and replaced by ‘proper’ middle-class 
physical constructions and social structures.  
 
The journalists in Guangzhou thought they fitted to what Robert Park urged 
Nels Anderson to write down only what they “see, hear, and know (Anderson, 
1967: xii)”. Nevertheless, different from the fiction writers in the nineteenth 
century, such as Charles Dickens, Edgar Allen Poe, Emile Zola, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, Victor Hugo, George Gissing, or Herman Melville, who used their 
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pens to tilt against injustice, the journalists in Guangzhou did not devote 
themselves to using the powers of words and images to produce a new moral and 
ethical susceptibility among the affluent or advantaged classes that would 
persuade them to meet their social obligations towards the less fortunate or the 
disadvantaged, like the London-based Morning Chronicle newspaper or 
photo-journalist Jacob Riis’s study of the slums in Manhattan in the 1850s which 
made known the urban poor by social investigation (Parker, 2004).  
 
What was written by local media was not that which “let the facts speak for 
themselves” or “let those who are actually living in these conditions to tell their 
own stories”. While apportioning the blame, structural factors received relatively 
little attention. Even when they were mentioned, they were treated as normalized, 
inscribed, and embedded structural features of individuals’ being, since, as I will 
describe in Chapter Three (section 3.4), it is almost impossible for media to 
criticize government’s policy in the given political context. Instead, attributing 
them individual-level explanations was widely adopted within both academic and 
popular circles. While the public discourses varied in degree and tone, they all 
ignored aspect of daily life, and impute deviance to groups who may simply 
maintain their ordinary patterns of talk and action. Let alone the thought that even 
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the criminality may be, as Vold says (1958: 201), “the normal, natural response of 
normal, natural human beings struggling in understandably normal and natural 
situations for the maintenance of the way of life to which they stand committed.” 
 
Popular depictions, which derive largely from local media, are not only 
transmitted into academic literature, but also infused many areas of governmental 
policy. By depicting the most extreme forms of behaviour found in the 
urban-villages as typical, the popular media constantly reinforce the stereotypical 
image of the lawless urban-villages dominated by deviance. Such images helped 
to stigmatize and demonize these villages as problematic urban spaces that breed 
“crime and marginal” activities and other socially unacceptable behaviours. Media 
discourse was extremely influential in shaping attitudes and perspectives amongst 
policymakers and played a significant part in conducting official documents. 
Policymakers and researchers have uncritically taken media discourses as a 
“proof” of social pathology and condensed logics of spatial-environmental 
causality similarly expressed by many of the researches on the 19
th
-century cities 
in the Europe (e.g. Driver, 1988; Rabinow, 1989; Osborne and Rose, 2004). In 
ignoring the difference between talking about their objects (in this case, the 
urban-villages) and talking about lay narratives on these objects, these lay 
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narratives underpinning academic and governmental discourses form a certain 
self-referential circularity (Falk and Pinhey, 1978; Thrift, 1986; Sayer, 1989; 
Halfacree, 1993), a discourse coalition that leads to simplistic spatial solutions to 
what are complex social and spatial problems. By delineating certain areas on 
maps and measuring the extent and kinds of “abnormalities” to be found within 
these spatial boundaries, specific locations or milieux are identified with various 
problematic qualities. 
 
While it is commonly accepted that cities and towns represent more urban 
areas and townships and counties more rural areas, those who live in the 
urban-villages can no longer be contained by existing administrative (and 
analytical) categories. In the context of the urban-villages regeneration 
controversy, they are categorized as a distinctive “lifestyle” group which is 
socially and spatially isolated from the rest of society. This group does not have a 
homogeneous construction, but is comprised of different subgroups, each of 
whom may carry a different social construction and be treated differently by 
public policy. They carry a generally negative construction in the urban-village 
regeneration controversy. The discursive conflation of villagers with peasant 
migrants and non-peasant migrants is an additional evidence of this stigmatization, 
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criminalization, and marginalization. This conflation proliferates throughout the 
discourse coalition, ranging from social policy and urban planning, and creates a 
misleading impression that almost all migrants are “rural-to-urban” peasant 
migrants. In fact, a proportion of migrants are “urban to urban” migrants. Many of 
the “rural-to-urban” migrants are also involved with a wide range of activities 
associated more with an urban society such as industry, commerce, transport and 
telecommunication and construction. They are still considered as “rural” because 
they are from rural settlements and have a rural hukou. Labelled as “migrants” and 
“villagers” with few entitlements, residents in the urban-villages were lumped 
together as an ideological category of society, a social group based on identity 
politics and a subjectivity made to bear the burden of the country’s perceived 
backwardness at different policy turns, and, structured by entrenched state 
institutions, they experience traumatic rounds of dislocation, especially when the 
all-encompassing regime in China redefines national priorities yet again in the 
post reform era (Siu, 2007). These labels conjure political, administrative, and 
cultural meanings, in which inequality and discrimination are deeply ingrained 




Table 2.3 Institutionally created segments of residence in relation to the 
urban-village regeneration controversy. 
Segments of residence Component indicators 
Undocumented migrants 
Those whose non-agricultural/agricultural hukou is birth-based 
in other city/county and without temporary residence permits. 
Documented migrants 
Those whose non-agricultural/ agricultural hukou is birth-based 
in other city/county and supplemented with temporary 
residence permits. 
Hukou migrants 
Those whose agricultural/non-agricultural hukou is 
destination-based in city. 
Rural villagers Those whose agricultural hukou is birth-based in city. 
Urban residents Those whose non-agricultural hukou is birth-based in city. 
 
Smart and Lin (2007: 286) argue that the gap between migrants to the cities 
and urban residents has diminished in recent years through the rapid erosion of 
urban privileges rather than through the extension of services and right to 
migrants. Nevertheless, the migrants in China are socially, politically, 
economically (as well as legally) constructed as “illegal entrants,” and 
“new-comers”. They are seen as “outsiders”. Not only the local states were 
reluctant to institutionally recognize rural migrants as part of the legitimate urban 
population with the same entitlements and obligation as those with permanent 
right of abode in their jurisdiction, but also villagers with rural hukou were 
neglected in government’s measurement of the level of urbanization. This attitude 




“The level of urbanization means the population in cities and town as a 
percentage of the total population. Normally, it means the percentage of 
people with urban census in the total population. However, as many 
experts state, because of the peculiar census policy in China, lots of 
peasants, who already move to cities and change their occupations from 
primitive industry into second and third industry, are still peasant census. 
The level of urbanization would be under-estimated if it is measured by 
the percentage of people with the urban census. Therefore, the 
measurement of the level of urbanization of Guangzhou needs to use the 
modification of demographic method. The method of modification is: 
the percentage of people with urban census in the total population, plus 
(1) part of the rural population who live in suburban area, use urban 
infrastructure, join urban economic activities; and (2) part of the rural 
population who live in city and town, in different level, do non-rural 
economic activities for a certain period of time. […] According to the 
criteria, the level of urbanization of Tianhe District has reached 100 
percent. […] The aim of this report is to scope the task and solution of 
the development of Tianhe District in the process of urbanization and 
modernization in terms of demography. As we all know, though 
occupations of those people with rural hukou are non-agricultural, most 
of their ways of living, proclivity, and habits are still rural. The 
governing policies of these people are also different from those of the 
people with urban hukou. Therefore, in the process of toward an 
international metropolitan of an area like Tianhe District, those people 
with rural hukou living in Tianhe District become a critical issue we 
have to confront with (Liu, 2003: 48).” 
 
I excerpt this document at some length because it poses a set of problems that 
are at the heart of, not only the regeneration of the urban-villages in Guangzhou, 
but also the urbanization in China. The narrative here is filled with contradictions 
about what kind of subjecthood is and ought to be counted in the measurement of 
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the level of urbanization. The level of urbanization is measured more by hukou 
than national citizenship. The institutional factor of the peculiar hukou regulation 
not only distinguishes migration in China from population movements in most 
other countries, where internal migration is generally “free”. The hukou system, 
which has functioned as an “internal passport system” (Chan, 1996), is as much 
an institution as a metaphor to differentiate and discriminate among classes of 
people and keep the floating population marginalized. The coexistence of hukou 
migrants and nonhukou migrant also forms its particular spatial and social 
mobility. Different from the “plan” permanent migrants who are eligible for 
obtaining a local hukou and subsidized welfare benefits (e.g. housing, medical 
care, education, and other necessities) and have access to array of jobs (especially 
those in the state sectors or enterprises) closed to nonhukou migrants, nonhukou 
migrants are seen as “temporary”35. They are “in” the city, but only in a sense. 
When being discussed, migrants tend to be treated in official documents or 
dominating discourses not so much as actors but as more or less anonymous 
contributors on the level of urbanization. In other words, the amounts of the rural 
                                                 
35
 Different terminologies have been used to describe the various meanings 
associated with this peculiar system, e.g. permanent/temporary migration, 
hukou/nonhukou migration, “plan”/nonplan or self-initiated migration, and 
formal/informal migration (Goldstein and Goldstein, 1991; Goldstein and Guo, 
1992; Chan, 1994; Yang, 1994; Yang and Guo, 1996; Fan, 1999). 
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to urban migrants are recognized as urban, but the persons of the rural to urban 
migrants are not. The notion of urban population here does not include migrants, 
and only fairly ambiguously includes residents with rural hukou. This form of 
allocating people to different citizenship statuses, differentiating populations, and 
subjecting them to different types of rule – Maoist era norms and values of 
organizing, conceptualizing, and managing the population – can be linked to 
Foucault’s (1991b) notion of neoliberal governmentality as the “conduct of 
conducts”, that is, the efforts of the calculative choice aiming at structuring the 
field of action of other actors. The spatial calculation and qualitative issues of 
group management are a political arithmetic, in which dividing, categorizing, 
calculating, ranking, ordering, organizing, and measuring population and space 
rely less on the obviously mathematical and more on the model of “rationality” 
which is both connected to mathematical models and is part of a wider process 
through which population and space are made “amenable to thought” (Osborne 
and Rose, 2004: 212; Elden, 2005: 14). Rationales send messages to target 
populations and others about the values of society and how much (or little) 
various social groups are valued in relation to such values, and, in turn, convey 
the implicit messages about what government does, whose problems are “public” 
problems, and what status the citizen has (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). All these 
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return to a double question concerning what is, and what is not, outside of, or 
beyond, the reach of the governmental. It is this authoritative regulation to 
conduct towards particular objectives (Rose, 1999) that I link back to the research 
questions outlined in Chapter One. 
 
2.5 Conclusions. 
Thus, the research questions laid out in Chapter One arrive at the three 
specific relationships and/or processes of the urban-villages regeneration in 
Guangzhou. The first focuses on the process in which governmental regeneration 
programmes of the urban-villages were produced, and considers the ways in 
which they have led to a specific planning approach towards the urban-villages. It 
concerns the kind of spatial calculation and qualitative issue of group 
management which are mobilized. How is population and space divided, 
categorized, and calculated? What issues and subjects are included and/or 
excluded in the discourse of the urban-villages regeneration, and in what ways 
does the discourse on the urban-villages prescribe actions and legitimatize 
conditions. How, and in what way, are the public perceptions of the urban-village 
deployed and used in the government’s regeneration policymaking process to 
legitimize and mould the concrete policies? With what actual planning, and in 
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what ways, with what values and agendas, does the government implement its 
regeneration policies? This focus leads to an inverted question concerning the 
system of categorization or “rationality” that has been pursued and mobilized to 
make sense of the phenomenon of the urban-villages and frame the urban-villages 
problem.  
 
The second seeks to explore is the form of governance shaped by the 
regeneration reform policy and the dynamics that have accompanied the 
implementation of this policy. What was the impact of the new governing 
coalition on the debate on the urban-villages regeneration? Technologies of 
government are those technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of 
conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain 
undesired events (Rose, 1999: 52). What subject effect or subject formation is 
aspired to bring about to be congruent with the objectives of the urban-village 
regeneration – a kind of capital accumulation under a hybrid socialist-neoliberal 
form of political rationality? 
 
Third, extending from transnational and migration researches, which highlight 
the incessant dialectical interplay of desires, identities, and subjectives on the one 
131 
hand, and the process of belonging, exclusion, and affiliation that are produced 
through migration on the other, Lawson (2000) argues that migrants’ social 
positionings allow them to question the dominant narratives of development. 
Their stories provide a rich account of the social and cultural costs of neoliberal 
development, revealing how peoples’ experiences are framed by systematic 
processes of privilege and discrimination. In the urban-villages regeneration 
controversy, migrants are an important but understudied component. They are 
well known for their vulnerable and marginalized second-class status in China’s 
cities (Zheng, 2005). They are seen as unproductive bodies and hobo subjects 
whose conduct should be criticized and problematized. Given this, how does 
individuals response, in the form of marginal resistance, to governmental 
regeneration programmes, in a way to give shape to conduct – a process of 
subjcetification that moulds people into certain sorts of economic subjects? 
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Chapter Three 
“Urban-Village? Regeneration? You Mean?” – A Methodological Context. 
 
“People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what 




As stated earlier, the research explores how the urban-village as a social 
construct becomes the “new stigmatizing topographic lexicon” by exploring three 
specific relationships and/or processes. The research therefore tends to study both 
the “up” and the “down”, the powerful and the powerless, and the hegemonic 
groups as well as those of oppositional groups. The focus is the processes through 
which “values and meaning become attached to events, people, or patterns of 
action (Schneider and Ingram, 1997: 106)”, to the extent that specific institutions 
and practices in the kind of social constructions are legitimate. The focus of this 
thesis is neither people nor the urban-villages qua artefact, but the actors as they 
are in conjunction with the urban-villages, and the urban-villages as they are in 
conjunction with actors. The intent hence is not only to “get inside” the physical 
site of the urban-villages, but to “enter” the battlefields upon which the 
urban-villages regeneration controversy is seated. In other words, the intent is to 
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enter into a social setting and get to know the people involved in it.  
 
In this chapter, I detail how the research was conducted and how the methods 
were developed to examine the discourses and practices of the urban-villages 
regeneration in Guangzhou. Written in the form of reflection, it discusses the 
methods used in developing relationships and trust for continued participation, the 
issues of personal relationships in the field and their influence on data, and how 
the ethical, methodological and political concerns and limitations encountered 
simultaneously provide a potential to unfold the dynamics, patterning of living, 
and urban practices of the urban-villages in general. By discussing the 
epistemological and methodological issues raised in the research design, and how 
these issues relate to the fieldwork situations in the urban-villages, it justifies 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, and an ethnographical approach, for detailed 
analyses of this field-based research. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
provides a biographical sketch to describe the processes involving in gaining and 
managing access to different actors, the methodological choices, and strategies 
that were involved in the research process. The second section the way that 
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empirical data were collected as well as its philosophical underpinnings. The third 
section describes the propositions and some epistemological concerns. The fourth 
section concludes by reviewing the methodological issues raised in the research 
design, and how these issues relate to the research situations in the urban-villages. 
 
3.2 Shaping the Research Design: An Ethnographical Approach with 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. 
The first section provides a biographical sketch to describe the processes 
involving in gaining and managing access to different actors, and the 
methodological choices and strategies that were involved in the research process. 
Excepting the preliminary fieldwork conducted in May to July 2006, this research 
draws on fieldwork in Guangzhou that was – carried out between February 2007 
and January 2008. The first six months in the field, I set up the goal to change my 
Taiwanese accent and learn to use the everyday vocabularies in China (which are, 
in many ways, somewhat different from those of the Mandarin I speak in Taiwan), 
local people’s dialects (mainly Hubei dialect and Cantonese), and the argot of 
residents in the urban-villages. During this period of time, I engaged in 
participant observation with journalists from two newspapers, profit-making 
agents involved in housing leasing, village cadres, and migrants in the 
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urban-villages who are persons within the target group itself (see table 3.1). I also 
conducted in-depth interviews with individuals including policymakers and 
officials of different sectors in three district governments (Panyu District, Tianhe 
District, and Haizhu District), representatives of the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government such as those based in the Planning Bureau and the State Land and 
Housing Bureau, and individuals from other local authorities such as villagers’ 
committees and street offices (see table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 List of key informants (I). 
Name Position Institute 
Cheng Mong Journalist Southern Metropolitan Daily 
Pan Xianlin villager Tangxia Village 
Su Xianwei villager Tangdong Village 
Xu Jing Journalist New Express Daily 
Xu Peiwu Photo-journalist People’s Daily 
Yan Changjiang Chief Yangcheng Evening Daily 
Yan Wendou Boss Dajia Management Corporation 







Table 3.2 List of key informants (II). 
Name Position Institute 
Chan Chengming Vice Chief Bureau of Urban Utilities and 
Landscaping of Guangzhou Municipality 
Chang Jianghao Leader Yangji Village 
Dong Chijung Manager SanJun Economic Cooperative (erstwhile 
party secretary of the Shipai Villagers’ 
Committee 
Lei Whuaso Chief Planner Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design 
Survey Research Institute 
Li Guogiang Chief Manager SanYuanLi LTD 
Li Lixuan Professor Department of Urban Planning, 
Zhongshan University 
Li Xuan Professor Department of Urban Planning, 
Zhongshan University 
Pan An Chief Urban Planning Bureau, Guangzhou 
Municipal Government 
Song Wenxian Party Commissioner Maihua Street Office 
Su Zhen Official Office of Family Planning, Tangdong 
Economic Cooperative 
Wang Ming Party Secretary Tangxia Street Office 
Wang Songmio Deputy Chief Planning Bureau, Tianhe District 
Government 
Wang Yuan Chief Planning Bureau, Guangzhou Municipal 
Government 
Xion Jingjung Official State Land Resources & Urban Housing 
Property Management Bureau 
Xu Chigong Chief Architect Jian Ke Architectural Design Institute of 
Guangdong Province 
Xu Hetian Leader Tianhe District Government 
 previous head Tianhe district government 
 
The interviews were supplemented by the analysis of policy documents, 
correspondence, minutes, accounts, policy briefings, records, and other sources 
such as unpublished histories of different urban-villages, to provide a detailed 
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picture of the production of governmental regeneration programmes and how and 
why they have been produced. I also reviewed articles from local newspapers 
about the urban development in the period between 1990 and 2007 (notably from 
local newspapers, including the Southern Metropolitan Daily, Guangzhou Daily, 
People’s Daily, Yangcheng Evening Daily, and New Express Daily), in order to 
evaluate the changing tone and terminology of the “urban-village misery”, the 
quality, and the quantity of local media coverage relating to the regeneration of 
the urban-villages. These methods enabled close empirical analysis of the 
dynamics, patterning of living, and urban practices of the urban-villages in 
general. 
 
Generally, I relied on snowball sampling but not meticulously pre-arranged 
meetings with my key informants. These informants were interviewed formally 
and/or informally multiple times, using information from previous informants to 
elicit clarification and deeper responses upon re-interview. As I will describe, 
these informants also acted as facilitators and referees in accessing to their 
fellow-colleagues and contacting other informants, using chain sampling to 
obtain a saturation of informants in all empirical areas of investigation.  
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My task in the field was to get access to, and establish credibility with, a 
number of different groups relating to the urban-villages regeneration controversy. 
I sought to develop a certain degree of trust and rapport with informants so that 
they were willing to impart to me the kind of information and group-based truth 
or knowledge to which insiders to that social world would be privy. Johnson 
(1975) argues that access should not be thought of as an initial phrase of entry to 
the research setting around which a bargain can be struck. Rather than a one-time 
activity, it is best seen as involving an ongoing, if often implicit, process, in 
which the researcher’s right to be present is continually renegotiated, with 
eligibility for inclusion being in terms of not only who you are, what your 
position is, but also what you are (in the sense of status being contingent on role 
performance). In reality, the ascribed and acquired statuses are hybrid, and, as 
Merton (1972: 22) says, “individuals have not a single status but a status set”. 
This status set led to a diversity of interactions with my interviewees, in which 
the method I deployed in the fieldwork is not necessarily formal interviews. As I 
will describe, it also involved other interview methods such as what Zimmerman 
and Wieder (1977) refer to as the “diary, diary-interview method”. This 
experience is supported by the contention that, in the field, the peculiarities of the 
individual researcher become magnified. The characteristics of the individual 
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fieldworker have an impact on the process of developing interactions with 
strangers and of course vice versa. This interactional dynamics can drastically 
affect the process of fieldwork and the changing landscape the research sits 
within (Wax, 1979; Agar, 1980; Stanley and Wise, 1993; Ladson-Billings, 2003). 
Thinking about this, Lee (1993) provides a helpful guide to write about the 
difficulty and different strategies in gaining and managing access to actors in the 
fieldwork.  
  
While not exaggerating, methodologically, the setting of this research is 
preoccupied with the problematics of access to stigmatized groups, ways of 
managing field relations, and the dilemma which arise from possessing what (Lee, 
1993: 15) refers to as “guilty knowledge” of deviant activities. The urban-villages 
are seen as conflict-ridden urban areas. The settings have often deterred 
researchers from engaging in a research based on the actual living experience in 
them. My hybrid statuses served to make me aware that I had certain empirical 
and methodological advantages in conducting field research, but also faced unique 
problems in simultaneously addressing ethical, methodological and political 
concerns. The contentious relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China since 
1949 enabled me, as a Taiwanese person, to have shared certain ideas, knowledge, 
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and ways of being (be they language or other) with people in China – a country 
with a political statement that Taiwan is part of China. However, having been born 
in Taiwan, I had no insight into the long history of the rural-urban dichotomy in 
the socialist era. Nor did I have the experience enabling me to understand what 
this rural-urban dichotomy means to those who experience the derivative 
constituents of this historical social institution in the Chinese urbanization in the 
reform era, such as the houko, land system, household responsibility system, 
house reformation movement, and rural to urban migration. Although my mother 
tone is Mandarin, my Taiwanese accent and everyday vocabularies sometimes 
compounded such issues, keeping me at a distance from their shared experience, 
which either led the interaction to the opposite of tolerating my intrusions into 
their lives and accepting me as a person worth talking to, or led the potential 
informants to speak to me in rather harsh tones. Illustrative of these is my 
face-to-face interaction with Wang Yuan, the chief planner of the Guangzhou 
Urban Planning Bureau: 
 
‘You said you are a Taiwanese doing a PhD in King’s College London 
and you want to do research [about the urban-villages in China]. For a 
guy like you, you don’t have the background knowledge to handle this 
topic. It involves too many things, such as the long history of 
rural-urban dichotomy, governmental policy, planning methods. […] 
There are too many things to handle, even for Chinese scholars! So far, 
I haven’t seen any research [on this topic] that can really describe not 
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only villagers’ but also government’s difficulties. […] For a guy like 
you, this topic is too sensitive. You are touching government’s sore. For 
a guy like you, most of the [official] documents are confidential. You 
have no chance to access to them, nor would anyone tell you anything. 
Even if you get access to these documents, you cannot bring them 
abroad. […] You shouldn’t let foreigners know the negative side of 
China (Field notes, December 2007).’ 
 
When the chief planner said this to me, it was in December 2007, the 
moment that my fieldwork was almost coming to an end. Our face-to-face 
interaction signals many things. Amongst a variety of topics the planner 
addressed to me, one message she conveyed is that this research topic is 
“sensitive” in relation to the topic of the insider-outsider debate. This message is 
of most important and able to have implications for sociological understanding of 
this research.  
 
In academic circles, one general issue is that of who should do it or who is 
better qualified for certain research (Bridges, 1973). This issue is part of a 
long-standing but somewhat disturbing problem in the sociology of knowledge in 
the form of the “insider-outsider” debate (Merton, 1972). One, the insider 
doctrine, holds that insiders, as the members of specified groups and collectivities 
or occupants of specified social statues, have monopolistic or privileged access to 
the knowledge of a group: the insider, as insighter, is “endowed with special 
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insight into matter necessarily obscure to others, thus possessed of a penetrating 
discernment (ibid. 15)”. The other, the outsider doctrine, holds that unprejudiced 
knowledge about groups is accessible only to nonmembers of those groups (ibid. 
31): it is the outsider “who finds what is familiar to the group significantly 
unfamiliar and so is prompted to raise questions for inquiry less apt to be raised at 
all by insiders (ibid. 33).” 
 
The idea of a simple binary rendition of the inside or outside relationship is 
arguably a fallacy, especially for reflexive research (such as that conducted by 
feminist researchers and critical race theorists) which overtly and explicitly 
engages in debates on positionality and acknowledges the connection of 
researcher identity with the changing landscape that the research sits within (e.g. 
Pile, 1991; Reinharz, 1997; De Andrade, 2000; Young, 2004). This static and 
unmoveable concept of insider status compared to outsider status ignores that a 
researcher’s positioned subject is dynamic and constantly re-created throughout 
the fieldwork – a subject that is fluidly negotiated through what Reinharz (1997) 
refers to as the existence of multiple-selves. After all, as Merton (1972: 22) says, 
“in structural terms, we are both insiders and outsiders.” Between complete 
acceptance and complete rejection lie many (re)positions. It is a back and forth 
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everyday social action along what Kelman (1980) refers to as a continuum. 
 
The complexities of sharing elements of identity with people in the field 
made me think that there is room to develop a kind of dialectical insider-outsider 
tension in the process of fieldwork. On reflection, it was this very existence of 
such back and forth movement with many positions in between the two extremes 
that gives shape to the differential accessibility to some settings rather than others 
and shaped my research design, to the extent that my journey diverged from the 
planned path and stretched the initial theoretical and methodological orientations 
from the discourses and practices of the urban-villages regeneration to the 
everyday forms of resistance to governance. 
 
I lived in Yangji Village for three months, volunteering as a journalist in the 
New Express Daily covering the news relating to the regeneration of the 
urban-villages in Guangzhou. I also volunteered as a lecturer of the fourth year 
design studio in the Department of Architecture, Southern China University of 
Technology. While these two jobs continued, I moved to Tangdong Village for six 
months and Huang Village (the village where Sun Zhigang died) for another four 
months, volunteering as a property manager. As a resident in Yangji Village, 
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Tangdong Village, and Huang Village, my everyday activities in these villages 
enabled me to develop ongoing relations with residents by participating in local 
events. This also enabled me to experience the ordinary routines and conditions 
under which local residents conduct their lives, and constraints and pressures to 
which such living is subject. During the early stages of the fieldwork, I engaged 
in participant observation through volunteering as a journalist in the New Express 
Daily. I followed three journalists around as they worked. This participant 
observation took in the form of shadowing, enabled me to observe the way in 
which media messages are produced and shaped (see this chapter, section 3.4). 
This also enabled me to get to know some people who hold positions of power, 
and, in turn, helped me to get access to some policymakers, officials, and 
representatives of local authorities. 
 
For example, my request to arrange a formal interview with the chief planner 
of Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design Survey Research Institute was in the 
first place denied without explanation. Then I mentioned the names of some of 
the other key people that I had spoken to, such as the ex-leader of Guangzhou 
Urban Planning Bureau and the Deputy Mayor of Shenzhen, and said that it is 
these key persons who said that I could make contact with him. In this way, I 
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positioned myself as someone who knew important persons, and was granted 
access to audit an official meeting held by Panyu District Planning Bureau. I used 
the same strategy to get access to different authorities for the regeneration 
projects of the urban-villages in Guangzhou, e.g. Cuolong Village in Baiyun 
District, Xiaozhou Village and Nanjiao Village in Panyu District (see table 3.3). 
Auditing these meetings provided information on who, and what issues, were 
included in the meetings, and, of equal importance, who, and what issue, were 
not. Observing who, and in what ways, said what to whom in the meetings also 
provided information-rich conversations for discourse analysis. 
 
Table 3.3 List of the official meetings held by different authorities for the 
regeneration projects of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. 
Date Authority 
2007, 05, 16 Baiyun District Planning Bureau 
2007, 08, 07 Tianhe District Government 
2007, 08, 08 Leide Economic Cooperative 
2007, 08, 22 Dengfon Street Office 
2007, 09, 17 Baiyun District Planning Bureau 
2007, 10, 13 Tangxia Street Office 
2007, 11, 20 Panyu District Planning Bureau  
2008, 01, 12 Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, Guangzhou Municipal Government  
2008, 01, 13 Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, Guangzhou Municipal Government 
 
Amongst the official meetings I audited, a meeting held by Panyu District 
Planning Bureau on 20
th
 November 2007 and a meeting held by Guangzhou 
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Urban Planning Bureau of Guangzhou Municipal Government on 12
th
 January 
2008 were of most value. In the former meeting, a professor from South China 
University of Technology (who was commissioned to make a regeneration project 
for Nanjiao Village in Panyu District) and a professor from National Sun Yat-sen 
University (who was commissioned to produce a regeneration project for a 
village in Baiyun District) were invited to share their research and experiences of 
the urban-villages regeneration. While discussing the regeneration project of 
Nanjiao Village, which was the main aim of the meeting, they reviewed the 
problems of the urban-villages and the failed regeneration projects of some 
villages. In the second meeting, the planner of Guangzhou Urban Planning & 
Design Survey Research Institute, together with the party secretary of Huadi 
street office, presented for the first time their regeneration project of Huadi 
Village to the chief planner of the Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, and 
officials of different sectors of the Guangzhou Municipal Government.  
 
Through my participation as a journalist in local newspaper, I was able to 
find suitable local residents for research. Inter alia, Yan Wendou and his fellow 
brothers, who are profit-making agents involved in housing leasing in the 
urban-villages, are an information-rich case. Yan Wendou started this career in 
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2002, with three fellows in Ke Village. In 2007, at the moment that the fieldwork 
was conducted, he has been doing this business, with more than 100 fellow 
brothers, in more than 5500 flats in 14 villages in Guangzhou, e.g. Tangxia 
Village, Tangdong Village, Shanxe Village, Dongpu Village, Yuan Village, 
Tonghe Village, Ke Village, Huangpu Village, and Zhu Village. Observing their 
practices in these villages provided a vantage point to get access to, and examine 
in detail the decision making of, different social actors, i.e. villagers, migrants, 
village cadres, party secretaries of street offices, etc., and their reactions to the 
discourses of the urban-villages regeneration which has framed the lives of those 
who live in these villages since the 1990s. 
 
Whereas some residents in the urban-villages, such as Yan Wendou and his 
fellow brothers, can be quite open about their everyday lives in the urban-villages, 
in these already stigmatized places, some of them are at-risk populations such as 
mafia, prostitutes, and drug dealers (figure 3.1). These “special” populations were 
difficult to contact by the usual means (see figure 3.2). They were cautious about 
outsiders, especially in interacting with researchers, surveyors, or journalists of 
local media. Residents have experienced a form of inequality at best and 
exploitation at worst. Interviews may have desirable or undesirable outcomes for 
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them. The product of the survey may be of an (in)direct derogation to them in 
some way. In terms of this, their vague and general expression becomes a verbal 
strategy to prevent the possibility that would threaten the alignments or interests 
of their dealings. When I conducted interviews as a not-so-trusted outsider, they 
either often expressed in vague and general terms, or there were just blank, 
cautious stares.  
 









(Source: author’s photo) 
 
Note: The tube in Guangzhou is fantastic, much better than that in London. Just 
outside the entrance of the tube, which is also the entrance to SanYuanLi, there is 
a caution written scratchily on the wall: “In order not to be robbed during the 


























(Source: author’s photo) 
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The cautious and insecure lives of the inhabitants in the urban-villages posed 
difficulties in terms of accessing this group for formal interviews, rendering it a 
difficult group for ethnographic research. Deviant activities are revealed, or 
manifest a “fear of scrutiny”, “explicitly seeking discreditable information (Payne 
et al., 1980; Lee, 1993: 6)”. An intrusive threat may result risking sanction, 
political threat, or negative consequences for them if their identities and stories 
were revealed. Obviously, it encompasses all of the three aspects of sensitivity. 
Yan Wendou, for example, showed his unwillingness to compromise his 
invisibility or that of his co-workers which may have had an adverse effect on 
any potential conflict between him and the state authority, and between him and 
the villagers. The initial encounter with Yan Wendou captures this well: 
 
‘I know you are a journalist. So you are not interviewing me but 
exchanging ideas with me informally. Many journalists, students, and 
researchers came to me, asking me to provide them with something to 
write, but they never live in the urban-villages and always write 
something nonsense. Besides, I am only a businessman. I don’t like to 
say anything in public. Even the government says something good 
about me in the media, be it newspaper or TV, it sometimes causes me 
trouble. For their positive sayings can lead to negative consequences. 
Last time the government put my career in the newspaper and said that 
it is a model for other villages to follow. The next day, some villagers 
came to me and said that now the street office asked them to improve 
their houses with the same facilities as mine. They said that this raises 
their prime cost. And it is my fault. They then said that they wanted me 
to pay more to them (Field notes, April 2007).’ 
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To show him that I was a bona fide researcher, I rented a single room in one of 
the properties he ran his business in Tangdong Village, with the price of 350 RMB 
per month. As I intended to take an active part in the practices of Yan Wendou and 
his fellow brothers, I also participated in routine activities and processes that 
constitute local settings, helping to resolve disputes amongst his fellow brothers, 
providing assistance when it was asked for, disseminating leaflets, negotiating 
with landlords and renters, talking to their children, etc. I also wrote articles for 
news coverage and op-ed columns on newspapers for his two biological brothers, 
who are journalists in the Yangcheng Evening Daily and Guangzhou Daily, as a 
quid pro quo for gaining access to Yan Wendou’s business. By volunteering in Yan 
Wendou’s business as a consultant and property manager, I had acquired a place in 
their business, and developed relationship with villagers and migrants, the former 
Yan Wendou’s landlords, the later his fellow brothers and tenants. When I did 
“enter” Yan Wendou’s business, the process of negotiation with villagers and other 
actors such as personnel in police stations, street offices, villagers’ committees, 
and district governments started to take place. 
 
Excepting 31 stand-alone interviews, of more than 100 Yan Wendou’s fellow 
brothers, I asked 23 of them who are property managers in different villages to 
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write working diaries for six months (between August 2010 and January 2011), 
with details of what they did, where they went, whom they had met, who moved 
in, who moved out, and who was complaining to whom and about what. I gave 
them three cameras to take photographs of anything that interested them. I also 
asked six of these 23 informants, when they are off their work, to visit those 
villages that Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers did not run their housing leasing 
business (e.g. Leide Village, Shipai Village, Yangji Village, Xian Village, Linhe 
Village, Sanyuanli Village), and write down in their working diaries as much 
detail as possible what they had encountered in these villages, be it a scenario, an 
event, or a verbal exchange. Their diaries and photographs provided a way to 
collect materials of 20 villages, and prompted 16 follow-up interviews to collect 
specific details about their everyday lives, the network of Yan Wendou’s fellow 
brothers, and the ways that things get said in their own terms (see table 3.4).  
 
3.4 List of follow-up interviewees. 
Name Villages mentioned in their working diaries 
Ai Shefu Tangdong Village, Shanze Village 
Chen Zuahong Tangdong Village, Zhu Village, Leide Village 
Deng Yang Tangdong Village, Shanze Village 
Hu Shenhua Tangxia Village  
Li Hwua Tangdong Village, Leide Village 
Liu Jiang Shanxe Village, Dongpu Village 
Wei Shuai Huang Village, Yuan Village 
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Yao Lin Ke Village, Xian Village 
Yao Xiaoming Tonghe Village, Tangdong Village, Huangpu Village 
Yen Jiangshian Tangxia Village, Ke Village 
Yen Jiangsong Zhu Village, Chepeo Village 
Yen Lin Gingshazhou Village 
Su Chan Dongpu Village 
Zhao Dain Yuan Village 
Zhen Pong Huangpu Village, Chepeo Village 
Zhen Tao Chenjing Village 
 
As one of Yan Wendou’s property managers, I was able to develop 
information-rich conversations with personnel of local authorities and cadres of 
villages, such as the party secretaries of the Dengfon Street Office and Tangxia 
Street Office, officials in the Floating Population and Rental Housing 
Management Office in Tangdong Village and Chenjing Village, personnel of 
police stations in Tonghe Village and Zhu Village. In negotiating with them, about 
the business of housing leasing, I observed actors in different settings and asked 
them further details associated with governmental regeneration programmes and 
events, and supplementary questions about specific behaviours in these events. 
These behaviours, referred to as “backstage behaviour” (Goffman, 1959) or 
“non-verbal signals” (Heron, 1989), are an important part, but it is often difficult 
for systematic study, and is, in a way, dependent on the note taker’s or informant’s 
sense of what is important (Maynard, 1989).  
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In sum, in order to study the practices of these actors in more depth, and carry 
out what ethnographers call “theoretical sampling” (Charmaz and Mitchell, 2001) 
that elaborates the analysis of these categories, fills gaps within the existing data 
with additional contextual data, and discover variation within and between them, 
I developed “peripheral membership” (Adler and Adler, 1994) which involved 
entering the world of the group being studied. Although I built close interactions 
with different actors, my role mainly remained that of a peripheral observer rather 
than “a full member” (Adler and Adler, 1987). Consequently, I limited my 
involvement with the group on various occasions in order to “sustain the presence 
of […] a marginal member in their midst (Lee, 1993: 142)”, and detached myself 
from some situations. I sought “to develop empathy […] but makes a conscious 
effort to limit [my] involvement and commitment (Alder and Alder, 1987: 39).” 
 
My involvement with informants did not always further the goals of the 
research. Nevertheless, it is “essential to alter the exploitative relationships which 
research imposes (Blauner and Wellman, 1973: 323)”. I learned in the field that 
exchange and reciprocity are more than ideal notions. Informants quickly found 
that they could call on me for a variety of services. Often I experienced 
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discrepancies between the needs of informants and the demands of the research. 
At times, my ongoing participant was all consuming, leaving me with little time 
for analysis of the evidence I was gathering. 
 
Part of the rationale of selecting the villages was due to the people I 
encountered in the fieldwork. I had intended, in an ethnographic style, to develop 
my research strategy once in the field. As a Taiwanese, a PhD student from UK, a 
temporal resident living in the urban-villages, a volunteered journalist of local 
newspapers and lecturer in a university, and also a property manager for renting 
business in the urban-villages, my multiple roles in Guangzhou provided me with 
a way of ethnographic immersion. Some perceived me, as a researcher who was 
working towards the completion of a degree. Others perceived me, as a journalist 
who was greedy to cover news and provided an example for the popular local 
saying in Guangzhou: ‘beware of fire, thieves, and, above all, journalists.’ Still 
some others identified me, as a property manager who was busy seeking tenants, 
negotiating contracts, and monitoring the upkeep of the properties. Such 
immersion inevitably entails some degree of resocialization to meet local 
expectation. For instance, outsiders in the settings saw me as a person with a 
record of involvement with insiders and appropriate live experience. Insiders in 
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the settings saw me as a person with a record of involvement with outsiders and 
the appropriate academic language to translate the argot of residents in the 
urban-villages. The “stigma contagion” (Kirby and Corzine, 1981) I have 
experienced also has influences on my relationship with those being studied and 
significant others. (For instance, ever since I came back from the fieldwork, I 
have never used a wallet, and sometimes look back nervously when I walk on the 
street.) 
 
3.3 Contesting Storylines, Discourse Coalitions, and Regimes. 
During the fieldwork, I became more intrigued to look at “what people 
actually do” so as to “focus on practices rather than discourse”, as Flyvbjerg 
(1998: 8) stresses in his opening chapter of Rationality and Power. I turned my 
attention to the activities of the “discourse coalitions” of the urban-villages 
regeneration in Guangzhou, and aligned myself with a discourse analysis that 
includes the notion of human agency (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Recent studies 
have advanced concepts such as “discourse coalitions” and “knowledge broker” to 
highlight how agents are embedded in discourses (Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994). A 
discourse-coalition refers to a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable 
set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular 
157 
period of time. The actors that “utters these story lines and the practices that 
conform to these story lines are all organized around a discourse (Hajer, 1993: 
47).” From this perspective discourses are inconceivable without discoursing 
subjects or agents that interpret, articulate and reproduce storylines congruent 
with certain discourses.  
 
At the moment that the fieldwork was conducted, the urban-villages were 
spaces of indeterminacy, whose space of analysis was on the way to be defined 
(see Chapter One, section 1.2). It was a time that the terms “urban-village” and 
“regeneration” have become words and concepts understood and used in popular 
and scholarly conversation in China (see Chapter Two, section 2.3). Given this, I 
asked two questions in the field: “what is the phenomenon of the urban-villages in 
China? What do you mean by regeneration?” The two open-ended questions are 
somewhat naïve for respondents. However, these less intelligible questions, as 
Fielding (2008) recommends, are useful in making people explain things to the 
researcher that are obvious to them, allowing respondents who have privileged 
access to, not the truth, but their opinions and meaning, to tell their own stories, in 
their own ways, and in their own terms, with room to pursue an unexpected or 
interesting aspect as it arose.  
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While giving readers some sense of the feelings of respondents towards their 
own experiences, these questions also become a strategic way to “defocus” my 
study, allowing those within the setting to define the research according to their 
own concerns rather than those of mine. Therefore, this research strategy can be 
described as “shallow cover” in which “the ethnographer announces the research 
intent but is vague about the goals. The researcher is announced but the research 
foci are not compromised (Fine, 1993: 276).” 
 
While asking different actors in the field, these two questions seemingly 
seeking for positive explanations immediately intertwined with a number of 
sub-questions concerning the (re)distribution of power in society and the policy 
making processes involved in the regeneration of the urban-villages, including: 
the discussions about “facts” (e.g., where, how many urban-villages in Guangzhou? 
Where are these urban-villages? How many populations, and how many buildings 
are in these urban-villages? Who benefits and who loses from the urban-villages 
regeneration? Who takes responsibility? Who has power? Who is empowered?), 
the interpretation of those facts (e.g., are urban-villages good or bad?), normative 
and philosophical arguments (Is the distribution of status quo just?), and casual 
questions (e.g., why are there so many urban-villages in Guangzhou? Who should 
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be responsible for this?). And the question “what are the aims, mechanisms, 
directions of the regeneration?” is engaged with inverted questions such as “what 
is rural?” and “what is urban?” While asking these questions, a set of contrasting 
words such as “socialist”/“capitalist”, “state”/“market”, “urban”/“rural”, 
“formal”/“informal”, “public”/“private”, “good”/“bad”, and “legal”/“illegal” 
appeared repeatedly across the assemblage of official documents, interviews, field 
notes, public discourses. While these words and terms seemed to be used and 
interpreted differently by different actors, they encapsulate particular knowledge 
bases and technical “procedures, instruments, tactics […] and vocabularies” to 
achieve certain ends (Dean, 1999: 31), and alternative imaginaries of normative 
understanding of “justice”, “equality”, or “efficiency”. These alternative 
imaginaries are performative. It is in their performative understanding that they 
interpret ideas like “justice”, “legal/illegal”, and what counts as “good” quite 
differently. 
 
These sub-questions contain a great deal of information about the issue 
context and the designing dynamics which constitute the elements of policy 
debates and therefore can be linked to discourse and narrative analysis and recent 
developments in policy analysis. The definition and construction of a “problem” 
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contains within the “solution” to that problem. A pre-existing policy solution may 
be taken and an issue may be constructed by policy entrepreneurs so that the 
solution appears to be the most logical one (Kingdon, 1984). The construction of a 
“problem” (and its immanent “solution”) involves the development of a particular 
discursive narrative (a “story”) defining certain categories as group phenomena, 
and depicting/portraying the evolution and causes of the problem (Kuhn, 1970; 
Lakatos, 1971; Brown, 1977; Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979; Sayer, 1989; 
Hawkesworth, 1992; Sabatier, 1999: 4; Atkinson, 2000). While presenting 
problems, an extensive battery of causal verbs is chosen in their narratives to 
“describe harms and difficulties, attribute them to actions of other individuals or 
organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke government power to stop the 
harm […] as though they are simply describing facts (Stone, 1989: 282; also see 
White, 1987).” Thus particular narratives attempt to portray ‘problems’ as if they 
have their origin in ‘natural forces’ and must be accepted and responded to in the 
particular manner specified by the policy narrative. By presenting a ‘problem’ in 
this manner, a narrative serves as the overture to policymaking, and an integral 
part of the process of policymaking and as a policy outcome, attempting to 
foreclose debate (or creating boundaries) and prevent a ‘problem’ from being 
thought of in ways that are not congruent with the dominant discourse from which 
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the narrative is derived (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; Hajer, 1993: 46; Atkinson 
1999: 59-60; 2000: 215). 
 
In the actually discussion of specific problems, different discursive elements 
are presented as a narrative, or storyline, in which elements of the various 
discourses are combined into a more or less coherent whole and the discursive 
complexity is concealed. Nevertheless only a few actors fully grasp complex 
problems. Although many of the actors involved are experts of some sort, they 
still depend on other experts for a full understanding. Story lines thus have an 
important organizational potential. These discourse clusters are held together by 
discursive affinity: arguments may vary in origin but still have a similar way of 
conceptualizing the world (Hajer, 1995: 47). 
 
In their activity of narrativing, scattered events was chronologically 
constructed, or in Ricoeur’s (1982) term, “manipulated”, into a meaningful totality. 
An event is something that happens after which nothing will ever be the same 
again. The event cannot be understood at the time that it happens because its 
distinctiveness is alien to the structure of the language and thought in which it is 
expressed. How the individual or group recounts the experience is a separate 
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event from the initial encounter. A further retelling of the group’s experience by an 
observer forms another event (Lyotard, 1988: 79). Each discourse coalition has its 
own storyline on the urban-village and post hoc discursive rationalization, 
projecting a particular version of reality. 
 
Lee (1993: 5) argues that the relationship between the researcher and the 
researched is likely to become hedged about with mistrust, concealment and 
dissimulation. From an ethnographic perspective, developing and maintaining a 
level of trust and rapport with informants was valuable and vital for the research. 
However, from a discourse perspective, trust and rapport is only one kind of 
interactive frame that can surround the ethnographic interview as a discourse 
event (Goffman, 1974). In the face-to-face interaction, other aspects of interactive 
setting such as posture can provide important information regarding the how they 
respond to the governmental regeneration policies. From this angle, the negative 
responses (gauged by length of responses, rapport, tone of voice and general 
cooperation). I received were nonetheless useful ethnographic resources in that 
they brought to the surface underlying attitudes and ideologies about the 
urban-villages and interpretations. Of course, the negative is not necessary hostile. 
For example, many of those who hold positions of power have a stake in 
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maintaining quiescence. Nevertheless, even the anomie and atrocity in the 
fieldwork provides a different and comparative interactive frame to understand 
why some interviewees may be hesitant, or openly hostile, to what may 
potentially constitute a threat.  
 
I utilized three categories of field notes. The first category comes from the 
transcription of interviews conducted with actors when I volunteered as a 
journalist in the New Express Daily. The second category involves a log record 
after the observations or interviews, which contains my feelings and reactions to 
matters, together with the fusions of thinking and feeling in research. Third, there 
are jotting notes I took when tape recording was precluded in research settings. 
Here I would like to give some examples. While observing official meetings, 
many times I was informed formally that tape recording was not allowed. In some 
research settings, the physical attributes (e.g. acoustics in a car, whispers in the 
public toilet of Planning Bureau, and physical movements in the urban-villages) 
did not allow the use of recording devices. Actors told me what was “behind the 
story” only after I turned off my record. There were also conditions in which the 
use of tape-recording was simply not proper. Many of them are when they saw my 
record, those observed just stopped talking. 
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Of course, some of the more disreputable secrets or “etiquettes” of different 
actors that I was allowed to learn in the field, such as the involvement of local 
officials and village cadres in Yan Wendou’s business, have been left out of this 
thesis due to the sensitive and possibly disputed nature of their substance. Being 
an insider and outsider simultaneously helped me to gain access to many areas, 
but inevitably, I was excluded from some forms of participant perception. Writing 
about access is also subject to a peculiar limitation. Of course this writing on the 
problems associated with access is based, as it inevitably must be, on my own 
account. While the description of the difficulties I encountered in the fieldwork is 
only ever written from one side. What are lost thereby in the process I describe 
here are the understandings of those who are being researched have of being 
studied. This nonetheless leads me to vivify what I found to be different 
engagements with neoliberal signifying practices, such as how village leaders 
feigned interest in governmental regeneration project and the "surface 
cooperation" of different actors. Given that my participant-observer status allows 
me to catch fleeting encounters that would hardly be captured by the formal 
interviews and surveys of traditional sociological research, a sense of presence in 
my writing can be considered as a privilege, in a way that, I hope, the stolid prose 
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drenched in theory can be supplemented with not only concrete and vivid images 
but the insight into the nuances of the fine-grained meanings of behaviour. 
 
3.4 “Urban-Village” as Le Mot Juste de L’espace? Some Epistemological 
Concerns. 
The contention of this thesis is that in the regeneration of the urban-villages 
in Guangzhou, the discourses of the urban villages, in Foucault’s terms, not only 
construct objects such as particular stylistic groupings of buildings or urban space; 
they also construct events and sequences of events into narratives which are 
recognized by particular social groups as “real” or serious. Such groups of 
discourse, as Crysler (2003), who followed Sara Mills’s Discourse, argues, make 
up the structure of an episteme, or the grounds of thought in which, at a particular 
time, some statements and not others, count as socially legitimate “knowledge”. 
 
As a consequence, part of the context is the preposition that the discursive is 
dialectically involved with the non-discursive such that one cannot exist (or be 
thought about) without the other. It assumes the discourses in the regeneration 
process to be less the objective, self evident, transparent, and neutral mirror 
reflections of an uncontestable reality than the embodied and performative 
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representations in an intensely political project in that the aim is to find the right 
word for space, or more properly, as Merrifield (1997: 417) and Massey (1992: 66) 
prefer, “le mot juste de l’espace”. These discourses, which are proposed by 
different social actors with different agendas and differently positioned audiences, 
contest against each other in the sense that they involve ongoing social practices 
through which space is continually reshaped and reproduced.  
 
The French word “l’espace”, rather than English word “space”, is preferred in 
their discussions for the reason that there is no neat correspondence of Lefebvre’s 
“l’espace” in English. As Shield (1991: 154-155; also see Merrifield, 1997: 417; 
Massey, 1992: 66) argues, l’espace for Lefebvre refers to not only the empirical 
disposition of things in the landscape as “space” (the physical aspect) but also 
attitudes and habitual practices. For, Shield, “l’espace” as a metaphor can be 
understood as the spatialisation of social order. He thus uses the term social 
spatialisation to “designate the ongoing social construction of the spatial at the 
level of the social imaginary (collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as 
interventions in the landscape (for example, the built environment). This term 
allows us to name an object of study which encompasses both the cultural logic of 
the spatial and its expression and elaboration in language and more concrete 
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actions, constructions and institutional arrangements (Shields, 1991: 31).” 
Following this, then, it is important to consider the “urban-village” in terms of the 
social (re)construction of the spatial in time (the inverted commas around the 
word “urban-village” are used to imply the sense of two spatialisations – both a 
physical space and a more complex symbolic one), in which it represents 
“particular imagined spaces consisting of everyday actions, institutions, policies 
and political arrangements linked by discursive and non-discursive elements, 
practices and process (ibid. 18).” 
 
This thesis is broadly informed by ideas of the social constructionist 
approaches. Rather than a strict constructionist approach which contends that 
there is no objective reality but only the construction itself (Spector and Kitsuse 
1987; Schneider 1985; also see Schneider and Ingram, 1993), the social 
constructionist approach that this thesis draws on is more of a contextual 
constructionism. The focus of this thesis is not only on the social construction of 
the urban-village but also on the reasons this social construction has arisen and 
how it may differ from objective reality. It pursues how the discourse functions 
ideologically to shape attention and provide reasons to act in response. With 
reference to Fairclough (2005), it explores how social practices are discursively 
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shaped, as well as the subsequent discursive effects of social practices. Or, to 
quote Harvey (2006: 213), “to think this through as an iterative process in which 
social processes produce spatial forms which affect social processes”.  
 
Operating in a society that transformed from socialist to capitalist, the 
discourse draws upon the material conditions that govern the realities and 
prospects of the cities, and thereby mediates among espoused values, future 
possibilities, and current dilemmas. The news coverage of the urban-villages 
emerged in the late 1990s, as mentioned in Chapter Two, can be an example. In 
the late 1990s, media discourse was seen by the government as an instrument for 
the legitimization of government’s intervention. It was at this time that 
semi-independent newspapers, such as the Southern Metropolitan Daily, were 
founded. Though media in China was still under the control of the government, 
the market-driven mechanisms had led to innovations and created some relative 
autonomy, but also pressure that profit primarily from increasing their circulation 
(Chu, 1994). While operating on the private ownership model to attract a large 
audience by any means possible, the media had an intention to get popular by 
producing aggressive investigative stories on social issues and wrongdoing by 
local officials that will sell. Despite prescriptive official standard contents 
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propagating certain policy initiatives (i.e., welfare, community policing, 
subsidized housing) and proclaiming that, despite government’s best efforts, 
urban-village problem, such as migrants and crime persist, the media constructed 
images of the urban-villages entails the power both to select and promote certain 
events as more important than others and also to imbue those events with an 
editorial flavour that emerges from the media’s own value system.  
 
Gradually, the urban-village problems became government’s pressure. To 
dilute the degree of the success in solving urban-village problems became an 
indicator for evaluating job performances of mayor and party secretary. The 
People’s Congress and Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, the so-called “Two Sessions” in March 2007, is a critical moment. 
Governmental officials were restricted to say anything before Chang Kuangning, 
who was assigned as Guangzhou City Mayor since 2003, stated his attitude 
towards the regeneration. At the moment, the regeneration of the urban-villages 
became a very sensitive issue. In order to have a better social and economic 
performance, all the news about the urban-villages was prohibited. The chief 
editor of the New Express Daily commented to me in interview: 
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‘You know, the People’s Congress and Committee of Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, the so-called “Two Sessions”, in 
March and April, is always a critical moment. At the moment, the 
regeneration of the urban-villages becomes a very sensitive issue. No 
officials dare to give comments before the mayor clarifies his intentions 
on this issue. Not only is it impossible to interview any officials, but 
also we are prohibited by, not only the City Publicity Department, but 
the Provincial Publicity Department, to write anything about the 
urban-villages on newspapers.’ 
 
Media in China is not an autonomous organizational system but a social 
institution that both responds to and shapes public opinion. A more open 
government for freedom of information and of the press, and the media’s 
supervision of Party and the government remain the “Achilles’ heel” of the 
regime’s commitment to the Marxist doctrine (Chu, 1994; Hao et al., 1996). 
Newspapers and journals of the Party, radio and television broadcasting stations of 
the state as well as other relevant publications are seen as the mouthpiece of the 
Party and people. They must unconditionally propagate the guideline, policies and 
regulations of the Party and government under the leadership of the Party, telling 
their audience what to think and how to act (Silverblatt and Zlobin, 2004). 
Publicity departments, or propaganda departments, are “gatekeepers” that 
examine the flow of news materials and prevent media from publishing unwanted 
information on certain particular topics through the stages of the selection and 
editing process. In the provided political context, it is almost impossible to 
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criticize government’s policy. Especially after the consolidation of control of 
government authorities over media in 2004, avoiding crossing the line that may 
have upset the delicate political balance between the media institutions and the 
political institutions became the main concern in the making
36
. At this point, what 
has to be taken into consideration is the way in which media messages are 
produced and shaped, especially the political, organizational, and professional 
factors which impinge on the process of message production. This leads me to 
consider not only the role of the media as a set of institutions that both respond to 
and shape public opinion, but also techniques of gathering, organization, 
classification, and publication of information. While the discourses of media, as 
representations of space, play a role in urban politics and in expertise making, the 
spaces of representation, e.g. the politics of media in China, is brought to the fore, 
especially the relationship of their work practices, production processes, and 
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 In January 2004, the director of the Southern Metropolitan Daily, together with 
the chief editor and publisher, were arrested by the public security officials and 
charged with embezzlement. Journalists at the newspaper suspected that the 
chief editor’s detention was linked to the newspaper’s aggressive reporting on 
political or social sensitive issues and wrongdoing by local officials, such as 
the death of a college student, Sun Zhigang, in March 2003 and Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in December 2003. These two reports led to the 
arrest of several local government and police officials. Therefore, the 
investigation into the finances of the Southern Metropolitan Daily launched by 
local officials was seen as the consolidation of control of government 
authorities over media. 
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socio-political environment. However, rather than seeing them as pawns in the 
regeneration game where they are required to perform particular practices, persons 
involved are agents and participants in the everyday practice of power relations, 
and are not passive recipients of governmental policies and directives. An 
exemplarily ethnographic vignette throws this point into sharp relief: 
 
It was in August 2007, two months before the regeneration of Leide Village 
was launched. I was assigned, as a journalist, by the New Express Daily to cover 
the development of the PRNT. I went with journalists from other local newspapers 
to interview the newly commissioned deputy district head of Tianhe District, 
about the municipal government’s re-evaluation of the development of the Pearl 
River New Town. Right from the beginning of the interview, however, he shifted 
the focus from the government re-evaluation to the problem of Leide Village, 
Xian Village, and Tang Village – the three urban-villages retained in the PRNT, 
and eagerly explained in detail the regeneration plan of Leide Village, such as the 
resettlement compensation of the villagers and migrants, and the building capacity 
of the new plan. These details were sensitive and should be announced by 
someone who held higher position. The moment I went back to the chief editor of 
the New Express Daily, a gag order was imposed by the Municipal Propaganda 
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Department against local media reporting on the regeneration of Leide Village. 
The chief editor asked me: ‘Who else were there when you interviewed him?’ 
When I replied that almost all the journalists from local newspapers in Guangzhou 
were there, the chief editor contemplated and said: ‘If we don’t put this news as 
headline, other newspapers will do it. Besides, the Municipal Propaganda 
Department cannot punish all the newspaper companies. […] Let’s do it!’ The 
next day, as the chief editor envisioned, what the deputy district head said became 
the front-page headline of all the newspapers in Guangzhou. 
 
This example is useful as I think that it is these submerged spaces of 
representation that this thesis draws on. In terms of Lefebvre’s (1991) spatial triad 
which explores how different types of space interact, overlap and/or align in the 
productive process of space, the discourses of the urban-village are 
representations of space, socially constructed out of symbols, codifications and 
abstract representations (Lefebvre, 1991: 38-9). These representations are based 
on the spatial practices of physical transformation of the environment which are 
the concrete or experiential spaces that are “lived directly before it is 
conceptualized” (ibid.: 34). They are the “logic and forms of knowledge, and the 
ideological content of codes, theories, and the conceptual depictions of space 
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(Shields, 1999: 163).” They are in conjunction with, while not being completely 
constrained by, the submerged spaces of representation, appropriated or 
dominated by particular social groups, related to power, the body, ideas, and 
ideologies. “[As] directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and 
hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 39, original 
emphasis).” These spaces of representation not only embrace the partiality of 
representation and knowledge systems, but also, in implying a certain level of 
spatial “competence” and a distinct type of “spatial performance” by individuals 
(Shields, 1999: 162), form, inform, and facilitate the deviations, diversity and 
individuality, continually and dialectically interact with and refer to the 




Though I drew upon a mixed method approach, including archival research 
and in-depth interviews, the method/process here relies heavily on the mix of 
ethnography with participant observation, and therefore is more or less in the 
condition of the downside of participant observation, such as increased threat to 
the objectivity of the data-gathering technique, unsystematic gathering of data, 
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reliance on subjective measurement, and possible observer effects. The approach 
here may also be criticized as using selective empirical evidence to represent the 
whole picture, over-generalizing from a few examples, or overemphasizing 
particular spaces, senses of time and partial representations, hence committing the 
conceptual error of synecdoche. Nevertheless, this process has the vantage point 
to reveal common understandings related to the phenomena under study, which is 
at stake here. 
 
Wolcott (1999: 253) asserts that the intellectual challenge to an ethnographer 
is to discern pervasive patterns in how individuals interact in terms of “what 
people say, what they do, and for the most part inferred, expectations they hold for 
the behaviour of others vis-à-vis actions they initiate themselves” (italics in 
original). An ethnographer is to conduct empirically grounded studies to unpack 
the actions and discourses through which various interpretations of reality are 
constructed in day-to-day practice. In this way I could be described as an 
ethnographer, going out into the field and returning to tell of the uniqueness of the 
experiences I had observed (Schratz and Walker, 1995). However, I do not mean 
to say that I know the ropes only by the saying that I have been there. Neither is 
my intention to stress the difficulties of fieldwork in a way that what results is 
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only a set of “heroic tales” in which “the reluctance of those being studied is 
overcome as a result of the researcher’s diligence, cleverness or artifice (Lee, 
1991: 121).” While seeking to grasp the meanings that different persons bring to 
the policy process, the arguments used to legitimatize policies, and the hidden 
assumptions or underlying normative implications and problems, my normative 
value position is, of course, in no way a “value-free” stance. Therefore, this 
confessional style of writing on the field experience can best describe the social 
dynamics of access and non-access processes is de facto the description of the 
phenomenon of the urban-villages. 
 
The physical, legal, social, political, economic, and demographic 
characteristics of the urban-villages in China are widely variegated and contingent 
upon location, history, and scale. The contingency was obscured by dominant 
discursive articulations of the “urban-village”, which involves what Rancière 
(2000) calls the “reconfiguration of a perceptive field” through which the 
urban-village – in its negatively connoted form – is provided with its universal 
reference. This calls for a reconfiguration of a perceptive field through carefully 
putting in place sensible evidences, considering their collisions and convergences, 
which have real effects on ways of being, saying, and doing. This means walking 
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a line of sorts between producing, on the one hand, overgeneralized accounts of 
the urban-villages, which tend to be insufficiently sensitive to local variability and 
complex site configurations, and, on the other hand, being excessively concrete 
and developing contingent analyses of isolated instances of this or that particular 
village. The latter may be inadequately attentive to the substantial connections and 
necessary characteristics of ensembles of practices and rationales that are 
assembled at various levels. 
 
The data generated from these research methods demonstrated that in order to 
look in some detail at the micro-practices of power, the context-bound local 
struggles and the achievement of local solutions, a more ethnographic approach 
incorporating Foucauldian discourse analysis was needed. In light of empirical 
data collected in Guangzhou in 2007/2008, I will, in the subsequent three 
empirical chapters, consider in turn the formation of the discourse coalition 
around the storylines of the urban-villages and the institutional practices in which 
discourses are produced. Drawing upon work in discourse and narrative analysis 
and recent developments in policy analysis, this thesis investigates the process by 




Therefore, before moving forward with the analysis, it should be noted that, 
whereas this research takes place in Guangzhou, with its materials mainly about 
the villages in/next to Tianhe District, the aim is not to document any specific 
village, nor are its implications limited to Guangzhou. At stake here is a better 
understanding of the subjective but collective understandings on my subject 
matter, i.e. the regeneration of the urban-villages. Drawing on an ethnographic 
approach incorporating Foucauldian discourse analysis, this field-based research 
provides not only different lenses through which to view the world in general to 
answer questions such as “what is going on there?” and “what do people in this 
setting have to know in order to do what they are doing?” (Wolcott, 1999: 69), but 
also “what this people or that take to be the point of what they are doing (Geertz, 
2000: 4)”. This engagement – the very stuff of cultural anthropology – pays 
attention to “examining the ways in which the world is talked about – depicted, 
charted, represented, rather than the way it intrinsically is (ibid.)”, and provides a 
better understanding to “what, what they do, does” (Foucault, 1982: 187).
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                               Chapter Four 
The Discourse Coalitions of the Urban-Villages Regeneration. 
 
“Solutions for one programme tend to be the problems for another 
(Rose & Miller, 1992: 190).” 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
‘Why is public security in Guangzhou so horrible? This is because these 
urban-villages provide bad people with places to stay. They – drug 
dealers, druggies, gangs, and prostitutes – come to Guangzhou and stay 
in the urban-villages. The spaces in the urban-villages are so cramped! 
Most of the buildings in the urban-villages are more than four storeys. 
Many of them are even with ten storeys. But many alleys in the 
urban-villages are less than one metre wide. Good people, if they live 
there, would become bad people. Besides, don’t you ever read 
newspaper? It is said in the newspapers that the urban-villages are 
problematic. Those journalists who just graduated from colleges also 
write about their own experiences living in the urban-villages. They all 
state that once they have enough money, they would move out as soon 
as possible. […] How can Guangzhou, as an international metropolis, 
bear having these urban-villages?’ (Interview with the chief planner, 
Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau) 
 
The chief planner’s narrative illustrates how the urban-village is conceived by 
central policy makers, and how such conceptions are produced in the dominant 
discourses about urban-villages regeneration in Guangzhou. As described in 
Chapter Two, the dominant discourse draws on concrete problems such as the 
illegal use and construction of collectively owned land, shabby landscapes, 
informal economy, poorly-controlled floating migrants and the census register 
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system, and soaring crime rates. These problems function as metaphors for a 
much larger structural problematic of urban restructuring – the fact that the 
rural-urban dichotomy, which was once a social institution and a pre-existing 
mode of urbanism in the socialist era, has become harmful to urban development. 
Perceived problems have been identified as problems resulting from a 
“rural-urban dichotomy”, requiring rural-urban integration to solve them. The 
most interesting part in the narratives is the use of the word “urban-village”, 
pointing to the roots of these settlements in the rural peasantry (Chung, 2010: 3) 
and suggesting two separating worlds and ways of living (urban and rural). The 
general public was largely determined by the particular “urban” narrative which 
saw the urban-villages problem as relatively isolated, not caused by wider 
structural factors such as the Guangzhou Municipal Government’s piecemeal style 
of urban development and piecemeal reactive response to the development of rural 
areas, and the messy actualities of various institutional and policy twists and turns 
within a restructured and increasing neoliberalized system. And it is not 
social-structural factors that decide whether the problems in the villages such as 
“crime and marginal” activities and other socially unacceptable behaviours can be 
solved, but rather their attribution to individual-subjective categories. 
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In this chapter, I turn to my empirical investigation of the urban-villages in 
Guangzhou. The first of three empirical chapters examines the discursive and 
structural conditions surrounding the “production” of governmental regeneration 
programmes of the urban-villages within a restructured and increasingly 
neoliberalized system. It seeks to understand the motivations, rationales, and 
mechanisms of the authorities underpinning the articulation of the urban-village 
regeneration. It discusses the formation of the discourse coalition of the 
urban-village regeneration in which the policy elites’ ideas and interests interact 
within an institutional setting to produce the policy design. It focuses specifically 
on discourses in which the structural constraints and contradictions, on the one 
hand, set limits to the range of solutions that are considered, and, on the other 
hand, are strategically portrayed and deployed by policy elites to promote their 
own interests and agendas and/or to hide their constraints and difficulties. By 
identifying the process of problem defining and agenda setting, characterised by 
the emergence of dominant narratives surrounding “urban development”, it 
evaluates the policymaking processes in which the concept of urban-village is 
defined and deployed to label and problematize a range of unsightly urban forms. 
It explores the shaping of this discourse, and considers the ways in which it has 
led to a specific planning approach towards the urban-villages.  
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The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
discusses the form of the conflict of “use value” and “exchange value” over land 
and buildings under an ambiguous property rights regime in the 1990s that was a 
key to other issues in the urban-villages regeneration. The second section 
identifies a set of key measurements used by central policy makers in the early 
2000s in characterising areas as “urban-villages”. It pays particular attention to the 
development of two governmental programmes (rationalities) – the institutional 
reform policy (IRP) and the “one village one strategy” principle – analyzing how 
the rationale and approach to the urban-village regeneration shifted from “villages 
with problems” to “urban-villages as a problem”. The third section discusses the 
multiple and contradictory rights to the city in the urban-villages regeneration 
controversy. It focuses on the issues of the transfer of collectively owned land and 
the welfare of inner-migrants relating to access to affordable housing. In particular, 
the ways in which these two issues are not marginalized but both simultaneously 
affirmed and denied in the processes of problematization of the urban-village in 
2007 are discussed to explore how interests are played out in the context of 
specific discourses and organizational practices. In the fourth section, I develop an 
argument that the framing of the term “urban-village” in policy concepts is 
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characterized by tensions to draw a dividing line between deserving entitlement 
and undeserving welfare, and difficulties relating to defining where and what 
ought to be regenerated, and who the objects/subjects of the regeneration are or 
ought to be. 
 
4.2 Local Citizenship Entitlement: Whose Welfare? Whose Right?  
Premised on the recognition that previous urban policy programmes had failed, 
in 1999, the Party Secretary of Guangzhou Municipality, Lin Shusen, who was 
known for his defensive attitude towards profit-seeking private developers, 
defined the limits of the possible direction that the policy of regeneration should 
take. In his speech, which repudiated private developers’ participation in the 
regeneration of the urban-villages and the old city area, the regeneration of the 
urban-villages was conceptualized as government’s responsibility:  
 
“Normally, to ensure the interests of the real-estate developers, the 
real-estate developers would propose a regeneration project with 40% 
resettlement and 60% commercial housing. This means the density will 
be 2.5 times more than the original density. At glance, it is the 
real-estate developers that help the government to solve the problem of 
the urban-villages. But in fact, the expense is the increase of the density 
of the city as a whole. Therefore, the government will never allow the 
real-estate developers to increase the density of the city by tearing down 
those buildings of the urban-villages and building high rise buildings. 
This decision is for the sake of the long-term development and a 
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sustainable environment of Guangzhou
37.” 
 
One clear element of Lin Shusen’s narrative is that the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government positioned itself as having an obligation to solve the problems. 
However, when Lin Shusen made this speech, it was the year when governmental 
regeneration projects had produced continued impasse or deadlock. In some initial 
resettlement programmes, they were project-based initiatives of apartments for 
resettlement conducted through negotiating with private developers, which were 
unprofitable as the new properties were not allowed to be commodified and 
exchanged in the real-estate market. In some cases, planners, who tried to make a 
case for regeneration, found themselves seesawing between internal and external 
barriers: they were either imposed by authorities to steer their conducts and 
compensation arrangements in line with private developers’ or government’s 
sensibilities, rather than villagers’ interest, or imposed by a variety of institutional 
constraints in which market-based options and operations would challenge key 





                                                 
37
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 12 May 1999. 
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(Source: Li Lixuan) 
 
For example, in September 2002, the Guangzhou Municipal Government 
announced an expenditure of 5,000,000,000 RMB on the regeneration of Shipai 
Village and other six designated villages. Li Lixuan, a professor of the 
Department of Urban Planning, Zhongshan University, was commissioned by the 
planning bureau of the Guangzhou Municipal Government to be responsible for 
the regeneration project of Shipai Village in Tianhe District (see figure 4.1). It 
was announced that the project would be finished by 2008. The 11,000 villagers 
were to be moved out, and the 3,700 lease houses in Shipai Village were to be 
torn down step by step. In Li’s scheme, there were going to be two boulevards 
forming a crossroad, dividing the village into four parts. The west-south part was 
going to be the site for forty two 35-storey high rise towers, of 100,000 m
2
 each, 
with another 86,000 m
2
 of commercial space. This project needed at least 
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200,000,000 RMB. It was assumed to be financed partially out of rental income 
from the village housing, the exploitation of the LCD, and the 12-year rental 
contracts for commercial space.  
 
The scheme stirred up a public debate: are the boulevards private or public? If 
they are public, will it be the government’s duty to compensate those villagers 
whose houses will be torn down for the boulevards? Where is the funding coming 
from? What to do with villagers who live their life by leasing housing? Where are 
those 40,000 migrant workers who live in Shipai Village going to live? What to 
do with the “culture” of Shipai Village? In terms of historical or cultural aspects, 
should we not preserve old buildings in the process of development? The 
argument appears to be multifaceted. However, the key issues under debate are 
whether villagers have rights over the physical change of Shipai Village, to what 
extent villagers can claim their property entitlement, and in what ways their 
property rights will be converted. Due to the uncertainty of the subject and 
entitlement, the ambiguity of the arrangement and allocation of collective 
property rights, and, most important of all, the underdeveloped mechanism of 
property rights conversion, this plan was suspended. As another professor of the 
Department of Urban Planning, Zhongshan University, Li Xuan, who was 
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commissioned by the planning bureau of the Guangzhou Municipal Government 
to be responsible for the regeneration project of an urban-village in Baiyun 
District, put it in interview: ‘We explained to the Law and Institution Office [of 
the Guangzhou Municipal Government] that unless we contravene the law, the 
plan would not be workable (Field notes, May 2007).’ 
 
Following Marx’s original formulation of use and exchange values in 
capitalist society, Logan and Molotch (1987: 1-2) describe that  
 
“any given piece of real estate has both a use value and an exchange 
value. […] [It] provides a ‘home’ for residents (use value) while at the 
same time generating rent for the owners (exchange values). Individuals 
and groups differ on which aspect (use or exchange) is most crucial to 
their own lives. For some, places represent residence or production site; 
for others, places represent a commodity for buying, selling, or renting 
to somebody else. The sharpest contrast is between residents, who use 
places to satisfy essential needs of life, and entrepreneurs, who strive 
for financial return. […] The simultaneous push for both goals is 
inherently contradictory and a continuing source of tension, conflict and 
irrational settlement.” 
 
It is this conflict between use and exchange values that shapes the 
urban-villages regeneration controversy. Unlike previous welfare housing systems, 
under which all housing units were assumed to be of identical location value, with 
their difference only in size and layout, differential land rent in the reform era has 
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increasingly become an essential component of housing costs and benefits. The 
land and housing systems, which used to be based entirely on use value, have 
been transformed into ones that are based on exchange value, whereas the 
development constraints within the HBL are still continuing. Such institutional 
involvement and regulatory intervention in the relationship of use and exchange 
of places is endemic to the HBL of the urban-villages. The bundle of rights that 
link an economic system with a political structure and a legal regime (Bazelon, 
1963; Becker, 1977; Reeve, 1986; Pejovich, 1990) – the right to use, the right to 
capture benefits, the right to change its form and substance, and the right to 
transfer – is intentionally kept ambiguous or fragmentary by the state (see Chapter 
One, section 1.3). In particular, exclusivity and transferability, the two rights 
which, in terms of neo-classical economists, can generate powerful incentives to 
pursue economic efficiency and distributive justice, and places limits on the action 
of individuals and governments (Alchian, 1965; Posner, 1973; Paul et al., 1994), 
are not clearly delineated, left in the vacuum. 
 
This relatively common pool resource situation creates extremely complicated 
bundles of rights. While outright purchase expenditures are strictly constrained, 
however, villagers, as landlords, can rent their property to migrants, as tenants. In 
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reality, it forms what Logan and Molotch (1987: 22) refer to as a “place market”. 
Villagers’ land has been acquired for one purpose but was found to be more 
valuable when rented for other uses. At this point their interest shifts from the use 
values of the HBL to its exchange value, or, in Mills’ (1969: 233) terms, 
“marginal productivity”. Given this, most villagers either had an affinity for 
on-site relocation and in-kind compensation or demanded off-site relocation and 
monetary compensation in terms of the full market price of urban land and 
property. While villagers saw this benefit as their legal entitlement deriving from 
their local citizenship, government saw villagers as free-riders who input zero 
prices for using HBL and their entitlement as undeserving welfare.  
 
Villagers’ demands were unreasonable for the government in two ways. 
Firstly, they contradicted government’s perception that though villagers were 
granted the use rights of HBL, and had the property right of housings, they did 
not have the full legal rights to their land. Ideologically, the HBL was owned by 
the state and the government has the authority to evict people from it; the 
compensation should be simply to meet villagers’ dwelling demand (90 m2 for 
each household, according to the assumed per capital urban land use), not 
according to how many square metres of the existing properties that villagers 
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built. Secondly, according to the Agrarian Law and the Revised Land 
Administration Law, the HBL, as a category of rural land, is collectively owned 
by collectives of villagers and not allowed to be transferred in the land market. 
The property on the HBL is not allowed to be transferred in the real estate market 
either. This means the compensation should not be in terms of the market rate of 
urban land and property. This debate is related, but not identical, to a much wider 
discussion surrounding the LUR reform during the revision of the Constitution in 
1988 and the Land Administration Law in the late 1990s, in which the 
transferring of collectively owned land in the land market was concluded as 
contradicting the national legal-political framework for land rights and the 
existing property law systems and may be harmful to the valorization of urban 




While confining themselves to the sphere of rule-creation, the policy makers 
cannot foresee and/or forestall properly the responses of local people. Two 
categories of residents in the urban-villages – villagers and migrants – are 
considered, but each one separately. They ignored migrants’ dwelling concerns 
and needs in the city. This in turn ignored the villagers’ need to make a living. The 
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 About the debate during the presentation of the draft for the Revised Land 
Administration Law in the late 1980s, see Ho, 2005. 
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underlying tone is the interlocking of migrants’ needs and villages’ demands. 
Migrants’ needs have been internalized into villagers’ demand. Planners were 
failing to respond to local villagers’ job needs – the other aspect of urban 
existence. An official noted in interview that,  
 
‘the intention of the regeneration was simply to meet villagers’ dwelling 
demand, without taking into consideration how these peasants, after 
losing their arable land, are going to make their livings. So far, this 
issue remains unsolved. It is the biggest mistake of the government
39.’ 
 
The HBL controversy signifies a more fundamental conflict. Local citizenship 
has concentrated on wealth redistribution, producing a characteristic pattern of the 
“rentier local state” and a rent-dependent local population in areas where local 
capitalism rather than enterprise organized by local government has been 
predominant. While providing security, rural-based institution was seen by 
urban-based institutes as reducing incentives for hard work. It also led to welfare 
dependency and hence as major obstacles to modernization. The chief planner of 
the municipal planning bureau, in interview, voiced some frustrations to the 
urban-villages problem: 
 
‘In fact, the government is hoist with its own petard. […] The 
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 Interview with Xion Jingjung on 14
th
 December 2007. 
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Guangzhou Municipal Government built at the beginning of city 
expansion infrastructure like roads, electricity, etc. And then the price of 
land in villages rose. Now these peasants criticize that the government 
doesn’t want to spend money on the regeneration of these villages. But 
we actually did! We spent money already at the beginning! Those 
peasants don’t see it. Only when these peasants see buildings do they 
say that it is money
40.’ 
 
Rent levels are based on the location of a property vis-à-vis other places, on its 
“particularity” (Lösch, 1954: 508). In Marxian conceptual terms, entrepreneurs 
establish the rent according to the “differential” locational advantage of one site 
over another. Gaining “different rent” necessarily depends on the fate of other 
parcels and those who own the use of them (see Gaffney, 1961). In economists’ 
language, each property use spills over to other parcels and, as part of these 
“externality effects,” crucially determines what every other property will be. The 
“web of externalities” (Qadeer, 1981: 172) affects and entrepreneur’s particular 
holding (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 24). From the perspective of the chief planner, 
renters pay what the villagers, who are landlords, demand, not because the 
housing unit is worth it, but because the property is held to have what Logan and 
Molotch (1987, 18) term “idiosyncratic locational benefits holding”. This benefit 
is therefore taking advantage of the positive externalities created by the urban 
development such as “re-distributional rent” (Walker, 1974) – the substantial rent 
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increments that come with specific government activity, or what Musgrave (1959) 
refers to as “merit goods” provided by the government, and relieving 
responsibility for negative externalities created by the actions in the 
urban-villages. 
 
While land-related institutions at the national level continues to play an 
important role in shaping the policymaking process of the urban-village 
regeneration, the conflict between use and exchange values over land and 
buildings under an ambiguous property right regime has led to a “regime of 
bargaining” (Walder, 1992). The Party Secretary Lin Shusen’s defensive 
performative utterance towards profit-seeking private developers, as a higher level 
discourse, has been internalized by lower lever discourses such as those of 
academics and policymakers, and largely restricted the viable schemes in the 
following years. In the initial governmental projects, the regeneration projects 
always have difficulties to move from proposal to construction. Li Lixuan, who 
also drafted a number of planning documents for the Guangzhou Municipal 




‘At that moment, the government was not only keen to know what this 
problem is but also the way to solve it. The mayor was in a hurry to 
know exactly how many urban-villages are in Guangzhou. The problem 
of the urban-villages is urgent, could not wait. It became a political 




In the conjuncture of perceived or real “failure” in its own terms, this 
statement of urgency was mobilized to justify the validity of the problem defining 
and agenda setting underpinning policies of the regeneration and management of 
the urban-villages. It diverted attention away from increasing more knowledge of 
the problem and possible solutions, more data-bases, and carrying out more 
research, to solving problems. The lack of data in part reinforces the need to form 
ad hoc strategy towards a structural policy. Government desire to solve the 
problem in a short period of time was linked to governance failures, outside the 
legitimate domain of governmental intervention in which such desire arose was 
characterised by a growing spatial polarisation. It is this confluence that leads the 
perception of “villages with problems” shifts to “urban-villages as a problem”.  
 
4.3 From “Villages with Problems” to “Urban-Villages as a Problem”. 
The definition of the urban-village in different official documents changes 
according to the situations of different villages. For example, in the official 
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documents of some districts, the urban-village means those village collective 
organizations with urban residents (not villagers or peasants) in urban regions. In 
some other documents, the number of the urban-villages was not counted by 
“village” but by “street”. If a street is evaluated as unsightly, it is counted as an 
“urban-village”. In 2001, the mayor quoted Li’s calculation and announced to the 
public that there were 45 urban-villages in Guangzhou. According to the Land and 
Housing Bureau, there were 69 urban-villages. Li explained retrospectively to me 
during an extended interview, ‘It depends on which criteria the city refers to. 
According to the 266 km
2
 built-up area in 1995, there are 109 urban-villages in 
Guangzhou. Nevertheless, according to the 385 km
2 
planning area in 2010, there 
are 139 urban-villages.’ 
 
In these official documents, the term urban-village means those village 
settlements geographically located in the city region but still maintaining any 
element of the rural system, i.e. collective owned land, rural census, villagers’ 
committee, or village administration like village economic cooperatives and 
township collective economic entities
42
. This definition, however, is not well 
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 Though the definitions of the urban-village are different, the ways of 
regeneration of urban-villages in different districts are more or less the same. 
See “The Method for Regeneration of the Urban-Villages in ChinHuanDao”, 
2003. 
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defined. And this leads to difficulties in the implementation of regeneration. As is 
said in The Progress Report of the regeneration of the “urban-villages”, in 2002: 
 
“Every relevant department in the government, according to its own 
duty, has its own different concept and understanding of the 
urban-villages. As to the number of urban-villages in Guangzhou, 
different departments and institutes also have different answers. In order 
to implement policies and classify duties of departments in government, 
City Building Committee, City Committee Policy Research Centre, 
Municipal Government Research Centre, Urban Planning Department, 
State Land and Housing Management Department, Department of Civil 
Affairs, Department of Rural Affairs, and District Government, did 
research together and define the term “urban-village” as: “those rural 
villages geographically locate in Guangzhou’s urban planning area 
approved by State Council
43.”  
 
Therefore, later in 2006, a key document produced by the Guangzhou 
Planning Bureau, “The Instruction for the Integration of the institutional reform 
of the urban-villages in Guangzhou”, refers to the “urban-village” in the 
following terms: “in the city region approved by State Council, those village 
settlements which still maintain the village system, collective land, and villagers’ 
committee. Or those village settlements in which all the villagers have been 
transformed into urban residents, but their land using, environment, urban form, 
etc., still maintain initial rural characters.” By this definition, Guangzhou city in 
                                                 
43
 Report of the Regeneration of Urban-Village. Guangzhou Building Committee, 
26 September 2002. 
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the PRD, compared to other cities in China, has the largest amount of the 
urban-villages: There are 139 villages defined as urban-villages (see table 4.1), 
with a total square measure of 12.57 km². While this is only 4.7% of the total 
urban area of Guangzhou (270 km²), it has a population of 1,200,000 (including 
immigrants, i.e. the flow of a population driven by economic opportunities), 





Table 4.1 The number of Urban-villages in different districts of Guangzhou 
District Baiyuan Tianhe Haizhu Fangcun Huangpu Liwan 
urban-villages 55 28 20 17 16 3 
(Source: Planning Bureau, Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2002) 
 
In an official document conducted by Li Lixuan, the 139 urban-villages were 
ranked to each other in terms of their location, stage of development, and their 
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position vis-à-vis the process of urban expansion. Based on these criteria, the 
urban-villages were hierarchically classified into three categories:  
 
• Embryonic urban-villages: those village sites located in the urban land use plan, 
but far from built areas and retaining a large amount of farmland.  
• Immature urban-villages: those villages retained a certain amount of farmland. 
They are locales where urban development approaches the rural boundary, and 
where urban and rural land uses interface.  
• Mature urban-villages: those villages whose farmland has been completely 
converted into urban uses, but village residential sites [the HBL] remain as rural 
enclaves isolated within built-up urban areas.  
 
In interview, Li Lixuan explained that the figure of 139 urban-villages is 
merely a generalization and can be misleading. In his opinion, the 45 
urban-villages in the category of “mature urban-villages” were those which should 
be the top priority for regeneration
45
. Nevertheless, after the figure was defined, 
the emphasis of the Guangzhou Municipal Government fell on the estimation that 
it needed 250 billion RMB to regenerate all the 139 urban-villages. This is 40.4% 
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of the GPD of Guangzhou as a whole. Such a shift of emphasis justified the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government’s statement saying that it was not likely to 
prioritise such expenditure to the regeneration of all the 139 urban-villages, nor 
was it seen by the government as a cost-effective way of regeneration. Lin Shusen, 
the Party Secretary of Guangzhou Municipality, avowed in October 2002 that: 
 
“The government has already put lots of efforts into the regeneration of 
the urban-villages. We have done a lot. We will follow the model of the 
regeneration of the old city area. Nevertheless, we will not have a time 
schedule of the regeneration. It may take 20 years or 30 years. We will 
not demolish all the urban-villages in one or two years
46.” 
 
Together with the rhetoric which emerged within the earlier narratives (see 
Chapter Two, section 2.3), the language of “impossibility” permeated official 
explanations, and is combined with institutional barriers and cost-benefit 
calculations to explain why the government could not solve the problem in a short 
period of time. It was also strategically deployed by officials in articulating their 
strategies to expand the definition of the problem of some villages to all the 
villages in the urban area. Rather than containing and limiting the “problem” to 
“pockets” in some urban areas where villages need special help to solve their 
problems, what can be seen in the idiom of the rationality is the precautionary 
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principle. One of the key policymakers and planners, Li Lixuan, said in interview: 
 
‘Why is the urban-village defined in this way? This is because we have 
to prevent the emergence of new urban-villages in the future. The 
ultimate development of the urban-villages is the root-and-branch 
urbanization, i.e. the transformation from rural to urban, from villagers 
to citizens, and from rural management to urban management. This 
transformation includes physical urban form, economic structure and 
organization, community structure and management, ways of living, 
quality of people, etc. It is a process of synthetic transformation. It 




Which village is or is not considered as an urban-village was thus subject to 
processes of attribution, which are, in turn, subject to the strategic calculation of 
the government. An appraisal of the process of defining urban-village and how 
the studies were conducted can help us to identify what the problem is. The data 
of the urban-villages compiled from research papers, official documents, and 
local newspapers are presented in Table 4.2 and 4.3. These data have their own 
specialized use in diverse relations with the formal political apparatus and are 
therefore geared towards various planning and other purposes, some towards 
social-economic, some towards political, some towards land-use, some towards 
social provision.  
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Table 4.2 Data from of Street Office, Tianhe District (2003) 
street Shiahe Denfong Chepo Tianhenan Linhe Xinhwua Shiadong Shipai 
area (k㎡) 1.26 4.75 5.6 2.48 3.8 4.228 2.16 4.3 
total Population 45809 85456 76000 68468 72671 66149 35483 250000 
Inhabitants 41419 44888 24000 51394 41795 27544 18500 130000 
Village cooperatives 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
street Wushain Tangxia Yuan Tianyuan Liede Xian YuanGang 
area (k㎡) 10.59 7.42 5.371 4.038 3.1 4.07 3.238 
total Population 99601 88006 59124 64663 22000 33890 40000 
Inhabitants 69601 38006 37219 47521 10000 8890 8000 
Village cooperatives 0 2 1 0 3 1 1 
 
street Huang Changxin Fonghuang Longdong Chianqing Xintang Zhuji 
area (k㎡) 6.17 13.215 22.998 11.7 4.9 14.95 10.015 
total Population 48220 39138 28573 60000 20019 51289 15547 
Inhabitants 19820 18698 12753 35000 5000 10289 8930 
Village cooperatives 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 




Table 4.3 Sample of the data of the urban-villages in Guangzhou 
Village Yangji Leide Xian Shipai Tangxia Tangdong SanYuanLi Kangle Linhe 
area (k ㎡) 0.29 0.31 0.185 0.747 1.7 3.1 6.8 0.904  
Buildings 1496  3000 3656 3580 2580    
Villagers 5253 7865 2860 130000 4000  5,000  2,300 


















10,000 20,000 5,000 
(Source: calculated from data collected from local newspapers, academic 





While loosely assembled together, they also embody what Merton (1965) 
refers to as the “palimpsestic syndrome48”: the information declines in the papers, 
documents, and articles making use of it. The central message is that there are 
definitional inconsistencies and problematical enumerations permeating the data. 
In interview, Chan Chengming, Vice Chief of Bureau of Urban Utilities and 
Landscaping of Guangzhou Municipality, described how the data are 
characterized by a lack of consistency and comparability: 
 
‘In some cases, different official documents have different data about 
the same village. For example, Tangxia Village in 1996 has a 
population of 3189 (peasant hukou) according to the local police station, 
6759 according to the Rural Statistical Yearbook, but 847 according to 
the Economic Statistic Division. In some cases, the statistical standards 
are different. For example, in some villages, the meaning of population 
is only the amount of people who are with peasant hukou. In some 
villages, it includes people with peasant hukou and people with 
non-peasant hukou. In some other villages, all the residents (people with 
peasant hukou, non-peasant hukou, and migrants whose hukou are not 
registered in Guangzhou) are counted into the demographics. In some 
cases, the data are merely confusing. This may be the result of 
administrative change. For example, a village disappears in 1986 but 
reappears in the data in 1996. This may be the result of the complex 
hukou transferring. For example, in the official document of a villagers’ 
committee, the total population is 584, but there are 810 in the labour 
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These blurred references and deliberate mixing of the categories add much 
perplexity to the reading of the relevant statistics and compound misunderstanding. 
Despite the existence of numerical discrepancies resulting from different methods 
and data resources, what is worse is that the collected data might be adjusted by 
villagers’ committees. Commenting on this, an official in the Land and Housing 
Bureau, who wished to remain anonymous, said in interview: 
 
‘It is difficult to get access to these villages and acquire the “real” data. 
Statistical data are adjusted by villagers’ committees on purposes. The 
contrived adjustment of statistical data has become an open secret in 
China, no matter in academics or government. For example, almost 
every local authority has two account books. One is for itself to 
document the real situation. Another one, with adjusted statistical data, 
is used to report to the higher level authority or the public. In fact, 
because counterfeiting data has become a common practice, leaders of 
many villages even don’t know what the real situations or data are. 
There are two ways of adjustment: raising or lowering data. In general, 
in some thriving villages, in order not to “crop up”, or in order to 
develop “steadily”, following the plan, or maybe for the reason to pay 
less tax, the data would be understated. In some other poorer villages, 
the data would be overstated to “gain” more official approbation. There 
is a saying from higher level government: in terms of a region, the data 
will get its balance since the data of some villages are understated while 
some others are overstated (Field notes, May 2007).’ 
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The availability of reliable socio-demographic information about migrants is 
always an issue. In many party-state documents and officially censored social 
science publications, the demography is often referred to villagers who may not 
necessarily be dwellers in the urban-villages. The data is less concerned with 
estimating the volume of all documented/undocumented migrants than villagers, 
and hence the number of migrants is merely a rough estimation. Besides, villagers 
are often hesitant to engage in governmental research or give the real information 
for fear of apprehension. As Li Lixuan recounted:  
 
‘Many times we have sent personnel to villages to investigate and 
collect information such as property conditions, social-demography of 
villagers and migrants, levels of income, and education. But [villagers 
and migrants] didn’t cooperate. They didn’t cooperate because of many 
reasons. Villagers were afraid of being asked to pay tax or penalty [of 
illegal buildings], or losing compensation in the future regeneration, 
while [undocumented] migrants were afraid of being deported, of being 
amerced [for having illegitimate children], or being put in jail
50.’ 
 
The confusion also partly resulted from the fact that the city referred to at least 
three different things. In some circumstances, it referred to built-up or urbanized 
areas. In other instances, it referred to planning areas or those areas that the 
planning bureau has made through urban planning intervention. In yet other 
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circumstances, it referred to administrative areas, or those areas under the 
jurisdiction of the Guangzhou Municipal Government. These criteria were 
different ways of classifying space, whose definitions and boundaries were de 
facto changing all the time. According to the Guangzhou Comprehensive Plan in 





between 1980 and 1999 (also see Tang and Chung, 2002: 43-44; Zhang et al., 
2003: 919) (see figure 4.2). In 2000, the State Council defined the planning area 
of Guangzhou as 385 km
2 
in 2010. The administrative area has been also changing 
from 1443.6 km
2
 to 3718.5 km
2
 from 2000 to 2009 (See Chapter Five, section 5.3). 
Whereas most of the time, the urbanized area refers to the planning area, in reality, 
the three criteria were confused due to the city striving to redefine the meaning of 
the suburban boundary, to the extent that even the data of the built-up area of 
Guangzhou Municipality in the Guangzhou Comprehensive Plan in 1994 is a mix 
of the three criteria (see table 4.4).  
 
 
Table 4.4 Built-up Area of Guangzhou Municipality 
Year 1949 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1995 1998 2000 2005 2010 
area (k㎡) 54.4 136 139 142 148 157 163 167 176 182 266 276 335 403 446 
















(Source: Guangzhou Comprehensive Plan, 1994) 
 
 
It seems that the aim of the policy makers is seeking to create an overall and 
holistic strategy for the city, rather than searching for pragmatic but piecemeal 
solutions for this or that particular village. While not every urban-village is 
located in out-of-the-way geographical peripheries, all of them are seen as social 
peripheries which are, in terms of Shield (1991: 3), “left behind in the modern 
race for progress”. Such a discussion takes us directly into the realm of 
marginality, relations of power, with particular attention to the role of language. 
The urban-villages as marginal places, with marginal status, come from 
out-of-the-way geographical locations, and are the site of illicit and disdained 
social activities. To be sure, the concept of marginality takes on a geographic as 
well as a social meaning (Bailly, 1986: 50; Shield, 1991: 3). 
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The hierarchical distinction which categorizes the urban-villages into three 
categories (embryonic, immature, and mature) combines a corporeal vocabulary 
with a spatial vocabulary of disease and deploys the term “urban-village” as an 
organic urban metaphor. It implies a way of conceptualization, in which the 
urban-villages, as morbid tumours, are imagined in clinical or epidemic form. 
This medical point of view understands the urban-villages as singular bodily 
diseases. Each of them is a bounded tumour, with its own incipient stage, 
immature stage, and mature stage. Based on this medical topography, the aim of 
the pathology is to kill pathogens, reduce disease, and control possible sites of 
inflection and proliferation. An ideological equation of the urban-villages as 
tumours instils particular “imaginary geographies” (Shield, 1991) into popular 
consciousness. These have been transformed into institutional policies, political 
economic arrangement, and empirically-specificable everyday actions such as 
local people’s investment and disinvestment strategies – themes which recur later 
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This way of defining concentrates upon that which is observable and 
measurable and, hence, leads to either descriptive definitions or definitions based 
on socio-spatial characteristics. In other words, the urban-village has been already 
“defined” by those doing the classifying. As Shield (1991: 168) expresses it, in 
the context of discussing similar attempts to “define” the “Far North” of Canada:  
 
“The appeal to popular perception is indicative of a tautological circle 
in all of these studies; starting out from commonsensical intuition, 
statistics are gathered and then interpreted in the light of commonsense. 
Thus ennobled by the clothes of empiricism, commonsense is 
represented as scientific conclusion
52.” 
 
Following this, the “definition” here is better seen as tools for the articulation 
of specific aspects of the urban-village than as a way of defining the 
“urban-village”. The methods involve trying to fit a definition to what is 
intuitively considered to be “urban-village”, in the absence of any other 
justification as to why properties built on the HBL were thought to produce to a 
distinctively negative rural character. It is in this method of calculation that the 
urban-villages in Guangzhou were presented as a binary issue: land which is 
collectively owned or state owned (see figure 4.3).  
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(Source: Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 2000) 
 
Note: Whereas Osborne and Rose (1999: 742) say, “mapping facilitated 
analysis.” Here, analyses were influenced by mapping. A map of the 
urban-villages in Guangzhou done by the Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau 
was made according to the built-up area in 2000. 
 
The form and character of regeneration programmes that the government 
conducted did not fit to the institutional structures. In order to operationalize this 
rationality, a set of governmental programmes have been introduced. In the late 
1990s to the early 2000s, the Guangzhou Municipal Government enunciated the 
institutional reform policy (IRP) and “one village one strategy” as two guiding 
principles for the regeneration of all the 139 urban-villages in Guangzhou. Central 
to the narrative contained in “one village one strategy” principle is the argument 
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that due to the conditions of villages were complicated and very different from 
each other, the government might not be able to take all villages’ variations into 
consideration. In the IRP, it, on the one hand, defined the term urban-village. On 
the other hand, it identified four steps to transfer the governance arrangements 
from rural-based institutions to urban-based institutions. There were multiple 
purposes and motivations in the governmental policy of the institutional reform of 
the urban-villages. The most important one was the aim to transform collectively 
owned land into state owned land. As Li Lixuan described in interview, the 
rationale was simple and explicit: 
 
‘At the outset the physical form was a key concern of the leader of the 
government. The aim of our program was to improve the physical form 
of these villages. But we encountered institutional and regulatory 
impediments. We found that we tackled symptoms rather than causes, 
and relatively little could be done under the existing rural-urban 
dichotomy system, especially those land-related issues. The root 
problem of why the plans we made didn’t work is that the housing base 
lands of these villages were collectively owned. The best way to solve 
this problem is to transform the collectively owned land into state 
owned land. In order to do this, we need a policy to transform the 




The policy’s major proposition concerned the transferring of the HBL, which 
was decisively confined by the existing institutional arrangements. In the design 
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of the Agrarian Law, only the collectively owned land can be transferred into state 
owned land – not the other way around. Policymakers referred to Clause 5 of 
Article 2 of the Regulation of Land Management as a merit. In this stipulation, it 
notes: “The following lands belong to the whole people and are state owned: the 
land collectively owned by those people who were members of the collective 
economic organization of village and later transferred as urban residents.” Based 
on the redirecting of this ordinance, the policy design appropriated the “condition” 
of people and things described in this stipulation into a kind of “causality”. In 
other words, the initial design of this stipulation was interpreted as the condition 
that if those people who were members of the collective economic organization of 
a village are later transferred as urban residents, then, the land collectively owned 
by those people can become state owned. This appropriation is plausible and 
becomes a useful pathway to circumvent the institutional barriers since the 
language of law is not to explain the terms it uses, but to give these terms 
operational definitions.  
 
Though the term “urban-village” was adopted in the official documents, it was 
not translated properly into policy. In the regeneration process, the validity of the 
pragmatist but piecemeal approach was questioned. As said in a minute of Tianhe 
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Politics Consultation Committee in 2004, “The Paper for the Research of the 
Regeneration of the Urban-Villages in Tianhe District,” the district government 
analyzed the predicament of the implementation of the regeneration:  
 
“The regeneration of the urban-villages is a very complex task. It is 
involved with economic, social, cultural, and political issues. It is 
concerned with the interests of the village collective entity, villagers 
(residents), government, and the subject of regeneration. Therefore, it is 
difficult if it is based merely on government’s official documents, meeting 
records, or public statements of leaders, without registration of concrete 
laws. […] In the regeneration of the old city areas, in which the land is 
owned by the State, there has been a complete system of laws and 
regulations for compensation, demolishing, and rebuilding. However, to 
date, in the regeneration of the urban-villages, because the land is not 
owned by the State, but collectively owned by villagers, it is difficult to 
adopt the vested laws and regulation for compensation, demolishing, and 
rebuilding. As to the regulations for the land collectively owned by 
villages, most of them are absent, especially those for practices.” 
 
In fact, the IRP is a belated legitimization of the already expanding local 
experimentation judged by authorities to be worth promoting as formal changes. 
Compared to property-led regeneration, which is a visible achievement, the IRP 
was seen, by some, as a post facto policy that only had a marginal influence on the 
process of the regeneration. For others, it was implemented in a fragmented way 
and no more than an empty institution that remains a paper agreement or a hollow 
shell with little social effect. It seems that this policy was far from being felt on 
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the ground. As the leader of Shipai Village commented in interview, the IRP is ‘a 
change that doesn’t change too much54’. However, while government regeneration 
projects had difficulties to move from proposal to construction stage, the “one 
village one strategy” principle and the IRP, which were equally strong processes 
at work, gradually played a role at the heart of government-led regeneration 
projects. The result was a much more complex and rapidly evolving set of 
institutions that govern the urban-villages. 
 
I will return to this later in Chapter Five, to the way in which the incomplete 
implementation of the IRP led to the invention of a set of technologies that govern 
the urban-villages, but, in closing this section, I would like to draw attention to the 
strategic role it plays. The IRP, together with “one village one strategy” principle, 
functioned more as a political statement to say that the problem of the 
urban-villages has been regulated and hence mitigated. It is a statement to convey 
a concept that government has a comprehensive strategy for local authorities and 
actors to follow. These two programmes can be read as what Peck and Tickell 
(2002) refer to a form of “crisis management”, as the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government sought ways to have a better social and economic performance in a 
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period of rapid urban expansion. The discourse of these two programs, with the 
desire for a rapid development as the central story line, came to be the most 
legitimate way to speak about the urban-village problems. These two programmes 
provided a discursive solution to the need to form an ad hoc strategy towards a 
structural policy. However, except for the incomplete implementation of the IRP, 
and, as described in Chapter Two (section 2.3), media’s reiteration and repetition 
of government’s resolve to rekindle the articulation of the urban-village 
regeneration, from 1996 to 2006, under the leadership of Party Secretary of the 
Guangzhou Municipality, Lin Shusen, who repudiated private developers’ 
participation in the regeneration of the urban-villages, the first round of the 
urban-villages regeneration movement witnessed a deadlock.  
 
4.4 Multiple and Contradictory Rights to the City. 
Lin Shusen left for the Deputy Party Secretary of Guezhou Province in July 
2006, and Zhou Xiaodang replaced Lin Shusen and was assigned as the new Party 
Secretary of Guangzhou Municipality. In the “Two Sessions” in March 2007, 
Chang Kuangning, the mayor of Guangzhou, declared that “real-estate developers 
are welcomed to partake in the regeneration of the urban-villages.” In the mayor’s 
much quoted aphorism, a bundle of statements was declared: “those who benefit 
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from the urban-villages regeneration should pay,” “government should take on a 
facilitating role in the regeneration of the urban-villages,” “villagers are the 
subject rather than the object of the regeneration”, and “it is a win-win outcome 
for villagers, government, and private developers. Only a policy that benefits 
government, collective cooperative, and villagers simultaneously can be likely 
able to be implemented successfully
55”. These statements marked a shift in policy 
and gave rise to the second round of the urban-villages regeneration movement. 
 
In this rhetoric, on the one hand, the political change provided a platform that 
transferred regeneration initiatives, which were used to be seen as the 
government’s liability, to market operations. On the other hand, in the mayor’s 
much quoted aphorism, villagers were changed from the objects who the 
government off-load its responsibility to, to the subjects who the government 
works in partnership with. The leader of the Tianhe District Government, Xu 
Hetian, recalled in interview: 
 
‘The mayor stated clearly that “the government will not scramble 
interests with people”. He gave two tenets to the regeneration of Leide 
Village. The first is that villagers are the subject of the regeneration. 
The Guangzhou Municipal Government and district government will 
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not fund the project. The expenditure will be from the land transfer fee 
of the HBL of the village. And the balance of revenue and expenditure 
should therefore be ensured. The resettlement of villagers and the 
development of collective economic should also be ensured. The second 
is about the auction of the LUR of the HBL. Except for the required fee 
and tax, the land transfer fee will be used in the regeneration of the 
urban-village. […] The subject of the regeneration of Leide Village 
shall be Leide Villagers’ Committee. Therefore, the project should be 
the issue of the self-governing organization. All the decisions and 




What Xu said reflects the changing tone of the mayor’s statement with its 
emphasis on “subject” and “self-governing organization”. From a Foucauldian 
perspective, the crucial issue was the use of the word “facilitating”, suggesting 
that the emphasis was much more on a reduction in the government’s role and a 
greater emphasis on the positive narratives of local villagers with village 
cooperative and an apparently increased role for private real estate developers. 
Nevertheless, it did not mean that the scope for governmental intervention was 
reduced, but, rather, by narrating the direct role of the government as supportive, 
the Guangzhou Municipal Government played a pivotal role in the regeneration 
projects.  
 
“One village one strategy” principle set out a space in which decisions can be 
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calculated. It created a language to justify the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government’s initiatives with different degrees of government intervention from 
creating optimal conditions for market operation, participation of business sector 
and the public, to a range of microregulatory interventions. For instance, in the 
project of Huadi Village regeneration in Haizhu District, the degree of 
government intervention was no more than district level. However, in the project 
of Leide village regeneration in Tianhe District, the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government had more political and economic interest/pressure due to the location 
of Leide Village is in the CBD ambit. It was not the district government or street 
office but the Guangzhou Municipal Government that has actively facilitated this 
project by employing economic levers to attract private investment and encourage 
real estate development, and making policy interventions such as offering 
favourable policies for land acquisition, demolition and relocation (see figure 4.4). 
In order to deliver the regeneration project more quickly, the affected residents 
were offered compensation packages that include not only compensation for 
villagers’ legal entitlement but also compensation for villagers’ illegal 
construction and displaced migrants’ cash compensation for rent. While a better 
compensation deal was offered in the Leide Village regeneration project, the chief 
of the planning bureau explained publicly: “The regeneration of Leide Village is 
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special. It cannot be seen as a model for all the urban-villages in Guangzhou
57.”  
 

















(Source: author’s photo) 
Note: In the urban planning, Leide Bridge was planned as the second main bridge 
connecting Tianhe District and Haizhou District. The bridge approach was 
planned directly cutting through the Leide Village. While the planning of the 
Leide Bridge was under discussion, the issues relating to the future of Leide 
Village were sensitive and left aside in any meetings. The building of Leide 
Bridge started in 2006. In 2007, half of Leide Bridge was constructed, from the 
Haizhou District. The Leide Bridge which loomed ahead to the Leide village 
further validated the “demolition-redevelopment”. As an official in the city 
government said, “After all, it is meaningless to preserve the village since there 
will be only two small plots of land left at the two side of the bridge after the 
bridge is done (Field notes, January 2008).” 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 16 October 2007. 
219 
The new regeneration initiatives had an attention to reconstruct the 
regeneration coalition adhering to market-oriented operation. It seems that “one 
village one strategy” gained new traction to tackle the structural socio-economic 
problems of these villages to reflect on the unequal distribution of growth, 
opportunities, and place potential. It was intended to be rearticulated to suggest 
the encouragement of the horizontal modes of coordination between agencies and 
local authority-driven regimes to develop local solutions to local problems. 
 
However, in the absence of a programmatic elaboration to translate the “one 
village one strategy” principle into a set of techniques to frame local development 
decisions, this guiding principle remains little more than a political slogan 
deployed to narrow government responsibility. It turns out that villagers were 
cautious about this “benevolent mask” and questioned the consistency of this 
policy agenda. A village party secretary commented during interviewing: 
 
‘Though Chang Kuang-Ning, the mayor of Guangzhou said so, it is 
difficult to say. As you know, the ex-mayor didn’t allow real estate 
developers to do the regeneration (Field notes, March 2007).’  
 
A party secretary of a street office also said,  
 
‘The government has advocated “one village one strategy” for a long 
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time. But there is no tangible strategy, nor does the government set out 
any clear set of plan for us to follow. Now the government has defined a 
direction of the regeneration by declaring that private developers are 
allowed to intervene. This direction is based on the current leader’s 
mind, but what if the next leader changes his mind? The plan is already 
there and we wish to speed up, the planning bureau has to have criteria 
in order to discover breaches, such as FAR, or to set out a clear and 
complete set of plan for us to follow (Field notes, March 2007).’  
 
An official in the Policy Research Office of the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government, who wished to remain anonymous, commented to me during an 
extended interview:  
 
‘In fact, “one village one strategy” means “no strategy”! [...] (with 
mischievously smile)  However, it is the best principle for the 
regeneration of the urban-villages. Since every village has its own 
specific situations, needs, and priorities, each village has to seek for its 
“opportunity” to move their regeneration projects from proposal to 
construction. It is the duty of local authorities to make the case for 
government support (Field notes, April 2007).’ 
 
Again, in line with neoliberal rhetoric, it became the responsibility of local 
authorities to accelerate the regeneration of the targeted villages by supporting 
public-private partnerships and develop bottom-up strategies, assessed by the 
municipal planning bureau. In seeking for the “right” types of regeneration to take 
place, there was no strategy for local authorities to follow. Local authorities 
scrutinized their peers (those of other villages) and guessed what the Guangzhou 
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Municipal Government prefers, or in their words, “to discover the breaches”.  
 
As I have reiterated, while the land and housing systems, which used to be 
based entirely on use value, have been transformed into ones which are based on 
exchange value, the development constraints within the HBL are still continuing. 
Different from the previous welfare housing system under which all housing units 
were assumed to be of identical location value, with their difference only in size 
and layout, differential land rent has become an essential component of housing 
costs and benefits. The rural-urban dichotomy continues to play a fundamentally 
important role in shaping the policymaking process. Most villagers have an 
affinity for on-site relocation and in-kind compensation rather than off-site 
relocation and monetary compensation. The inherent issue is to what extent 
villagers can claim their entitlement. At its core is the transformation of use value 
and exchange value. These issues were again posed, albeit differently, in 2007. 
What has been hidden is the intention to appropriate and marketize the hitherto 
uncommondified realms. This influences the understanding of whom or what is in 
relation to the urban-village regeneration. 
 
In part driven by the new Property Law, effective in 2007, one of the key 
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features in the regeneration of Leide Village at the end of 2007 was the new 
approach to the property rights conversion. As it said, “demolish one square metre, 
compensate one square metre”, it is a principle for the exchange of property rights 
or a real estate transaction price of monetary compensation. In the new planning 
project of Leide Village, the design institute at the beginning provided four 






, and 60 m
2
. Only two 
villagers chose the 200 m
2 





The villagers explained in interview: ‘I don’t want a big apartment. I prefer 
smaller apartments because in the future, my sons and daughters can live 
separately.’ Nevertheless, as the chief architect commented during interview, 
‘they prefer smaller apartments because they can rent their apartments to tenants.’ 
Though the apartments for resettlement were not allowed to be commodified and 
exchanged, actually, the use value of villagers is acquiesced to be able to be 
transformed into exchange value. Villagers behave in the way they behave. That is, 
they continue their life by being landlords.  
 
Now, it is interesting to note that in terms of the ethical criterion of the 
criticisms in the early 2000s, actually, villagers are still rentiers. However, this 
kind of negative discourse of the urban-village was strikingly absent from public 
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media. Instead of addressing this issue, the discussions about the Leide Village 
regeneration focused on market operations. The narratives surrounding the 
launching of the regeneration of Leide Village was dominated by building better 
housing for villagers and the upgrading of villagers’ living standards, with the 
tone that it is through the generosity of the government. The regeneration was 
heavily market-driven. Nevertheless, issues relating to profit-making, profitability, 
government’s compromise in market-led strategies and making room for high 
value-added investment and development, and why the use value of villagers is 
acquiesced to be able to be transformed into exchange value, were deliberately 
toned town.  
 
Instead, social oriented agendas were emphasized or used to enhance political 
support and legitimacy. In the provided political context and in part given the 
media control of government, local newspapers were filled with articles 
nostalgically yearning for the fading away of ancestral shrines of clans, dragon 
boat race on the Lei River, and the cultural life of villagers. Ironically, this 
nostalgia was in the past portrayed by the same local newspapers as a backward 
and improper part of urban life and should be eradicated and replaced by ‘proper’ 
urban physical constructions and social structures (see Chapter Two, section 2.3). 
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In celebrating the new environmental amenity, what was in the past seen as 
backward when occupied by villagers and migrants, became a selling point when 
high-end real-estate was proposed.  
 
For profit-seeking property developers, rising land value is the single most 
vital factor for profitability. This need is for high-value end uses, including 
expensive commercial developments and residential apartments. The rationality of 
urban-village regeneration is dominated by property-led regeneration. The overall 
programmes have not sought to tackle wider problems such as the 
undersubscription of affordable housing for lower income migrants. Such views 
are of relatively little concern to the policy-makers, planners, and developers, for 
whom the regeneration is primarily about meeting the needs of property market 
investors and villagers. There were different procedures for groups with and 
without title deeds in the relocation process. In seeking to balance between 
economic efficiency, developers’ interests, social equality and equity, and affected 
residents’ interests, however, what has been absent is the voice of excluded group 
categorized as inner-migrants. The compensation and the resettlement of migrants 
were not considered to be the government’s obligation.  
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After all, temporary migrants do not “belong” to the destination and are 
expected to return to their place of registration eventually. They are seen by the 
government as a flow of people, transitory and, perhaps, only fleeting a presence 
in the city, or more specifically, in the urban-villages. Rather than considering all 
residents within the city limits, the Guangzhou Municipal Government only 
considers residents with Guangzhou hukou. For those migrants without title deeds, 
who constitute the majority of the residents in the urban-villages, their being 
excluded was naturalized through the naturalization of market rationalities and the 
normalization of individualized responsibility. In pursuit of the instrumental goal 
of the urban-villages regeneration, affordable housing for low income migrants 
was characterized as oversubscription and may have risks or possibly negative 
results. In interview, an official said: ‘It is impossible for a city to deal with the 
issue of migrants, which should be the responsibility of the state. If we consider 
affordable housing for migrants, all the migrants from other provinces would 
come to Guangzhou.’ 
 
It is only particular “problems” and “needs” that are identified in such 
discourses. Affordable housing for lower income migrants has not found its way 
onto urban-villages regeneration agendas, neither is social exclusion challenging 
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marginalised urban inhabitants’ right to city space considered as an issue. The 
dominant discourse pays at least rhetorical attention to social issues associated 
with the problems of the urban-villages. However, the official rhetorical attention 
to social issues is mobilized politically to legitimize projects, while the underlying 
and sometimes explicit objective is different. In fact, governmental regeneration 
projects are place-bound and spatially targeted regeneration schemes. While 
tackling threats to the quality of urban life, such as crime and poor public services, 
social exclusion was not considered a problem but as a good outcome and taken as 
granted in the planners’ and policymakers’ understanding of urban complex. In a 
meeting held by the municipal planning bureau about the regeneration of Huadi 
Village, for example, little attention was paid to migrants who may be priced out. 
Their presence was seen as undesirable, as all the participants in the meeting 
agreed with nods when the chief planner of Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design 
Survey Research Institute, a pseudo-public planning company, said, ‘Now it is 
time for Guangzhou to replace underprivileged migrants with a more affluent and 
high-end skilled populace.’ 
 
Compared with migrants, villagers had a more privileged institutional position. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that they fully participate in the decision making 
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process. Worse, they were emphasized to reinforce planners’ cases. For example, 
in a meeting held by Panyu District Planning Bureau, in which planners, 
professors, architects, and party secretaries of street offices were invited to discuss 
the regeneration project of Nanjiao Village, the problems of the urban-villages and 
previous failed regeneration projects of some villages were reflected. These 
villages, e.g. Shipai Village, Xian Village, Yangji Village, Leide Village, and 
Sanyuanli Village, were, in their words, ‘mature urban-villages in the city centre, 
ripe to be regenerated.’ The impasse had stabilized into a novel question: why 
does the urban-village regeneration always fail? The planners said, ‘The 
regeneration plans we made are practical and workable. But why have they failed, 
and cannot move from proposal to construction? This is because the 
implementation of the institutional reform of the urban-villages is in-complete.’ 
The turmoil around the discourses is emblematic for the limits of the institutional 
powers in the urban setting to let land-related capital “flow” to where it was most 
effectively and efficiently utilized. The incomplete implementation of the IRP was 
emphasized as a way to shift the regulatory competence of the state onto 
‘irresponsible’ and ‘irrational’ individuals (villagers) and hence ‘irresponsible’ 
and ‘irrational’ collectivity (villagers’ committees).  
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In other meeting held by the municipal planning bureau about the regeneration 
of Huadi Village, at a crucial juncture about the conferral of beneficial subsidies, 
the planner could be heard in the conversation with the chief planner of planning 
bureau: ‘Yes, the building capacity is higher than that designated in the 
comprehensive plan. But, […] this city owes peasants a lot.’ Through 
indiscriminate use as a rhetorical device, the planner was trying to lead the 
negotiation by political-ethical claims for equality and justice of the historical 
disadvantages and unequal distribution of power, status, and economic well-being 
of villagers inflicted through a combination of policy and economic circumstances. 
Compensation for past injustice legitimized not only the planner’s interpretation 
of regulations and building codes, but also the relegation of existing statutory 
norms, procedures, and regulatory constraints. In this narrative, villagers were 
relabelled from contenders (who have political power but are viewed negatively) 
or deviants to dependents (who are politically weak and evoke sympathy), and 
were positively constructed as a marginalized, excluded, and exploited group 
during the rapid urban expansion.  
 
In many regeneration projects, such as that of Leide Village and Yangji Village, 
statutory planning such as building capacity defined in the comprehensive plan 
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was bypassed. This in turn meant that the government had no choice but to accept 
the replacement of the comprehensive plan by the projects. As the Deputy Chief 
of the Tianhe District Planning bureau explained, the building capacity of the new 
plan is decided according to the maximum of profitability and economic 
efficiency. First, they measure the resettlement compensations, construction costs, 
various charges and administrative fees, such as land transfer fees, environmental 
sanitation fees and construction taxes. From the perspective of developers, a 
consequence of a huge investment is that the threshold price of per square metre 
housing that can make the Leide Village project profitable cannot be lower than 
RMB 6800. In other words, if the high density is not preferred by the municipal 
government, it could lower the building capacity by loaning villagers mortgage. 
This means the government shifts responsibility for risk of market uncertainty to 








Figure 4.5 The regeneration project of Cuolong Village. 
(Source: Jian Ke Architectural Design Institute of Guangdong Province) 
 
Note: The same as the regeneration project of Huadi Village, the regeneration 
project of Cuolong Village is to replace all the villagers’ houses, which are 2 to 3 
storeys, with four high-rise residential towers. Each one is 16 storeys high. 
 
Such high-rise schemes, which should be confined to central areas, were also 
developed on the city peripheries. Although it is certainly true that a portion of the 
villages in Guangzhou possess these attributes, the stereotype is often extended to 
individual village in which the stereotype does not hold. For example, in the case 
of Cuolong Village regeneration project, Xu Chigong, chief planner of Jian Ke 
Architectural Design Institute of Guangdong Province, convinced villagers by 
designing units with big balconies, each one the size of 20 m
2
 (see figure 4.5). On 
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the one hand, he told villagers that in the building regulation, the floor area of the 
balcony is half counted. In this way, they can have more floor area. And the point 
is, after the final building inspection is completed, they can have additional works 
to the balconies, changing them into studios for rent. One the other hand, the 
planner told the official of the planning bureau that the project is a vertical village. 
Each villager has their own courtyard. As the chief planner said in interview, 
‘officials of the planning bureau know what we are doing, and it is an unspoken 
consensus (Field notes, June 2007).’ 
 
Given the current urban enfranchisement structure, the scalar definition of 
participation is on the cutting edge of what is acceptable within social and 
regulatory spaces. It maintains some balance between capitalist’s profit 
orientation and a sense of obligation on local citizenship entitlement, which 
derived from the historically and geographically socialist institutions. Not only 
low-income housing for migrants but also the presence of villagers would drag 
down surrounding property values. This is well illustrated in the extended 
interview with the chief planner of the planning bureau, who is also quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter: 
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‘I have been the chief planner of the Planning Bureau since the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government launched the CBD plan in 1992. […] 
We commissioned a private developer to do a marketing survey. The 
conclusion is: the housing market of the CBD is for those people above 
the age of 35. Think about this: in what way can young people afford 
the price? As to those people above the age of 35, they have families 
and children. After they move to the CBD, they will think: “my child 
and peasants’ children are attending the same school.” The quality of 
school for peasant’s children must be bad. Now we have three villages 
in the CBD. These villages and the CBD are in the same education area. 
You tell me whether or not should we regenerate these three villages? 
(Field notes, 5
th
 December 2007)’ 
 
Every year during the Chinese New Year and the Labour Day in May, the two 
periods of time when the mobility of migrants is high, the mayor always makes 
more or less the same statement in public: “For migrant workers, Guangzhou is 
the friendliest city in China.” This much-cited claim becomes an ironical quip as 
the exclusion of migrants in the urban-villages regeneration is naturalized. In 
seeking to address the needs of villagers, migrants are de facto the most visibly 
denuded victims. They got no benefit out of it. So far, they face forced hardships 
caused by land clearance, eviction, and steep rent increases. They are still 
bouncing around from village to village, struggling for living wages, job security, 
affordable housing, welfare provisions, migrants’ rights, quality public education, 
alternative modes of transportation, etc. The eradication of existing migrant 
communities, at the expense of causing more geographically shifting slums and 
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shanty settlements – the long-term consequence – is not seen as an issue, since, as 
an official said in interview, ‘there are still lots of “urban-villages” in Guangzhou 
(Field notes, November 2007).’ The critique should by now be predictable: 
market-driven objectives become the leading trajectory of the urban-village 
regeneration projects, even in the areas where the residential and commercial 
demands are not so high. This is supported by the evidence that almost all the 
regeneration projects after 2008 target a similar form of regeneration agenda, 
stating that the village is going to be transformed into a CBD, with residential and 
commercial buildings which are more than 30 storeys high. In trying to stay a step 
ahead of the bulldozer, whether this market-oriented operation and large scale 




Much of the literature surrounding urban regeneration has been, in an 
increasingly sophisticated way, about the matches and/or mismatches of the 
diagnosis and responses and which areas ought to be the focus of government 
policy (e.g. Lawless, 1989; Kleinman and Whitehead, 1999; Atkinson and Kintrea, 
2001; Stone, 2002; Atkinson, 2004; Hughes, 2004; Parry et al., 2004; Diamond 
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and Liddle, 2005; Raco, 2005; Robert and Sykes, 2005; Thomson et al., 2006; 
Fuller and Geddes, 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008; Thomson, 2008; Rae 2009). 
Compared with this, whereas much has been written, both in Anglophone Chinese 
Studies and Chinese-language literature, about the phenomenon of the 
urban-villages in China and how to “solve” this “problem”, less has been written 
about their social construction or the ways in which the urban-villages are defined 
and deployed as part of a labelling and problematizing of a range of unsightly 
urban forms. By opening up this inverted problematic, this chapter analyzed the 
processes of defining the urban-village and their relationship with those they seek 
to target by paying particular attention to the development of two governmental 
programmes (rationalities): institutional reform policy and “one village one 
strategy” principle. These two governmental programmes are crucial because they 
provide a microcosm to analyze the changing rationale and approach to the 
urban-villages regeneration in Guangzhou.  
 
I argue that the essential thing is these two programmes attempted to 
rearticulate a kind of rationality, which was intrinsic to the hybrid nature of 
neoliberal policies and programmes. Political rationalities and techniques of 
government are shown to be intrinsically linked to shape the ways to define 
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identifiable and operable locales, entities, and persons. Nevertheless, the framing 
of the term “urban-village” in policy concepts is characterized by tensions to draw 
a dividing line between deserving entitlement and undeserving welfare, and 
difficulties relating to defining where and what ought to be regenerated, and who 
the objects and subjects of the regeneration are or ought to be. In line with 
neoliberal rhetoric, these two programmes highlighted individualized 
responsibility and incrementally drifted towards market-based options and 
operations, in which decisions were “driven by cost-benefit calculations rather 
than missions of service, equity, and social welfare (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; 
Leitner and Sheppard, 2002).” 
 
The primary focus of the regeneration of the urban-villages was the 
environmental improvements of unsightly urban forms. Initially, it targeted 
individual locations rather than people. But it then extended throughout the whole 
city area. Within some forms of simplification and rationalisation, what we have 
here, then, is a policy design that targets a population (in this case, the villagers) 
along the line of an entrenched stereotype. What is inherent is a syllogism – that is, 
urban-villages are problematic and needed to be regenerated. Albeit with various 
levels in a spectrum ranging from very remote rural areas, through transitional 
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areas, to modern city, they are all deviant and hence needed to be regenerated, 
since all the 139 villages in Guangzhou are categorized as urban-villages. I argue 
that this syllogism stems from a failure to distinguish between the urban-village as 
a distinctive type of locality and the urban-village as a representing space – 
confounded by an inadequate conceptualization of the urban-village. In terms of 
this, the IRP is not merely an “empty institution” that remains no more than a 
paper agreement or a hollow shell with little social effect. It is in the production of 
this policy, the concept of urban-village is defined and deployed by the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government to label and problematize places which may 
not be problematic in the ways defined. 
 
The policy makers did not aware that the state intervention scoped with the 
term “urban-village” is not part of the solution, but part of the problem and, in 
turn, creates further contradictions and crisis. The spatial confinement of “the 
problem of the urban-villages” conceals the structural dynamics of the city-region, 
the gap between the designated areas and their surrounding area, and larger 
societal problem. In forming the policy, administrative village was characterized 
as a key scale at which state policies and practices were delivered. However, the 
relevant scales are not defined outside of so-called “natural” components or 
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influences. The definition of where, what ought to be regenerated, and who the 
object/subject of the regeneration is or ought to be, is, as Harvey (2000: 75) says, 
“fundamental to the whole question of how to formulate a […] sensitive politics. 
It is through a dynamic interaction which what might be called ‘natural process’ 
scalars that human beings produce and instantiate their own scales for pursuing 
their own goals and organizing their collective behaviours.” I concur with Harvey 
(1990: 419) who, in discussing the geographical imagination of space and time, 
notes that “the very act of naming geographical entities implies a power over them, 
most particularly over the way in which places, their inhabitants and their social 
functions get represented […] the identity of variegated peoples can be collapsed, 
shaped, and manipulated through the connotations and associations imposed upon 
a name by outsiders.” 
 
In writings of a generation ago, but which has influenced more recent work, 
Logan and Molotch (1989: 42) argue that “the politics of place is about whose 
interests government will serve. The growth machine dynamic is a crucial part of 
the process that pushes people from one residential location to another, from one 
city to another. Cities, regions, and states do not compete to please people; they 
compete to please capital – and the two activities are fundamentally different.” In 
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advocating supposedly universal cures and one-best-way policy strategy, the 
market has become the invisible hand that determines where and how the 
urban-villages regeneration should occur. So far, in incorporating a wide range of 
individual self-interests, values, perspectives and arguments into policymaking, 
implementing and evaluation, justice-oriented rationales (such as need, care, 
welfare, social equality and equity) or the so-called soft values that cannot be 
quantified in economic terms (such as urban diversity, urban aesthetics, 
community cohesion and integrity of the society, and so on) get little if any 
attention in policy prescriptions; worse, in shifting the regeneration focus from the 
more problematic urban-villages to more cost-effective locations, they serve in 
prescribing “policy that does not address what is fundamentally at stake in these 
decisions (Gillroy, 1992: 218).” 
 
The articulation of the urban-village regeneration is shaped by the limits of 
policy options at local level. Only the parts of existing institutional arrangements 
that do not contradict the policies and legal-political framework at the national 
level, or those that do not touch upon the fundamental essential, such as collective 
ownership, can be “creatively destroyed”. I argue that it is in this process, the 
rationale shifts from “villages with problems” to “urban-villages as a problem”; 
239 
the approach to the urban-village regeneration shifts from that of piecemeal to that 
of “one-size-fits-all”. The limits of policy options function as means to legitimize 
the rationale of the institutional reform of the urban-villages. This is the process of 
the problematization through which certain issues were identified, while some 
other issues were kept off the agenda. 
 
By conferring value on urban land through the definition of exchangeable 
land use rights, and conversely, by denigrating the unexchangeable collective land 
(HBL) as valueless, the urban-village regeneration gained its economic 
legitimization. This led to the constructing of the regeneration coalition adhering 
to market-oriented operations and large scale demolition. In terms of efficient use 
of land resources, this raises a series of questions about the understandings of both 
the regeneration of the urban-villages and the multiple and contradictory rights to 
the city. For example, the central issue of the urban-village regeneration is the 
relation of regeneration projects to existing planning instruments and regulations. 
On the one hand, relevant statutory norms, procedures, and regulatory constraints 
are relegated to a secondary and subordinated place. On the other hand, the 
government’s regeneration always starts from those villages which are not located 
in the built area. The physical form of these villages is not the same as those in the 
240 
built areas. How are these project-based initiatives over regulatory plans and 
procedures achieved?  
 
It is the responsibility of local authorities to accelerate the regeneration of the 
targeted villages by supporting public-private partnerships which develop and 
implement bottom-up strategies, assessed by the municipal planning bureau. Yet, 
there was much ambiguity about who these local authorities are. For example, in 
the official documents of the Guangzhou Municipal Government, it was never 
clear who these documents should give; villagers’ committee was either elided or 
bracketed. In some meetings that I audited during the fieldwork from 2007 to 
2008, it was party secretaries from street offices negotiating with the Guangzhou 
urban planning bureau. In other meetings, it was village leaders negotiating with 
higher authorities. This ambiguity brings to the fore the issue of making sense 
what Larner (2000) refers to as the “messy actualities” of the form of governance 
that characterize neoliberal projects. If the form and character of regeneration 
programmes are critically dependent on the institutional structures that underpin 
agenda formation, then, one critical issue left unaddressed in Chapter Four, on 
institutional reform, becomes crucial: how was institutional reform policy 
implemented? What is the outcome of the implementation of the IRP? Why has it 
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become an “empty institution” that remains no more than a paper agreement or a 
hollow shell with little social effect? An examination of incomplete or on-going 
schemes is relevant to debates over the direction that policy should take. This is 
where I turn to in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five 
The Janus-Faced Strategies of Local Authorities 
and the Messy Form of Governance. 
 
“Making people write things down and count them – register birth, 
report incomes, fill in censuses – is itself a kind of government of them, 
an incitement to individuals to construe their lives according to such 
norms(Rose and Miller, 1992: 187).” 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
In Chapter Four, I described that the institutional reform policy (IRP) since the 
late 1980s and particularly in 1992 had sought to restructure the terrain of 
governance by seeking to change the ways the urban-villages are governed. 
Among a range of competing programmes, the IRP was increasingly declared in 
rhetoric by the Guangzhou Municipal Government as a proactive and holistic 
mechanism when it found itself, in the process of regeneration, lacking both 
resources and authority/legitimacy to control effectively properties in the villages. 
Given the previous difficulties of government, of ensuring that regeneration 
projects moved from proposal to construction stages, it was assumed by the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government that the institutional reform would develop 
the “right” structure of governance to modify years of problems caused by wider 
structural forces beyond the regulatory reach of the Guangzhou Municipal 
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Government. This would, in turn, create an environment amenable to pave the 
way for appropriate patterns of intervention and foster the “right” types of 
physical transformation of the area to take place in the future.  
 
Yet, as I argued, the IRP can be said to be a product of its historical context 
(the rural-urban dichotomy), in which the problematization of the subjects rests on 
the socially constructed images of issue and target groups, and therefore fits what 
Schneider and Ingram (1997) refer to as a “degenerative policy-making process” 
(see Chapter Four, section 4.2). The choice of policy elements and the underlying 
logic mirror the way that the “urban-villages problem” was framed. While the 
implementation of the IRP was seen by the Guangzhou Municipal Guangzhou as 
fragmentary, it results in an ambiguous governance of the regeneration of the 
urban-villages in Guangzhou, which is, in Larner’s (2000) term, “messy” in form, 
and difficult to make sense of.  
 
In this chapter, I draw out one critical issue left unaddressed in Chapter Four – 
the form of the governance of the regeneration of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. 
The second of my three empirical chapters deploys Janus metaphor to make sense 
of the characteristic/nature of the governing coalition that is entwined with, and 
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shaped by, the dynamics that have accompanied the implementation of the IRP. 
By paying attention to the micropolitics surrounding the IRP, it identifies the 
different ways in which problems and opportunities were defined by the two local 
authorities, i.e., street office and villagers’ committee, and the ways in which 
members utilise resources to organize their activities and assign meanings to their 
own and others’ actions. Based on the empirical materials collected in 2007/2008, 
the chapter illustrates the diverse forms of practice indicative of the tensions and 
disjunctures that led the IRP to its fragmentation and displacement.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
outlines and evaluates the process of the implementation of the IRP, and its 
associated rationale and policy formation problems. The second section identifies 
a range of local-scale techniques of management that serve to “frame” actions at 
the local level. It pays particular attention to the development of two governing 
technologies – village cooperative’s stock share and street office’s informal deals 
on property relations and governance practices – analyzing how they cooperate as 
a technique of governmentality to bind economic activities, social lives, and 
individual conducts with property control, and turn ordinary activities and spaces 
into “sites of surveillance”. The third section examines the covert circumvention, 
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complicity, and alliance of the key actors of the two organizational entities in the 
regime, i.e. officials of street offices and leaders/cadres of village cooperatives, in 
relation to the internal dynamics of coalition building and the mode of 
coordination across institutional boundaries. In the fourth section, I develop an 
argument that whereas the outcome of the implementation of the IRP was 
evaluated by the Guangzhou Municipal Government as fragmentary, displaced 
and incomplete, the actual reconfiguration of the new governance structures 
expresses the “natural” outcomes of an ongoing renegotiation amongst the 
different levels of government to maintain legitimacy, social cohesion and 
sufficient political support. Ironically, it is this very actual reconfiguration of local 
authorities that is most suited to meet governmental agendas. 
 
5.2 The Flawed Policy Design of the Institutional Reform Policy of the 
Urban-Villages. 
After the deployment of the household responsibility system (HRS) and the 
joint-stock system (JSS) in Yangji Village was proved to be economically 
successful and politically correct, in 1987, eleven other villages in Tianhe District, 
including Shipai Village, quickly followed up (see Chapter Two, section 2.2). 
These two grassroots experimentations, which were ipso facto less deliberately 
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designed from above than a skilfully improvised technology of governing from 
below, were invented directly in response to a surge of rural lawlessness in the 
changing socioeconomic conditions. In 1997, these two grassroots 
experimentations were evaluated by the Guangzhou Municipal Government as 
workable and could be institutionalized as a basis of the government policy to 
deal with the weak governance of the villages in Guangzhou. Later in 1997, 
Shipai Village was announced by the Guangzhou Municipal Government, as a 
pilot, to spearhead an institutional reform experiment to convert the hukou of the 
villagers of Shipai Village from peasant to non-peasant, and transform the 
economic entity of Shipai Village from village collective into shareholding 
cooperative. The entitlement of the management, administration, and ownership 
of the collectively owned properties of Shipai Village were transformed from the 
Shipai Villagers’ Committee to the Sanjun Economic Cooperative, whose stocks 
were shared by the collective stockholding cooperatives of Shipai Village and 
individual stockholders who were villagers of Shipai Village. Between 1999 and 
2000, the Guangzhou Municipal Government further designated eleven villages in 
Tianhe District which had deployed the HRS and JSS, and seven other villages in 
Tianhe District, to launch a trial and error experiment on this institutional reform 
plan.  
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Between 2000 and 2002, with the backdrop that the problem of the 
urban-villages was increasingly recognized by both the society and the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government, this institutional reform experiment was seen 
by the Guangzhou Municipal Government as “mature enough” to be promoted to 
all the villages in Guangzhou. Written in the form of “suggestions”, an official 
document, “Some Suggestions Pertaining to the Institutional Reform of the 
‘Urban-Villages’ in Guangzhou”, also known as Document No. 17, was enacted 
jointly by the Guangzhou Municipal Government and the CCP Guangzhou 
Committee on 24
th
 May, 2002. The “17th Document”, hereafter, refers to this 
particular policy. It is a key document to the institutional reform policy (IRP) of 
the urban-villages. 
 
In this key document, four steps to transfer the governance arrangements of 
people and things, from rural-based institutions to urban-based institutions, were 
envisioned to be able to eradicate the rural/urban dichotomy that resulted in the 
structural problem of the regeneration of the urban-villages. The four steps are:   
 
(1) Transforming the hukou of all the villagers in the urban area from peasant to 
non-peasant.  
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(2) Transforming collectively owned lands into state owned lands.  
(3) Abolishing villagers’ committees, with the transforming of village economic 
cooperatives and township collective economic entities into shareholding 
cooperatives. 
(4) Setting up street offices and neighbourhood committees to take over village 
governance.  
 
Through the redefinition of the elements of village entity in legal language, 
the four steps of the IRP served as a toolkit to dismantle earlier political 
settlements and their form of institutionalization (welfare, forms of local 
citizenship, villagers’ committee), and simultaneously undermine existing 
configurations of public life and local social relations and the link between the two. 
Chan Chengming, Vice Chief of the Bureau of Urban Utilities and Landscaping of 
the Guangzhou Municipality, explained in interview: 
 
‘Though living in the city proper and leading a modern life, a villagers’ 
social and economic life was supported by a special network based on 
family or blood relations. The aim of this policy was to break the old 




                                                 
58
 Interview with Chan Chengming on 13
th
 September 2007. 
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One of the aims of the 17
th
 Document is to strip-back the social work of the 
villagers’ committees to those of street offices and neighbourhood committees, 
and reduce the villagers’ committees to economic entities. To underpin the 
rationale and legitimacy of this aim, the 17
th
 Document pinched the principle of 
“separation of the administrative body from the enterprise” enacted by the central 
government in the Fifteenth National Congress in 1997
59
. As stated in the 
document, “according to the principle of separation of the administrative body 
from the enterprise, the villagers’ committee is defined as ‘not an economical 
entity’ and hence should be transformed into an economical entity.” Rather than a 
higher level discourse setting the boundaries and basic assumptions, to rationalize 
opportunistically the policy design, this principle functioned as less a rationale 
than a convenient rhetoric for doing whatever is politically expedient. In interview, 
Xion JingJung, explained:   
 
‘Why did we use this principle as the base for the institutional reform of 
the urban-villages? This is because we had to use words that people can 
understand. In other words, this principle is enacted by the central 
government. This provides us a good way to legitimize this policy. 
                                                 
59
 Framed in a kind of contrast between state and market, the aim of the 
“separation of the administrative body from the enterprise” principle is to ban 
formal involvement of the administrative body in business for the sake of 
anti-corruption on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to enhance economic 
incentives and promote the efficient production of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). 
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However, once you intend to delve into it seriously, you will find there 
is no logical connection between the two
60.’ 
 
The pattern and logics of the IRP, of course, was not underpinned by this 
fragile link between the “separation of the administrative body from the 
enterprise” principle and the 17th Document. The 17th Document, written in the 
form of “suggestions”, was a non legislative form of regulation, rather than a 
normal policy approved by the People’s Congress. Nevertheless, it was 
compulsory and gained its legitimacy because it was enacted jointly by the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government and the CCP Guangzhou Committee. As Xion 
Jingjung explained in interview:  
 
‘The 17th Document is special because it is enacted jointly by the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government and the CCP Guangzhou 
Committee. In fact, this document does not even have the status of an 
administrative regulation. It falls short of the status of “law”. No one 
knows the exact legal implications either. However, it is not important. 
After all, who enacts this document matters
61’ 
 
From the perspective of the Guangzhou Municipal Government, the design of 
the IRP established incentives for villagers, who are target population, to 
participate because it would distribute to local villagers some financial benefits 
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 Interview with Xion Jingjung on 15
th




and offer them the right to access urban social and economic services. The 
Guangzhou Municipal Government assumed that by transferring the governance 
arrangements of people and things of the urban-villages, from rural-based 
institutions to urban-based institutions, it could establish continuity in land 
administration and management in the urban area, and, in turn, bring all the HBL 
under its control. However, instead of meshing smoothly and with complete 
malleability in the ideal schemes of the programmatic logic, as the policymakers 
envisioned, the implementation of the IRP was not without problems. During an 
interview, the leader of Shipai Village showed me a document of the Shipai 
Villagers’ Committee, written before the Shipai Village was announced by the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government as a pilot to the institutional reform in 1997. 
In this document, the Shipai Villagers’ Committee made a statement to the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government that:  
 
“We think, though the villagers of Shipai Village have been leading an 
urban life, their aptitude, propensity, perception, and way of living, are 
still rural. […] Besides, the self-governing of villagers’ committee has 
been accepted by villagers and works well.” (Field notes, May 2006) 
 
In February 2001, Chang Jiang-Hao, the leader of Yangji Village, together 
with the other ten village leaders (who were also representatives of the People’s 
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Congress of Guangzhou), argued in the People’s Congress Meeting that  
 
‘in the governmental institutional reform policy, the HBL is stipulated 
to be transformed from collectively owned land to state owned land. 
Villagers are asked to pay the land transfer fee. However, neither should 
the transformation of HBL be seen as a commercial transaction, nor 
should the government ask villagers to pay the land transfer fee, 




Villagers also had an incentive not to enrol in the urban social insurance 
system. In 2003, there were 138 villages that had implemented this policy, with 
380,000 villagers changing their census from peasant to non-peasant. However, 
only a small percentage of villagers enjoyed urban social welfare. For instance, in 
Tianhe District, only 2409 out of 76209 villagers enjoyed urban social welfare. In 
Baiyun District, there were 13,000 villagers, but only villagers of Sanyuanli 
Village (1400 villagers) enjoyed urban social welfare. The implications of this 
policy made them think that they were not treated as targets deserving of service 
but mere objects to be manipulated for the government’s purposes. In interview, a 
villager said without hesitation: ‘the reform would not be realized if it was put to 
vote. We all know this. What benefit can we have from the reform? Besides, we 
already think we are urban (Field notes, June 2006).’  
                                                 
62
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 13 April 2001. 
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The institutional reform was neither an issue at stake in the perception of the 
villagers’ committees nor seen as beneficial for the villagers. That they have to 
pay for what they already owned confused villagers because, in their perception, 
the use right of the HBL is a right entitled by the Constitution. Nevertheless, one 
village after another did comply, a process undertaken by the villagers’ 
committees. Dong Chijung, the leader of Shipai Village, who was the party 
secretary of the Shipai Street Office at that moment, retrospected in interview:  
 
‘The annulment and reform of the institution of village were 
implemented partly by force, under the pressure of the Party. Those 
villagers all agreed with the annulment and the reform of the institution 
of village after the ideological undertaking
63.’ 
 
As to the land transformation, in 2004, at least 70% of the HBL in Guangzhou 
were announced by the Guangzhou Municipal Government to have been 
transformed from collectively owned land into state owned land. In the actual 
practices, however, these lands were transformed on paper, with a short 
endorsement appended at the end of the document: “land transfer fee unpaid.” 
This means those lands already transformed into state owned lands still have 
                                                 
63
 Interview with Dong Chijung on 11
th
 June 2006. 
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barriers to enter into the land market. In interview, the recall of Xion Jingjung, an 
officer in the State Land Resources & Urban Housing Property Management 
Bureau, gave a sketch to the contour of the implementation process of the IRP. 
 
‘It is impossible to ask those villagers to pay the [land transfer] fee. For 
those villagers, it is neither understandable nor practical. They think that 
the lands are theirs in the first place. Why they have to pay an extra fee 
to prove their ownership again? At the end, we came to this strategy. We 
achieve the task assigned by our boss to change villagers’ certificate of 
collectively owned land into certificate of state owned land. The lands 




While villagers’ committees felt they that had no choice but to comply and 
accept the compulsory rearrangement, to be repealed or transferred into “village 
cooperatives”, public services (such as hygiene, security, and education), social 
works (such as family planning, and birth control), and welfare of elders (such as 
medical care and old age pensions), which should be transferred from villagers’ 
committees to neighbourhood committees and street offices, were still maintained 
by village cooperatives and delivered on the basis of the governing formation of 
the HRS and JSS. In February 2007, Chang Jianghao, the leader of Yangji Village, 
again argued in the Two Meetings: 
                                                 
64
 Interview with Xion Jingjung on 14
th
 December 2007. 
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“After the implementation of the IRP, we are not agricultural, not 
industrial, neither commercial, nor residential. We are neither fish nor 
fowl! The government transfers us from agricultural to non-agricultural. 
However, the public funding does not cover our villages. Our 
cooperatives have to pay tax. However, we still have to fund public 
services by ourselves. It is not fair!
65” 
 
In seeking to create a new development agency for regeneration, the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government signalled that the agents and actors of the 
village communities which, as existing locally based authorities, already had the 
power in their hand, were not identified/defined as the “right” local authorities. 
However, except for the existing rural taxation – known as “santi wutong” (three 
collections and five unified management)
66
 – the urban government and the 
services provided by it are nonetheless irrelevant for the villagers. This places an 
onus on the Guangzhou Municipal Government and provides a space for the 
villagers’ committee to negotiate with the Guangzhou Municipal Government – 
either the government provides resources in ways that match the rhetoric 
contained in the 17
th
 Document, or the government accepts that the reform works 
                                                 
65
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 16 February 2007. 
66
 “Three collections and five unified management” refers to the three collections 
by the village including collective investments, welfare, and cadre 
compensation; the five collections by townships include levies for schools, 
family planning, veteran support, militia, and road construction and 
maintenance. See Benewick et al., 2004: 16. 
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upon pre-existing bounds of allegiance. This dilemma opens up spaces for 
villagers’ committees, as a regeneration agency, with opportunities to influence 
and shape regeneration agendas and programmes in a variety of ways not 
available to similar agencies operating in less buoyant regions such as those in the 
old city area.  
 
5.3 From Weak Governance to Over-Presence Governance. 
Originally raised directly in response to a surge of crisis in rural authority after 
decollectivization (Kelliher, 1997), a villagers’ committee, which was created to 
replace production brigade and production team after the denunciation of the 
people’s commune in the early 1980s, is an entity with an ambiguous legal status67. 
According to the Constitution, introduced in 1982, and Organic Law, introduced 
                                                 
67
 It would be helpful to clarify certain terminology. Village entity has been 
renamed and transformed over time – from people’s commune, brigade 
enterprise, township and village enterprises (TVEs), villagers’ committee, to 
village cooperative. A village cooperative is not a single firm but made up of 
several production teams (later after the demolition of People’s Commune in 
1980 reformed as “she”, or village administrative councils), each with clearly 
defined governing boundaries and its independent economic and administrative 
structure. Production teams are alliances of companies centring around a 
villagers’ committee. Production teams hold each other’s share and deal with 
each other on a preferential basis. In the context of institutional reform and 
discursive adjustment, because “natural village”, “villagers’ group”, 
“administrative village”, and “township” were assumed to vary together or are 
meant to refer to the same thing, these terms were often used interchangeably 
in colloquial speech to indicate the specific collectivity of a village. 
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in 1998, a villagers’ committee is not defined as a limb of the government, but a 
self-governing collective economic organization comprising a social group with 
the identity of peasant (those who are with agricultural hukou)
68
. Leaders and 
officials in a villagers’ committee are not lowest-level agents within the formal 
government structure. Village leaders are elected directly by the villagers – 
namely, the members of the collective entity – through village-level elections (the 
only election in China) and hence empowered to speak and act in the name of a 
territory. A villagers’ committee is not merely an economic actor and a highly 
administrative self-governing coalition. It is also a political, cultural, and conjugal 
coalition. From this perspective, village leaders and officials are the lowest-level 
agents of the Communist Party.  
 
While urban residents relied more on their work unit than on the 
neighbourhood committees and street offices for their subsistence, villagers were 
more dependent on the villagers’ committees for their livelihood. In the village 
economy underpinned by the HRS and JSS, a portion of the village’s revenues is 
redistributed to locally born residents as annual payments. Part of it is invested in 
                                                 
68
 Article 111, “The neighbourhood committee or villagers' committee which the 
cities and countrysides set up according to resident's residence is the mass 
autonomy organization in the basic unit.” 
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improving the local infrastructure such as water, electricity, and roads. Part of it is 
devoted to substantial improvements in social services. The concept of “stock” of 
the joined stock system was adopted not in a general sense in a market but as a 
way to refer to the distribution of individual dividends. Generally, villages had 
different stock distribution manners. Individual dividends were based on criteria 
such as occupation, administrative rank, job performance, gender, loyalty and 
political connections. Villagers who were seen as having earned a position of 
respect, of doing good things for the village, or considered to be meritorious, can 
have more individual dividend. Individual dividend could not be bequeathed, 
granted, and transferred. 
 
Decisions about who qualifies for a share and to what degree are clearly of 
considerable importance. This influences the decision-making processes within 
family life, professional life, and married life. In some villages, such as Shipai 
Village and Tangxia Village, the distribution manner is based on the current 
patriarchal cultural context: that is, a male can have more individual dividend than 
a female. In some villages, such as Tangxia Village, if a female villager marries a 
guy whose hukou is not registered in Tangxia Village, she has to change the place 
of her hukou registration from Tangxia Village to where her husband registers his 
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hukou. And she will be dismissed from her individual dividend in Tangxia Village. 
As a consequence, endogamy (where villagers marry each other inside their own 
villages) and uxorilocal marriage (where the husband moves to the wife’s village 
in contrast to the traditional custom of the wife transferring to the husband’s place 
of residence) has become the dominant preference. Villagers tend to select 
marriage partners that enable them to register hukou in the same village, as a way 




 Document, villagers’ committee is defined as governmental and as 
such should not be in charge of economic activities. Villagers’ committees were 
urged and pressured to change from their multifunctional role as producers, 
redistributors, regulators and providers of social services to become more clearly 
focused on their economic role. Former villagers’ committees, which managed the 
collective economy, was transformed into joint-stock cooperatives whose stocks 
were shared by collective corporate stockholder and individual stockholders. 
Distributional rules after the implementation of the IRP were further set locally 
and varied accordingly from one village to the next. In the case of Shipai Village, 
the stock distribution is fixed according to the socio-demographic condition in 
1994. Those villagers who change place of hukou registration can still keep the 
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stock. Whereas those villagers, who are born after 1994, are not acquired a share 
of stock, stock can be bequeathed, granted, and transferred. In Sanyuanli Village 
and Tangdong Village, the stock distribution manner is rather different. For 
example, a new born child has five points. The point is added when this child 
grows up. When the child is 16 years old, he or she would have 30 points. 
Whether a person is eligible to share the stocks depends on his or her identity. 
Every year the village would have new born children. It seems the village has to 
add new stocks. But in fact, the stock distribution manner in these two villages is 
less a concept of stock in the common sense than a simplified saying of a numeral 
in an algebraic expression; that is, the total wealth of the village, or the numerator, 
is the same. It is just the social-demographic composition of villagers, or the 
denominator, is different. In this latter example, the distribution manner is rather 
complex. 
 
As the approach of stockshare was adopted by the villages in Guangzhou, it 
became increasingly contextualized. Managerial control over various recalcitrant 
interests, excluding from access to decision making processes in the village 
economy and reducing a proportion of individual dividend became the outcomes 
of villagers’ own conduct. What conduct should be counted as a factor to the 
261 
individual dividend calculation is through negotiation and it is different from 
village to village. For example, those villagers who commit crimes in some 
villages (such as Sanynanli Village where the drug issue is critical), or those 
villagers who do not participate in activities held by their villagers’ committees 
(such as the learning program held by the villagers’ committee in Shipai Village), 
would be punished by abating their individual dividends. This also applies to 
family control, to punish those villagers who have illegitimate children.  
 
This method of calculation links individual conducts, private decisions, and 
public objectives in a new way. Individual dividend is bound with the controlling 
of conduct. The village committees became shareholder-based cooperatives, 
governing by calculation, dealing with social, economic, infrastructural, 
environmental or other matters. As self-managing organizations, villagers’ 
committees determined for themselves the rules and norms that they would abide 
by in their day-to-day practice. Villagers themselves enforced these norms. Other 
villagers checked up on their building, and this became evidence of “good 
performance”. 
 
After the implementation of the IRP, a raft of techniques was developed for 
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managing a new relationship between street offices and villagers’ committees. 
Street office would like to institutionalize by the technology of monitoring on the 
number of migrants in each leasing building. Villagers, as landlords, were asked 
by the street office being responsible for migrants’ registration. Villagers have to 
document migrants’ information, including birth, job, hukou, and, marriage. 
Based on this information, street office charges administrative toll of leasing from 
villagers. However, for street office, it is difficult to clarify those buildings 
leasing for migrants and those villagers themselves live. Villagers are forced to 
act as intermediate targets to influence other targets (migrants). This structures 
the actions of villagers and migrants. 
 
While village cooperatives succeed in inventing a range of formal/informal 
techniques of management to bind economic activities, social lives, and individual 
conducts with property control, street offices also developed local solution to local 
problems. Street offices not only mobilized a set of formal but limited 
technologies of governing revolving around building permission, but also 
bypassed statutory regulations and institutional bodies. Inter alia, absorbing 
existing quasi-legal or extralegal practices becomes a lever for street offices to 
gain leadership. Village cadres were assigned as officials in the street offices or 
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neighbourhood committees to do jobs relating to the village governance, e.g., the 
positions in the Floating Population and Rental Housing Management Office. 
They were employed by the street offices, with the salaries paid jointly by the 
street office and village cooperative, about 1300 RMB per month in 2007. It was 
quite obvious that absorbing village cadres into street office and neighbourhood 
committees has multiple benefits in village governance. It saved street offices the 
trouble to hire in-house staffs to carry out the tasks, which requires local and 
endogenous knowledge and practice to identify mechanisms through which policy 
delivery and implementation can be made more effectively.  
 
In contrast to a villagers’ committee, a street offices, as a sub-district 
government, is defined as a limb of the government. It is responsible for the 
provision of a variety of public and social services for general residents which 
include fire and crime patrols, marriage registration, household registration, 
sanitation, supervision of delinquents, nurseries, recreational and cultural 
activities, family planning and mediation, management of park and public toilets, 
and so forth. The division of high position and low position coalitions is set 
according to the specific administration levels to which the coalescing partners 
belong. Under the nomenklatura system (bian zhi), in which the upper level 
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governments exercise authority over the appointments of party cadres and 
government officials, including promotion, dismissal, and transfer (Burns, 1987; 
Chan, 2004; Heilmann and Kirchberger, 2000), party secretaries of the Street 
offices are not elected locally by the constituency but assigned by the upper level 
governments on the basis of their economic performance (Burns, 1987; Heilmann 
and Kirchberger, 2000; Huang, 1996; 2002; Ma and Wu, 2005). Given this “party 
controls the cadres” system, what matters for leaders of street offices is economic 
performance which in turn could be their political capital to draw the attention of 
the upper level governments and hence obtain promotion. By becoming a 
development agency, the street offices are seen as a focus around which new 
partnerships and regimes may develop.  
 
Later in Chapter Six, I will discuss how villagers conduct themselves 
differently than is intended by this “over-presence” governance. What is involved 
is the production of self-producing subjects – subjects whose own self-production 
is prone to reversals and appropriations. In closing this section, I would argue that 
from a governmentality perspective, the complicity and covert circumvention of 
local authorities (street office and villagers’ committee) operate as over-present 
governance. It focuses upon the governmental technologies that serve to “frame” 
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actions at the local level. It outlines the institutional reform policy (IRP) and 
surrounding governmental programmes that have attempted to reconstitute 
socially excluded communities, the spaces within they live, and how they live 
their lives. It does this by restructuring how they are governed and how they 
govern themselves and others. All acts, including but not limited to explicit acts of 
direct state intervention, resulted in local inhabitants learning to police themselves 
accordingly by managing their mobility, visibility, and behaviour. Therefore, 
everyday acts (e.g. negative statements about the urban-villages by “outsiders”) 
are equally as important as formal acts of policing mandated by law. As Hiemstra 
(2010) argues, in the context of discussing the “immigrant illegality” in Colorado, 
this operates as a technique of governmentality and turns ordinary activities and 
spaces into “sites of surveillance”. 
 
5.4 Who Governs the Village? Multi-Agency Governance or Multiple 
Regimes? 
In a way, the abovementioned regime is amorphous and difficult to define, 
since the form and extent of the implementation of the IRP is highly variegated 
and context-dependent. It differs greatly from village to village and is constantly 
evolving in relation to its spatiotemporal context, to the extent that even the 
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Guangzhou Municipal Government did not know exactly which organization was 
the governing body. An evidence of this is the addressee in many of the official 
documents of the Guangzhou Municipal Government relating to the 
urban-villages. In some documents, street office was the addressee. In some other 
documents, both street office and villagers’ committee were the addressees. In yet 
some other documents, though these two local authorities were both the 
addressees, villagers’ committee was written with a bracket in the official 
documents. The bracket of the villagers’ committee encapsulated the complexity 
and ambiguity of the implementation of the IRP.  
 
The uneven implementation of the policy can be linked to the differing 
socio-spatial characteristics of villages or their specific social or economic 
concerns. In some villages, the institutional reform works upon pre-existing 
bounds of allegiance at local level, as a way to reduce the scope for local 
resistance. In other words, the street office and villagers’ committee are de facto 
the same group of people, dealing with the same duties. In a prosperous village, 
such as Shipai Village, the party secretaries headed the economic management 
committee (or its equivalent by some other name), which oversaw all the 
collective cooperatives in the village. The composition of the economic 
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management committee was identical to that of the villagers’ committee. After the 
implementation of the IRP, one street office and five neighbourhood committees 
were set up. The five neighbourhood committee, which comprised ten residential 
groups, were the former five production teams which comprised former ten 
economic communes. What differs before and after the implementation of the IRP 
was only the title of the entity. Rather than transforming from one pure form to 
another, it is more likely an ongoing process involving the re-composition and 
reconstitution of inherited institutions. In practice, it is a reasonable consequence 
that the joint-stock cooperative is still responsible for the finance of 
neighbourhood committees. In reality, except for some personal who complained 
that the extra paper works influenced their routines, most of the villagers and 
officials accepted “peacefully” the institutional change. It is a change that, in the 
words of the leader of Shipai Village, “did not change too much”. 
 
In some other villages, such as Yangji Village, the uneven implementation of 
the IRP stemmed from the inconsistency of governmental administration at 
district level. In 1988, Yanji Village was under the jurisdiction of Dongshan 
District. In 1993, its jurisdiction was transferred to Shahe Town, which was later 
upgraded as Tianhe District (see figure 5.1). After Tianhe CBD was planned and 
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the Guangzhou Avenue was built in 1985, the HBL of Yangji Village located at 
the fringe of Tianhe District and Donshan District was geographically segregated 
from Tianhe District area by Guangzhou Avenue. As described in the words of an 
official in the Maihua Street Office: ‘the policemen of Tianhe district don’t want to 
go there. They think Yangji village belongs to Yuexu District and Maihua Street.’ 
Given this, in August 2005, Yangji Village was administratively transferred from 
Tianhe District to Donshan District and then Yuexiu District when Donshan 
District and Yuexiu District were annexed in October 2005. The redistribution of 
Yangji Village was announced by the Guangzhou Municipal Government as for 
the good of the governance of the village itself. However, as shown in the 
chronology, it was part of the administrative reform project which consolidated 
two contiguous districts, i.e. Dongxian District and Yuexio District. It was 
announced by the Guangzhou Municipal Government that it was for the reason to 
save costs and manpower of the government, and to solve the issue that these two 
districts were too small for a sustainable development. This was a by-product of 
the Guangzhou Municipal Government’s project on a broader scale to transfer the 
two economic and technological development zones, i.e. Luogang and Nanxia, 
into administrative districts. 
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Chronology of the administrative districts 
redistribution of Guangzhou Municipality 
 
2002      The Guangzhou Municipal  
Government proposed the 
preliminary concept to transfer 
the two economic and 
technological development 
zones, i.e. Rogang and Nanxia, 
into administrative districts.  
 
2003      The Guangzhou Municipal 
government elaborated this 
concept into the redistribution of 
all the districts in the city. The 
plan was submitted to the State 
Council for approval. 
 
2004, 06   The Ministry of Civil Affairs 
gave a comment to keep the total 
number of the districts and 
suggested the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government to 
combine some smaller districts 
in the old city area. 
 
2004, 07   The Guangzhou Municipal 
Government proposed the plan: 
a.) Combining the Dongxian 
District and Yuexio District; b.) 
combining the Fangcun District 
and Liyuan District; c.) set up 
Rogang District and Nanxia 
District; d.) adjusting the 
administrative boundary of the 
districts of the old city area.  
 
2004, 07   The official document “The Plea 
of the Adjustment of the 
Administrative Districts of 
Guangzhou City” was proposed 
formally to Guangdong 
Province Government. 
 
2004, 09   Province Government proposed 
the document to the state council 
for approval. 
 
2005, 04   The administrative districts 
redistribution plan was 
approved by the state council.  
 
2005, 10   Dongxian District and Yuexio 
District, Liyuan District and 
Fangcun District were annexed. 



































































When higher level government was administratively upgraded from 
county-level municipality to district level municipality, administratively and 
politically, Yangji Village illustrates how changes in local governance involved 
the reshuffling of power relations among various administrative and geographical 
scales. When the IRP was implemented in 2002, the governance of the 0.29 km
2
 
Yangji Village, with its 5253 villagers and about ten thousand migrants, was taken 
over by Tianhenan Street Office in Tianhe District. However, in 2005, it was 
Shipai Street Office 
Tangxia Street Office 
Maihua Street Office 
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transferred from Tianhenan Street Office in Tianhe District to Maihua Street 
Office in Yuexiu District. Compared with street office, villagers’ committee can 
more effectively communicate to villagers. In interview, the party commissioner 
of the Maihua Street Office described, in an oblique way, his relationship with 
Chang Jianghao, the leader of Yangji Village: 
 
 ‘The management and governance of the urban-village are very 
difficult. Those villagers still think they are peasants. They don’t work 
at all. They still live by house leasing. Besides, if they need help, they 
still go to their ex-village leader. She [Chang Jianghao] has a high 
position in the village. This is why we also give her a position in our 
danwei. […] All the cadres in the neighbourhood committee, street 
office, and cooperative are the same cadres in the villagers’ committee. 
Everything can be dealt with easily
69.’ 
 
In yet some other villages, the situation was more complex than simple 
categorization might suggest. For instance, after the implementation of the IRP, 
the governance of Tangxia Village and Tangdong Village was taken over by 
Tangxia Street Office. In Tangxia Village, together with Tangdong Village, there 
were about 7000 buildings, about 40,000 flats. Most of these buildings are four to 
eight storeys high. Tangxia Street had the largest migrant population in Tianhe 
District, most of them living in Tangxia Village and Tangdong Village. The exact 
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 Interview with Song Wenxian on 22
nd
 March 2007. 
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population data of residents was therefore inconsistent. Proximately a population 
of 15,000 is the data from the Office of Family Planning in the Tangxia Village 
Cooperative, proximately 40,000 was the data from the party secretary of the 
Tangxia Street Office, and proximately 140,000 was the data in terms of the 
jurisdiction of the Tangxia Street office. If it is a settlement with a population of 
40,000, it is a concept of town, rather than a village. If the number 40,000 is 
correct, all these 40,000 people live in the 1.7 km
2
 Tangxia Village, and there is 
only one police station.  
 
Taking over the governance of these two villages seems beyond the ability of 
the Tiangxia Street Office. Yet, a general solution was quickly arrived at by the 
negotiation of these two local authorities in this urban-village: That is, the village 
cooperatives were in charge of the governance and social works of their villagers. 
The Tangxia Street Office and neighbourhood committees were in charge of those 
of the migrants. All these three organizations have their own offices for family 
control. The one in the village cooperative was in charge of the family control of 
villagers. The family control of the migrants residing in Tangxia Village and 
Tangdong Village was managed by the Office for Family Control in the Tangxia 
Street Office. Carried with this seemingly blunting solution was a more subtle 
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realignment in the practice of governance.  
 
The tensions between street offices and village cooperatives can be palpable 
by taking a look at how the governmental project of “Constructing a National 
Sanitary City” in 2007 was launched in Tangxia Village and Tangdong Village. In 
order to be entitled as a “National Sanitary City”, in 2007, the Guangzhou 
Municipal Government launched many programmes to cleanse the backward and 
uncivil elements in the urban-villages. The programmes were mainly about 
improving the sanitary conditions of the urban-villages. However, the 
programmes also included leasing properties and migrants registration, enhancing 
public security, curbing illegal building constructions, and banning informal and 
illegal economic activities. As the lowest-level government governing Tangxia 
Village and Tangdong Village, the officials in the Tangxia Street Office found that 
they were in the position to execute the programmes of the higher-level 
governments. In executing these programmes, they were endowed with 
responsibility without power and resources. They would rather calculate this task 
assigned by the municipal government as a political risk than a political 
opportunity. In interview, the party secretary of the Tangxia street office 
interpreted the allocation of discretion from his point of view: 
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‘According to the [Organic] Law, a street office is not a level of 
government but an agency of the government. Its task is to inform, 
report, and assist the upper level government [district government]. 
Nevertheless, because of the area-based governance principle, the task 
of the [Tangxia] street office changes from liaising with government to 
implementing district government’s policy. Every department of the 
government asks the [Tangxia] street office to organize people and 
implement their policies. It becomes the [Tangxia] street office asking 
help from those departments which should implement the policy
70.’ 
 
While the Tangxia Street Office was lack of resources to execute the 
programmes, the Tangxia Village Cooperative and Tangdong Village Cooperative 
hired about 100 security personnel to maintain public security and handle petty 
crimes, and 40 sweepers to clean domestic rubbish, waste, and piles of litter in 
the narrow alleys. From the villagers’ committee’s point of view, the Tangxia 
Street Offices could manage in name only. The leader of Tangdong Village 
Cooperative explained to me during the interview:  
 
‘You ask me if the village cooperative has been at variance with 
neighbourhood committees or the street office? Actually, there is none. 
This is because the neighbourhood committee prefers doing nothing. 
Besides, we know how to deal with them. For instance, they should be 
in charge of some social works. Then we let the neighbourhood 
committee to be in charge of those works. They didn’t have their own 
offices. We gave them places as their offices. We also proffered some 
small benefits for them to maintain their running, such as parking 
lots
71.’ 
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In this narrative, the village cooperative’s primary objective was to continue 
to govern the village according to its own criteria of good practice. As a mass 
autonomy organization, it must find ways of cooperating with the street office. 
The village cooperatives avoid doing anything that may upset the delicate 
governing balance in the villages. Villagers’ committees adopted alternative 
strategies, rather than ignoring the new rearrangement, recklessly refusing to 
consider whether their actions are permitted or not, making explicit its 
non-co-operation, or arguing its non-compliance is lawful. In the process to forge 
new relationships, actors attempted to ensure challenges do not occur (Cooper, 
1996: 262).  
 
According to the Organic Law on Urban Residents’ Committee, the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government should be responsible for providing a budget, 
an office and a salary to each neighbourhood committee. Nevertheless, in reality, 
many of the neighbourhood committees in Tangxia Village and Tangdong 
Villages were, at least partially, reliant on village cooperatives’ funds to execute 
their mandates. Some of the buildings that house the offices of neighbourhood 
committees were also provided by the villagers’ committees. Street offices were 
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relatively resource-poor, drawing on the relative stability and reliability of these 
groups. Its personnel are on the payroll of the district government, but it must 
raise funds for its operation. It relies on locally situated social relations to make 
their operations viable. From this angle, it is the street office that would like to 
act as a strong leader and expand its influence. The outcome is meant to minimize 
cost and maximize efficiency of village governance. Street office and village 
cooperative adapt to each other, with only limited occasions of severe conflict. 
They form a relative stable coalition through which village governance takes 
place. 
 
While the characteristic/nature of the governing coalition in any given context 
remains contingent, certain broad tendencies can be identified. The task of the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government was to establish a continuity, in both a 
vertical and a horizontal direction. This means while the horizontal modes of 
co-ordination between agencies are encouraged, the vertical relations of power 
are nonetheless salient. In rearticulating the local governance regime, though 
street office and village cooperative form a relatively stable coalition through 
which village governance takes place, both street office and village cooperative 
have an intention to take the lead in constructing local regimes, agendas and 
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partnerships. On the one hand, the government tends to place street office-led 
development regimes in a stronger position to influence the form and character of 
the development that takes place. On the other hand, local agencies, be they street 
office or village cooperative., are “strongly suggested” by the planning authority 
to form development partnership and network with certain specific private 
developers affiliated with different levels of government and/or quasi-public 
development companies such as planning institutes. 
 
In some cases, local activities run ahead of district authorities. For example, 
in the following quotes, the party secretary of Tangxia street office was aware of, 
and realistic about, villagers’ situation regarding building licenses. In the local 
practice, he replaced the authority of the planning bureau and gave villagers a 
piece of paper as a document of building permission: 
 
‘These villagers only need to give me three drawings [current, planning, 
fire prove plan], then I give them a notification. I don’t have any 
authority to approve villagers’ building permission. However, the 
meaning of notification is that I know what they are doing. If villagers 
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 An official meeting held by Panyu District Planning Bureau on 20 November 
2007. 
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While officials in the municipal planning bureau and district planning bureau 
were surprised by this tactic practice of land management, the party secretary of 
the street office legitimized this unauthorized discretion through the language of 
impossibility. As he explained to the officials of the Municipal Planning Bureau 
and District Planning Bureau in a meeting held in the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government: 
 
‘I acquiesced to them. If you can do nothing, you are not given much 
authority to regularize their building, nor have you authority to give 
them official sanction. But you need to leave them some egresses, some 
leeway to live. Rather than perpetuating the problems, at least I find a 
way to control the situation
73.’ 
 
The control of the building did not just work by policy mandates alone. It 
worked effectively in villages because villager cooperatives played a role in this. 
In interview, Chang Jianghao, the leader of Yangji Village, said:  
 
‘I exhorted these villagers not to rebuild their properties more than four 
storeys high. I told them that Yangji Village is going to be regenerated. 
It is not worth spending money on rebuilding. We control the rebuilding 
of the properties by controlling the stock share of villagers. This is why 
most of the buildings in Yangji Village are no more than four storeys 
high
74.’ 




 Interview with Chang Jianghao on 22
nd
 April 2007. 
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While the government tended to place street office-led development regimes 
in a stronger position to influence the form and character of the development that 
takes place, village cooperatives were often characterised by the government as 
grasping. Different from village leaders, party secretaries of the street offices were 
seen as governmental and have a close relationship with policymakers and 
officials in the Guangzhou Municipal Government. They worked in and through 
the Guangzhou Municipal Government and district governments, their voice could 
be heard and was seen as helpful in setting the policy agenda.  
 
However, it does not mean that the street offices were clear about what would 
be the right type of regeneration. In the project of Huadi Village regeneration, for 
example, the party secretary of the Huadi Street Office in some meetings was 
asked by the Planning Bureau to make a plan that is consistent with governmental 
flag-ship projects such as the “Pearl Riverside CBD”. In some other meetings, he 
was asked to modify the plan to be in line with governmental wider agendas and 
objectives such as “building socialist new villages” introduced by the central 
government in the Fifth Plenum of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee at the 
end of 2005. The aims of “building socialist new villages” is to mitigate the 
polarization of poor and rich and the discrepancy of rural and urban, and therefore 
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may be considered irrelevant to the regeneration of Huadi Village. While being 
asked to frame the regeneration project of Huadi Village in different programming 
languages, the scale and scope of the planning became uncertain. As the party 
secretary of the Huadi Street Office complained: 
 
‘We applied for government approval and asked for political support. 
However, the Development and Reform Commission commented that 
the regeneration plan we proposed didn’t consider the planning in a 
larger scale, nor did we consider economic development. This confused 
us in many ways. I don’t know whether our project is “building socialist 
new villages” or urban-village regeneration? (Field notes, January 
2008)’ 
 
Villagers were successful in claiming their right to participate and appropriate. 
However, the degree was limited. In many of the official meetings I audited 
during the fieldwork, village leaders and villagers were excluded from the official 
meetings. For instance, in the meeting held by the Panyu District Planning 
Bureau on 20
th
 November 2007, the compensation for villagers was discussed. 
Nevertheless, none of the villagers was in the meeting, nor had anyone 
representing them. During the break of the meeting, I asked an official, ‘why is 
village leader not invited in the meeting?’ He replied bluntly, ‘village leader is 
neither governmental, nor on our side.’ Villagers had a formal say in villagers’ 
committee. In these meetings, which were an access to establish policy networks, 
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village leader was excluded outside policy community. Village entities and agents 
had relatively less concrete legal and political power. Nevertheless, it does not 
mean they were excluded from governmental networks. Village leaders can easily 
get access to the centres of power. They can communicate with the Mayor or the 
Chief Party Secretary of Guangzhou directly in different circumstances. In an 
extended interview, the chief planner of the planning bureau, Wang Yuan, 
complained to me:  
 
‘The leader of Yangji Village had presented the regeneration project of 
Yangji Village to the Mayor and the Party Secretary of Guangzhou 
many times. But she never came to communicate with us. The 
implementation of the policy of institutional reform is in-complete. 
Now the situation of these villages is that a street office and a villagers’ 
committee coexist. They govern together. Those village leaders, come 
on, they are all representatives in the People’s Congress of Guangzhou. 
Do you think it is possible asking them to do nothing
75?’ 
 
Rather than allowing institutional disobedience, such as ignoring the new 
rearrangement, or recklessly refusing to consider whether its actions are permitted 
or not, making explicit its non-co-operation, or arguing its non-compliance, was 
lawful, villagers’ committees have been abolished, and the main bodies have been 
reorganized into “village cooperatives”. However, in the actual reconfiguration of 
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village governance, villagers’ committees are not simply passive objects to be 
excluded as supplanted local authorities. Villagers’ committees adopt alternative 
strategies. In seeking to adapt to this new form of governance, many have 
deployed their double roles to exploit gaps in the programmes and technologies of 
governance to their own advantage. While engaging in forms of 
resistance/alteration at certain points beyond all recognition, they have managed 
to invent local-scale techniques of management and turn the course of events in 
favour of local participation and have developed forms of governance and action 
that reflect their needs. 
 
5.5 Conclusions. 
In examining different forms and characters of synchronically and 
diachronically variable regime formations, much of the literature of urban 
regeneration deploys Janus as a metaphorical evocation to explore the flip side to 
the process of innovative horizontal and networked arrangements of 
governance-beyond-the-state (e.g., Harding, 1995; Stoker, 1995; Ward, 1996; 
Gibbs and Jonas, 2000). In some literature, a Janus-faced approach is adopted 
directly as a generative device to reveal how the state-civil society relation, the 
meaning of citizenship, and the nature of democracy itself are rearticulated, 
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redefined, and repositioned (Swyngedouw, 2005; also see Latour and Woolgar, 
1979; Latour, 1987). In some other literature, it is adopted as an interpretive 
strategy to evaluate horizontal modes of coordination between agencies and 
vertical relations of power and responsibility that underpin the development of a 
local agenda (e.g., Harding, 2000; Raco, 2003). In yet other literatures, a 
Janus-faced approach is adopted in more prosaic terms to frame a double 
dynamic
76
 (Hajer, 2003) and the agencies in developing their capacity reflexively 
to broader government programmes in which they operate (e.g. Imrie and Raco, 
1999; Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000). 
 
In an attempt to deploy the Janus metaphor and reveal what it refers to in 
more prosaic terms, an additional objective of this chapter is to explore the role of 
metaphors in the construction of particular truth-value claims. By “Janus”, I mean 
to capture, both rhetorically and analytically, the irony and paradox of the 
strategic responses of the two local authorities to the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government’s institutional reform policy in shaping a specific and differentiated 
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 Hajer (2003: 175-176) uses the term “double dynamic” to describe “actors not 
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form of conduct of the self and of the others.  
 
The rationale and policy formation of the IRP are problematic in nature. As I 
have shown above, this policy is conducted through an inadequate institutional 
diagnosis and design rationality because state institutions and relating 
laws/policies, used to define fundamentals, such as villagers’ committee, 
collective land, and ownership, are unclear and still intentionally kept ambiguous 
and vague by the state (Ho, 2005). In the rather thin and negative understanding of 
the HRS and JSS – the two formations of technologies for governing, derived 
from village’s socialist-led regime of accumulation and its accompanying mode of 
regulation – and the fact that these two systems are nonetheless the basis to 
underpin village governance and regulate village economic activities, social lives, 
livelihood, and individual conducts, governmental assessment of the affected 
interest groups and the ability of government to mobilize support for reform and 
resist opposition are misjudged.  
 
The institutional reform is important, although of course never complete as the 
policymakers imagined. After all, a project of such kind is congenitally contingent 
and partial, rarely completely realizing the aspirations of government (Foucault, 
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1979; 1991b; Huxley, 2006). Whereas a large policy literature, developed since 
the 1970s, has focused on the causes of implementation success or failure, in this 
chapter, I argue that the implementation problem, and the fragmentary nature of 
its outcome, should not be dismissed as temporal or peripheral, but rather a 
significant structuring device in its own right. It creates a subsequent context with 
its own form of politics from which the subsequent policy design will ensue. In 
seeking to develop a more coordinated approach to the urban-village regeneration, 
it is through the implementation of this policy that created a governing coalition 
or regime to reshape government-led regeneration into multi-agency regeneration.  
 
However, rather than a governance promoted by the government agenda, the 
multi-agency governance is ipso facto an accidental consequence of the partial 
implementation of the IRP, since, in terms of the Guangzhou Municipal 
Government, the outcome of the implementation of the policy is fragmentary, 
displaced, and incomplete. Ironically, while the fragmentation of the mode of 
governance redefines the role and position of local authorities, the actual 
reconfiguration of the new governance structures expresses the “natural” 
outcomes of an ongoing renegotiation amongst the different levels of government 
to maintain legitimacy, social cohesion and sufficient political support. It is this 
286 
very institutional reconfiguration that most suited to meet governmental agendas.  
 
While facing the Guangzhou Municipal Government’s demand to implement 
the IRP, street offices found themselves in a position that is in-between the upper 
level government and villages. As the lowest-level government, they have to 
execute decisions made by high-level government and confront complaints of 
local residents. In dealing with regeneration and governing pressure of the 
urban-villages, they found that they were endowed with responsibility without 
power. Likewise, while facing different segments of the government, villagers’ 
committees were caught between loyalty to their fellow villagers and the political 
necessity to enforce government policy. Village leaders represented their fellow 
villagers and their claims to their conventional rights over the land. They were 
also members of the Communist Party, who must unconditionally execute the 
policies of the Party and government under the leadership of the Party. Both street 
offices and villagers’ committees were facing in opposite directions at once. Their 
strategies were performed in Janus-faced ways, particularly at the beginning of the 
transferring of the governance arrangements of people and things from rural-based 
institutions to urban-based institutions.  
The Janus metaphor renders the understanding that the two sides are of equal 
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importance. The mixture of motivations, and need to create alliances amongst 
disparate forces involved, mean different narratives can be constructed from the 
same or overlapping cluster of events. The complicity of street offices and village 
cooperatives is crucial to its operation as technique of governmentality. Residents 
of the urban-villages are governed, not directly from above, but through 
technologies such as the village cooperative’s stock share and street office’s 
informal deals on property relations and governance practices. The institutional 
reform provides a space for actors and organizations of the government at 
different levels (municipal, district, street) to intervene in different forms.  
 
Whereas these forms of conduct and body techniques are analyzed in this 
chapter for the ways they are shaped and give shape to the outcome of the 
implementation of the IRP, this policing of conduct also produces unintended 
outcomes and unexpected alignments of local authorities and allies of local 
residents than that is intended by the power itself. In seeking to develop a more 
coordinated approach to the urban-village regeneration, it is the actual 
reconfiguration of local authorities that creates new subjects/objects, and hence 
new problems and new techniques, which have been structurally, discursively and 
deliberately excluded from the dominate discourse coalition. The new 
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subjects/objects enter the frame of governance or reinforce their power position, 
while the hitherto excluded or marginalized social groups such as migrants and/or 
locales remained excluded. Bearing these in mind, I shall now turn to Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Six 
“New Alley Action”! Villagers, Migrants, Yan Wendou and His Fellow Brothers. 
 
“Policy designs signal whether politics is a game of self-interest or a 
process of deliberation through which broader, collective interests are 
served (Schneider and Ingram, 1997: 101).” 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
“The sceneries of these villages are more or less the same every day. 
Cooking smells waft through the air as the multi-dialectal chatter is 
drowned by the sound of playing Mahjong. Some girls, who are 
prostitutes, stand in the deep dark impasses. They look at every 
passer-by mischievously, while sewing shoe-pads. If there is an eye 
contact, he is the customer they are looking for. Some middle age 
women, who are house minders, hang in front of the village gate, stare 
at every passer-by. They seek tenants, negotiate contracts, and monitor 
the upkeep of the properties. In these urban-villages, one can see that 
many buildings are under construction. During the day, no one works in 
the construction sites. However, these buildings grow. Villagers usually 
build when it is still dark in the morning, from 1 am to 4 am. One of the 
villagers explained to me: ‘A guy from the [Tangxia] Street Office told 
me, I can build when they are off their job.’ (Field notes, August 2007)” 
 
As I have described in the previous two empirical chapters, in both the 
literature and discourses in the dominant society, the problem of the 
urban-villages is largely seen as resulting from the spatial concentration of 
anomalies of “bad people”. Whereas urban residents whose income falls below 
the official poverty level are identified by policy as disadvantaged people whose 
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poverty is not their fault, the social constructions of the urban-villages portray 
villagers negatively as indolent persons who receive benefits for which they are 
not eligible. As a group of people who are linked by social ties, sharing common 
perspectives and engaged in joint action in geographical locations or settings, 
villagers are considered to be politically weak but with positive constructions in 
other policy areas. Nevertheless, in the issue context of the urban-villages 
regeneration, they are losing their positive construction and moving toward what 
Schneider and Ingram (1997) refer to as the “emergent contending group”, with 
images such as “undeserving” and “selfish”, gaining for themselves at the expense 
of others. Migrants carry a construction that they are deviants. The lack of strong 
networks and solidaristic organizations of migrants renders them as merely a flow 
of people, a fleeting presence in the city, and this has exacerbated the perception 
that they are passive and inactive in reacting to the urban-villages regeneration.  
 
In contrast to stereotypical depictions described in previous chapters, Yan 
Wendou, who is a profit-making agent involved in housing leasing in these 
villages, has a divergent view of the organically formed spatial boundaries and 
social relations in the urban-villages: 
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‘The urban-village is a highly self-managing place. One says it is in 
muck, a tumour, a den of iniquity, the conglomeration of crimes. It is, 
however, a paradise for me. The government neither implements urban 
governance in, nor extends any infrastructure to, these villages. For this 
reason, these villages have to put self-governing into practice and deal 
with infrastructure in their own ways. But now, such practice has 
become a sin of villages. […] The urban-villages serve as the focal 
point of the city’s collective anxieties, the scapegoat for ills not of their 
own making. In your eyes, the urban-villages are unsavoury areas; for 
me, they are capable of self-improvement (Field notes, April 2007).’  
 
He continued:  
 
 ‘The urban-villages have been demonized by the mainstream. Most of 
the urban residents never have an actual experience living in the 
urban-villages, but they always say that the urban-villages are chaotic, 
backward, and dangerous. They always say that the urban- villages are a 
problem. This is what I would like to ask you: In what ways the 
urban-villages are a problem? In fact, these urban-villages are now 
located in the city centre. The so-called “villagers” have been totally 
urbanized. It is stigmatization if we keep on calling them 
“urban-villages”. Instead of “urban-village”, I use the term “new alley”. 
Instead of “urban-village regeneration”, I use the term “new alley 
action” (ibid.)’. 
 
In Yan Wendou’s narrative, villagers are not serendipitous rentiers or petit 
peasants, plodding through a sedentary life in an unreflexive way. Instead, they 
can be described as active “place entrepreneurs” referred to by Logan and 
Molotch (1987: 29) as those who are “directly involved in the exchange of places 
and collection of rents.” In contrast to the dominant discourses about the 
regeneration of the urban-villages, the self-narratives of Yan Wendou and his 
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fellow brothers, who are migrants themselves, embody the different and diverse 
ways that local residents speak about themselves and their activities. Their 
testimonies portray the complexity of urban dwellers’ positionality and lives in 
relation to a society that is increasingly understood and governed by means of a 
kind of neoliberal style of thought. 
 
Having shown how the complicity and covert circumvention of local 
authorities operate as a technique of governmentality and turn ordinary activities 
and spaces into “sites of surveillance”, the third of my three empirical chapters 
shifts the focus away from the transformation of formal institutions based on the 
construction of marginality identified by the dominant society, to the forms and 
types of individual responses to the governmental regeneration of the 
urban-villages. In understanding the urban-villages as sites for subjectification, it 
discusses the effects of discourse on the self-narratives and lives of local residents. 
It evaluates how practices play out in local residents’ self-narratives, and explores 
the different ways that local people strategically and actively engage in 




The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. Through the ways 
in which different governmental programmes are interpreted at a local level, the 
first section illustrates a range of practices that I characterize as “present-oriented 
strategies”, and considers the ways these practices, in the form of marginal 
resistance, work as counter-conducts to the governmental regeneration of the 
urban-villages. Evidenced by the presence of Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers, 
the second section discusses different engagements with neoliberal signifying 
practices. In dialogue with theoretical perspectives derived from public choice, the 
third section, then, turns to discuss the specific disenfranchisement problems of 
urban residents associated with the urban-village regeneration controversy, and 
raises the question of what benefits and dis-benefits it may have for the social and 
spatial structure of the city. The fourth section concludes by arguing that local 
residents’ marginal resistances are not as powerless as has often been suggested by 
both the literature and discourse of the dominant society. Rather, they enact a 
process of subjectification that moulds people toward specific forms of 
counter-conduct. It is this neoliberal subjectification that flattens a deeper, more 
difficult, question of who should be identified to be empowered and participate, 
and to what degree, in decision making relating to the regeneration. 
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6.2 Present-Oriented Strategies as Counter-Conducts to the Governmental 
Regeneration Programmes. 
Somewhat analogous to the harshness of Britain’s Speenhamland laws (see 
Walker and Buck, 2007), the Chinese hukou system, initiated under Mao in the 
1950s, is not merely a demographical tool, designed to identify personal status 
and provide population statistics to measure the level of urbanization, but a 
monitoring and control mechanism of population migration and mobilization. It is 
used by the Chinese government directly to regulate population distribution and 
serve many other important objectives desired by the state (Shen and Tong, 1992; 
Chan and Zhang, 1999; Fan, 1999). The hukou system provides the state with the 
means and information that can be used for securing social and political order and 
other related objectives, e.g. child birth control, social security, and tax. It 




Government regulations allow some legal migration from villages to small 
and medium sized towns in the same county. However, in large cities, such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, migrants are severely restricted from 
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 For a more detailed study on the hukou system, see Ma and Hanten, 1981; 
Johnson, 1988; Christiansen, 1990; Goldstein, 1990; Chan, 1996; Cook, 1999; 
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becoming permanent rightful members of urban society (Siu, 1990; Woon, 1993; 
Xu and Li, 1990). In Guangzhou, temporary residence card is a primary 
mechanism through which migrants are surveilled. Migrants need various 
documents to verify their identity, job status, marriage status, etc. If they fail to 
produce a job card, ID card, or proof of temporary residence, or if the local police 
suspect they are undocumented, local police have the authority to send them to 
detention and repatriation shelter, forcing them to work and holding them until 
relatives pay for their release. For those without relatives to pay for their release, 
they will be either bailed or put into jail and then sent back to their hometown.  
 
The hukou system is intensified and loosened, at different levels of 
government, for different reasons, and in different period of times. A recent most 
notable example is the state’s migration restriction during the Olympic Game in 
Beijing in 2008. It is through this very existence of government activity that social 
problems are articulated. From Foucauldian perspective, the hukou system is 
functioned as a “technology of power” to control population movement toward 
certain desired effects. Numerous in-between categories of residence are invented 
by local authorities to extract what resources were available from the local 
population, be they villagers or migrants. For example, migrant control was 
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loosened after the death of Sun Zhigang in 2003
78
. Some street offices in 
Guangzhou nonetheless reissued the temporary cards due to the shortage of 
finance. These acts have clearly increased the level of fear among local residents. 
The ramifications are even severer in places such as the urban-villages. Migrants 
have to suffer a lot of red tape to get a temporary residence card. In order to get a 
temporary residence card, a migrant is asked to bring all other certificates such as 
married or un-married certificate, even the tax document of where he or she works. 
Not surprisingly, residents of the villages in Guangzhou shared numerous stories 
of abuses of the urban government at different levels. During the fieldwork, 
sewage collectors (for manure) told me about how local officials gave them the 
wrong information about the duration of the governmental project for 
“Constructing a National Sanitary City” in 2007, surcharged temporary residence 
cards, and demanded extra fees for business licences and birth certificates. A 
migrant from Hubai Province, who rented a small place from the village leader 
and ran a business of a small snake bar in Tangdong Village, also gave an 
example: 
                                                 
78
 Sun Zhigang was a university graduated young man who went to Guangzhou. 
In March 2003, he failed in showing his temporary resident card to local police 
in Huang Village. He was then sent to detention and beaten to death. His death 
gained national attention in 2003 and led to the loosening of migrant control. 
See Chapter Three (section 3.4); Siu, 2008. 
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‘Last year, I went to the [Industrial and Commercial Administration] 
Bureau to apply for a [business] licence. The officer there told me that 
my shop was too small to apply. This year, because the government 
would like to compete with other cities in the national project [of 
Constructing a National Sanitary City], the surveillers seized my 
utensils, put me in a car, and forced me to the bureau to apply for the 
[business] licence. Ok. I was willing to apply. But then they told me that 
because I didn’t apply for the licence last year, I had to pay the penalty. 
I was thinking about arguing with them, but then I said to myself, “Just 
pay the fee. I don’t want to get into trouble.”’ (Field notes, September 
2007) 
 
Migrants have little recourse against such mistreatment and bureaucratic 
hassle because of their disadvantageous social status. From this perspective, 
villagers’ and migrants’ often hesitate to engage in governmental researches or 
give real or accurate information, as described in Chapter Four (section 4.2), is 
understandable. Villagers and migrants were sceptical for many reasons, thinking 
that the data collected might be used for social control purposes or as a 
mechanism for scrutiny of them and their activities. Villagers were afraid of being 
asked to pay taxes or penalty charges for illegal buildings, or losing compensation 
in the future regeneration, while undocumented migrants were afraid of being 
deported, of being penalised for having illegitimate children, or, at worst, being 
put in jail (see figure 6.1). 
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(Source: authors’ photo.) 
 
Note: Liu comes from Hubai Province, 1200 km away from Guangzhou. He and 
his wife rent a shop, a nameless greasy spoon, with a size of 5 m
2
. A place for 
cooking, plus a refrigerator and some family belongings fill up this small space. A 
small TV continuously playing martial art programs hangs above. Three small 
tables for customers are on the street, with three small parasols. Actually, these 
three parasols are useless when the sun is burning or when it is raining. Next to 
the tables are five iron buckets for garbage. There is always someone rummaging 
wastes in these buckets. From the north to the south of the street, there are seven 
this kind of small shops. They are all nameless greasy spoons, the same as Liu’s. 
When it is time for meal, the whole street is pervaded with the smell of cooking 
and sauces. 
 
Since the 1990s, there have been different governmental programmes to deal 
with the problem of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. Measures have been taken 
to curb “illegal” building constructions. Campaigns have been repeatedly 
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conducted to “cleanse” the “backward, uncivil elements” of these areas. A 
background for these encounters was numerous media presentations. On 
television, in magazines and newspapers, commentators reflected on the problems 
of the urban-villages. There were always rumours from somewhere about when 
the government was going to send people to inspect whether or not there were 
illegal buildings in the villages. The plethora of news in local newspapers and 
media reinforced the message that the urban-villages were undergoing a major 
transformation, with significant investment and redevelopment. But governmental 
regeneration plans have never come to fruition. No one knew when this would 
happen or even if it would happen at all.  
 
Similar to Beauregard’s (1993: ix) Voices of Decline, in which he describes 
that the proclaimed decline of cities has framed the lives of those who came of age 
in the United States in the last half of 20
th
 century, the proclaimed regeneration of 
the urban-villages has become naturalized and diffused in everyday language in 
Guangzhou. It has framed the lives of those who live in these places and shaped 
the common perceptions which are transmitted and turned into shared inclinations. 
The information and impressions they glean from these presentations re-appear in 
their discussions with friends, neighbours, colleagues, and strangers. This public 
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discourse influences people’s decision making in deciding how to invest, where 
they should live, with whom and at what costs and for what benefits. 
 
It is this “framing” that seems to have engendered local people’s “present 
oriented” strategies. The “present-oriented” strategies are intertwined with local 
people’s particular conceptualization of the urban-villages and their multiple 
social-geographical imaginaries to governmental regeneration policies, which are 
intimately related to their particular everyday experiences and livelihoods in the 
urban-villages. In this sense, it is significant that the wider perceptions of times of 
these various groups, and their attitudes toward the governmental policies provide 
an insightful understanding to the way they understand the governmental 
regeneration projects (see figure 6.2). In interview, a villager’s response 
exemplified the present-oriented strategy:  
 
‘Yah, I know what you are saying. But I think in this way. The 
government claimed that these villages are soon to be torn down. Yes, I 
know. But, come on, it takes time. And which one is the first? Think 
about it. When the governmental regeneration comes to this village, it is 
already nine years later (Interview with a local villager in Yangji Village, 





 Figure 6.2 Kai Gong Da Ji. 
(Source: authors’ photo.) 
 
Note: The four words on the red board are "Kai Gong Da Ji", i.e. "an auspicious 
beginning for the new construction site". This construction site is in Shipai Village 
in Guangzhou. The size is 4m*5m. The widths of the two adjacent alleys are 90cm 
and 130cm. It was alleged that there was going to be a new eight storeys high 
housing on this construction site. In 2007, there were circa 50,000 people living in 
the 0.73 km
2
 Shipai Village. As a village located in the Tianhe CBD, every inch of 
land was contesting. While the cost to build housing in the villages in Guangzhou 
in the 1990s was 450 RMB per square metre, it was at least 800 RMB per square 
metre in 2007. The construction of an eight storeys housing on a 120 square 
metres housing base land (HBL) needed 800*120*8=768,000 RMB. 
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Villagers made sense of their rebuilding activities with the storyline that the 
municipal government’s ambitious goal to regenerate all the 138 urban-villages in 
Guangzhou before 2010 was unattainable, at least not in the near future. Local 
residents consider a number of concrete factors that could potentially alter future 
exchange value interests along with use value goals – and a key one is the 
indeterminacy of government activity. This indeterminacy causes villagers, as a 
group, to mixed strategies and interests. In envisaging how many years they still 
have to earn their money, they formed a kind of reflexive risk-calculation. They 
may have different degree of rebuilding. They may, as I will describe in the next 
section, lease out their properties to profit-making agents involved in housing 
leasing to minimize the risks relating to the vagaries of urban development.  
 
Villagers have lost their status of being peasants after the implementation of the 
IRP (see Chapter Five). Nevertheless, under the umbrella of the HRS and JSS, 
they still maintain their land-related entitlements derived from their former 
peasant status, such as the using right of the HBL, property ownership, and the 
right to tenancy. In a way, they still maintain their twin status (villager and 
peasant). This twin status provides them with an entrée into local business and 
cultural life in their villages. This means the villager status becomes less of a 
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burden and more of a resource, enabling villagers to be shareholders of the 
immense collective economy based on the villages, which separates them in terms 
of economic power from ordinary city dwellers and migrants who rent houses to 
live in the urban-villages (cf. Li, 2002: 3). All villagers have advantages in 
gaining access to resources because villagers’ committees are strong lineage 
entities. Their personal connections help to secure their investment. The two are 
connected and reinforced each other through the tendency for individual. 
Advantage in one can be used to develop advantage in the other.  
 
In the urban-villages, villagers have certificates for the right to use land. They 
are not restrained from build housing on it. In early periods, the municipal 
government did not care to interfere with any construction in the villages, but in 
the later periods, they began to seek to control the development of these villages. 
Although the municipal government in 1999 had stopped issuing building 
permission of the HBL, many of the buildings in the urban-villages are still 
continuously rebuilt (see Chapter Two, section 2.3). All the villagers, including 
village leaders and cadres who hold higher positions, continue to rebuild housing 
on the HBL without permissions. Villagers in similar situations also made up 
communities of fate, and they often got together to help fate along a remunerative 
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path. Villagers monitored their peers, using social networks to learn who was 
going to do what and where. This led to the difficulties of those, like government 
officials or village leaders, who might try to control them. The ethnographic 
reality shows that villagers did not consider their housings to be illegal. A villager 
in interview gave a storyline:  
 
‘I rebuilt my house in the late 1990s. I saw everyone has rebuilt his own 
house, including the village leader, cadres, and the party secretaries. I 
just followed what they did (Field notes, May 2007).’  
 
While there is a strong intention to pursue economic benefits, it is certainly the 
case that villagers rebuild their properties for reasons other than economic gain 
and profit. This makes sense when one realizes that although the rebuilding of 
housing by villagers is considered, in the dominating discourse of regeneration, as 
an economic imperative, the economic rationales of rebuilding, and the different 
degree of rebuilding, also reflect social objectives. The boundary between social 
and economic reasons is often not clear. And the arbitrary position between the 
social and economic categories provides villagers with spaces to pursue their 
maximum benefit. An extreme example I encountered during the fieldwork is that 
a wife of a villager gave a birth of her daughter. Her husband was angry because a 
female baby would be distributed less individual dividend than a male baby. The 
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husband said to his wife angrily that either they were going to have a second child, 
which is illegitimate and would be punished by abating his individual dividends, 
or they were going to rebuild their house.  
 
Villagers’ narratives have been shaped, indirectly or partially, by many 
different relations, institutions, and contexts, such as social status, patriarchy, 
marriage, gender, and family. They conduct themselves with their specific logics, 
differently from those objectives proposed by a given mode of conduct (see 
Chapter Five). This different form of conduct is, for Foucault (2007), a form of 
counter-conduct. As he describes, counter-conducts are 
  
“movements whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to 
say: wanting to be conducted differently, by other leaders (conducteurs) 
and other shepherds, toward other objectives and forms of salvation, 
and through other procedures and methods. They are movements that 
also seek, possibly at any rate, to escape direction by others and to 
define the way for each to conduct himself (ibid.: 194-195).” 
 
Many houses in the urban-villages were rebuilt and torn down many times. 
Villagers halted the construction pending a dialogue with key people. After it was 
dealt, be it in the form of negotiation, bargain, persuasion, bribe, the construction 
resumed. To put it simply, if local residents, in due course, find the right guy and 
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talk in the right way, political higher-ups, who were often profited from the 
situation through corruption, would turn a blind eye. The villagers and migrants 
were tipped off to flee in time. 
 
Although surveillers (cheng-guan) were asked to prevent from unauthorized 
constructions in villages, they merely went through the motion of punching few 
holes on the wall of unauthorized buildings to indicate that they accomplished the 
duty. A villager said: ‘During the day, they wear their security guard uniforms, 
with big hammers in their hands. But during the night, they take off their uniforms 
and live in this village. Do they still want to live their life in this village?’ Another 
villager said, ‘While it was still under construction, some security personnel came 
with hammers in their left hands and stretched out their right hands to ask for 
money.’ In the eyes of villagers and migrants, security personnel are more like 
goons and thugs. They are surveillers brandishing their cudgels. 
 
Security personnel, called cheng-guan (城管), are based in the street office 
and they are in charge of everything. For example, they are in charge of checking 
if there is any illegal construction. They are neither officially employed, nor in a 
well-paid position (Their salary is 1300 RMB per month). They are temporarily 
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employed and hence have nothing to do with promotion. Because their personal 
income, apart from their salary and perks, were pegged to their fringe benefits, it 
is understandable for local residents that they would ask some extra money. 
Almost every one of them is a villager or a migrant living in this village. It also 
made them difficult to do their job. Another villager also said: ‘the party secretary 
also owns houses with six floors high. Besides, the party secretary of the street 
office runs the small business of gambling. Last week, his gambling shops were 
banned by the police station. Nevertheless, he can still get back those gambling 
machines.’ 










(Source: authors’ photo) 
Note: A migrant said, ‘I have been in Guangzhou for some years. There were lots 
construction sites in villages. My wife and I earned our lives as construction 
workers. But now there are not as many constructions as in the past. And I am 
getting old. Now I am a sweeper.’ 
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Migrants vary in their attachment to the urban-villages. Their mobility in the 
city is rather limited, or their movements are restricted to utilitarian purposes. In 
other words, high labour mobility or job instability of migrants, proximity to their 
working place is their most important consideration to choose where to live. 
Evidenced by the observations during the fieldwork, random interviews also 
indicate that those migrants living in the urban-villages in Guangzhou can be 
classified into two categories. The mobility of those who have jobs in the urban 
area is shaped by the closeness of working places. For those whose jobs are in the 
urban-villages, their mobility is shaped by which village they can find a job. 
People of the first category choose which village to live according to where they 
work. People of the second category choose which village to live according to 
which village they can find jobs (see figure 6.3). Due to financial constraints, the 
migrants’ household strategies are to minimize costs and bring back as much 
saving as possible to their hometowns (Zhu, 2001a). As my informants explained, 
‘I will never rent a place on the street. It will cost me 500RMB per month. I prefer 
save 200RMB per month to live in the deep inside of a village’, or, very tellingly, 
‘If I have extra money, I would send it back to my family in Hubai Province,’ or, 
most squarely, ‘I wake up every day at four am and go out for work. It is already 
dark when I finish my work at 11 pm. What am I supposed to do with sun light?’ 
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Their present-oriented strategies are a form of rationality. However, local residents, 
including villagers and migrants, constituted it as a matter of fact, just the ways 
things are. 
 
While migrants appear in official documents, not so much as actors but as 
more or less anonymous contributors to the level of urbanization, local villagers’ 
“resistance” is not little or no coordination or planning. Their refusals to register 
and pay tax to the street office provide a strategy for them less interested in 
confronting government policy and forcing change than in maintaining practices 
they can “live with”. Their refusal to invest in the long term is important to their 
resistance strategies. They engage in verbal strategies, produce modes of adaption, 
and create norms of behaviour that take the form of “present-oriented strategies”. 
It is within this context that “living for the moment” is presented as fundamental – 
albeit with different degrees of intensity – of the existential standpoints of groups 
in the urban-villages.  
 
6.3 Not only Black and White, but also Grey. 
The visibility of Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers in the urban-villages 
signifies the government’s difficulty in regeneration and the need of street offices 
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or village cooperatives to manage the urban-villages. It embodies the different and 
diverse ways that local residents speak about themselves and their activities. Their 
testimonies portray the complexity of urban dwellers’ positionality and lives in 
relation to a society that is increasingly understood and governed by means of a 
kind of neoliberal style of thought. In interview, Yan Wendou explained: 
 
‘These villagers have to find tenants by themselves. If they fail, they 
lose money from every single vacant room. Apart from the loss, they 
have to stay at their properties 24 hours a day doing cleaning, upkeep 
and maintenance, and writing reports to the villagers’ committees, 
neighbourhood committees, and street offices. It is a tiresome job for 
them. Therefore I offer these villagers to let me rent their properties and 
my people would deal with all the works for them. They don’t need to 
worry about finding tenants; they don’t have to worry about losing 
money, they can be away to enjoy their lives with their own pastimes. 
All they need to do is check their bank account on the 5
th
 of every 
month. Above and beyond, when the contract terminates, all the 
refurbishment that I have invested on the properties belongs to them. 
[…] I explained all these advantages to the villagers, and they all 
accepted my proposal.’ (Field notes, April 2007) 
 
The business that Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers have been doing is 
very similar to the management practice of a real estate agency. They rent 
properties from villagers with the price of 20 RMB per square meter and relet 
them to migrants at double the price. In each property, Yan Wendou and his 
fellow brothers have invested approximately 100,000 RMB on refurbishment, 
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such as changing the pavements in the potholed alleys, repainting, installing 
internet and telephone, and storing furniture. These properties are also 
refurbished with a number of security measures such as walls, fences, gates, 
guards, and installing CCTV. If it is necessary or profitable, partitions in flats are 
also changed to suit the market (e.g. a two bed room flat into four single rooms, 
or maybe two one-bed-room-flats). By deducting the initial rental, the prime costs 
of management, and the loss of vacant flats, they have earned profits from each 
flat with the rate of 100 to 200 RMB per month. Their management practices 
resonate with local people’s investment and disinvestment strategies expressed in 
their discussions of limited individual dividends from village cooperative or 
irregular rental income. In general, this investment approach takes approximately 
three years to recover the initial costs. By ensuring villagers’ long-term and 
regular income, Yan Wendou in turn insists to sign up at least a six-year contract 
with the property owners. These lucrative business issues of securitising space 
have also been prominent in creating the conditions for successful projects. With 
entrances controlled by security guards and their own internal security systems 
guarded at their perimeters and monitored by closed circuit TV, newly renovated 
residential buildings have been made “safe” and to be seen to be safe to make 
sure that renters would not loss their belongings such as laptop, mobile phone, 
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and money. In engaging with building activity, Yan Wendou and his fellow 
brothers cater to migrants who demand “safety”, villagers who demand regular 
income, and government which demands “good governance”.  
 
Before Yan Wendou came to Guangzhou, he has been working in the local 
government in Yichang County, Hubei Province, for 16 years (first as a village 
leader of Sandopin Village, then the chief of the United Front Office, Yichang 
County Government, Hubei Province). He came up with the idea of being a real 
estate agent in the villages when he found that he always had trouble finding a 
suitable place in Ke Village in Guangzhou. The first villager he talked to did not 
believe him, nor understood what he was going to do. Nevertheless, after he paid 
the villager ten months rent plus two months deposit in one time, the villager 
accepted his thought, though with doubt. (For instance, in my participatory 
observation, I often heard more or less the same sentences that villagers said to 
Yan Wendou: ‘I must tell you bluntly that should the government tear down the 
village, I won’t take the responsibility of the investment you are going to put in 





























 (Source: authors’ photo)  
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To guarantee profits and eliminate risk, Yan Wendou runs his business with 
the method of investment in shares. In his vernacular, these shareholders are his 
“fellow brothers”. Most of his “fellow brothers” came from Hubai Province, and 
the majority of them are his relatives, be he or she his niece, nephew, uncle, or 
aunt. The family relation in Yan Wendou’s investment is not weakened or 
attenuated. As he always said in a more or less Italian way, “S/he is my cousin.” 
These people normally call him ‘brother Yan’ or ‘boss Yan’. They used to be 
employed by him, but later become shareholders of his investment. Yan Wendou 
has a special way of managing his employees; in some cases, he allows some of 
his fellow brothers to become shareholders, putting them to invest some more 
profitable houses, in order to maintain their partnership. In other cases, some 
employees would voluntarily join his investments in some less profitable houses 
to show their royalty to the fellowship. For those who refused to participate in the 
investment, would be posted to work in less profitable houses. 
 
Yan Wendou has tried many ploys to fit the housing leasing market. Flats of 
housings built by villagers are with different partitions. However, not all of them 
fit to the housing leasing market. In one of the property that Yan Wendou was 
refurbishing, for example, the partition is a very big living room and a very small 
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bedroom. A common strategy for villagers is to rent it to restaurants, small 
factories, or supermarkets, as accommodations for their staffs with the price of 
650 RMB per month (six boys in the living room, three girls in the bed room). 
After changing the partition into four studios, however, each studio can be leased 
out with the price of 400 RMB per month. Another example is his practice in 
applying a special program for internet cable in the urban-villages. The internet 
company would not invest on the cables in these villages because in their 
perception, migrants are transient and the investment would be in vain. 
Insecurities in livelihood render a character that is less easy to control. By 
providing a regular entity, Yan Wendou’s practice maintains a physical appearance 
appropriate for formal business which seems to turn people and things in the 
urban-villages into “governable subjects” and “governable spaces” (Rose, 1999: 
31-40). The local is given an ontological status as the locus in and through which 
the hitherto difficult to administer can be subjectified. 
 
The institutional reform described in Chapter Five provides a space for actors 
and organizations of the government at different levels (municipal, district, street) 
to intervene in different forms. It produces unintended outcomes and unexpected 
alignments. An expression of Yan Wendou captures this very well: 
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‘“During the harvest season, a farmer reaps in the field. After it is done, 
he sends people to the field to glean spikes of rice. He then again sends 
people to the field to pick up unhusked rice. He wants every granule of 
rice in the field to be collected in his barn. So, the issue is: what are 
those voles and birds going to do? What are they going to eat if nothing 
is left in the field? At the end of the day, it will cost you more. Those 
‘grey’ between the black and white, are just like voles and birds. One 
needs to leave some rice in the field for them.” After I told my brothers 
this story, they all understand what I mean (Field notes, August 2007).’ 
 
Though it is not a “reality talk”, Yan Wendou’s tale about ‘not only black and 
white, but also grey’ is a useful metaphor to illustrate some of the opportunistic 
behaviours of different social actors, ranging from local mafia to governmental 
officials, relating to the urban-villages regeneration. Normally, a village is 
multi-surnamed. Dominant clans maintained ancestral halls and displayed degrees 
of cohesion through social networks and community rituals. Clan is a collection of 
independent and/or interdependent actors who share a relatively high degree of 
trust. Clans are not marginal, trivialized communities. Rather, they function as a 
social network upon which villagers can rely on for assistance and support. For 
example, in Tangxia Village, villagers whose surname were Pan, Zhong, and 
Liang, were majority, comprising almost all the production teams (renamed “she” 
since the reforms) and dominated the cadre’s positions in the village cooperative. 
They are dominant in decision makings regarding the use of collective land and 
fiscal reserves, the management of village cooperatives, the collection of fees and 
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the general development of the village, engaging and mobilizing villagers, 
distribution and use of profits arising from the collective cooperatives, and 
negotiation and allocation of the balance of individual dividend against collective 
expenditure (such as for community hygiene, village schools, the upkeep of roads, 
salaries of cadres, and public security). The access to villagers’ houses depends on 
village cadres or officials in the district governments. 
 
An example is that the policemen of Dengfong Street Office in Tianhe 
District went to ask Yan Wendou to run housing leasing business in Dengfong 
village. However, they gave him either properties they own, which were in poor 
locations and made them difficult to be profitable, or those properties with crime 
or prostitute problems. As to the properties with better profits, they would rather 
run the business by themselves instead of having someone else to run the business 
for them. 
 
“A while ago, I was asked by the policemen to take over properties of 
two streets. These properties were occupied by prostitutes, and the area 
was kept in check by gangs. It was fine for me to negotiate with 
prostitutes, because they don’t make fuss on the rental issue, but it was 
an issue to negotiate with gangs. It was nonsense to throw me to cope 
with the rectification order of these streets. Even if I managed to get rid 
of these prostitutes, they still carry their careers somewhere else, not to 
mention that those migrant workers in the area have their natural 
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‘desires’. The whole request is just pointless. However, in order to make 
a good friend with the policemen, I still took their properties (Field 
notes, October 2007).’ 
 
Another example is one of the buildings that Yan Wendou runs his business, 
Haitangju. It comprises three six floors buildings, with 200 units, including single 
room, one bedroom flats, and one two-bedrooms-flat. It doesn’t apply for the 
building permission. Besides, even if it applies for building permission, according 
to the regulation, it can only build four floors, not six floors as it is now. It can be 
said as illegal. However, since it is collectively owned by the 10
th
 village 
production team, it is legal. As to the ownership, two years ago this building was 
contracted to a cadre, Su Shenwe (pseudonym). Three months later, Yan Wendou 
rented this building from Su and started to run the lease business. The concept of 
“contract” is different from the concept of “rent”. The concept of contract is 
derived from the HRS (see Chapter Two, section 2.2). The difference of “contract” 
and “rent” is: Except that the concept of “rent” belongs to capitalism and hence is 
taboo, in the concept of “rent”, there is a subject, a landlord for instance, and an 
object, a tenant. After the implementation of collectivization in 1954, everything 
is collective owned. Since everyone shares part of the ownership which cannot be 
divided, no one can be called “tenant”. Mr. Su can contract the building because 
he is a villager in Tangxia Village. This means he is also one of the owners that 
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own this building. That is why Yan Wendou has to pay him 20,000RMB per year 
to buy the right of contract. Next to the Haitangju Building A is Haitangju 
Building B. Yan Wendou also rents it for his business. The difference between 
these two buildings is that he doesn’t have to buy the right of contract. But what 
happened was another villager, A-Dong (pseudonym), came to him and said that 
he would contract that building. At the end, they came to an agreement. Yan 
Wendou has to pay the rent of the eight retail shops to the production team, but A 
Dong can get the right to rent these shops out. This means Yan Wendou has to pay 
A-Dong about 40,000 RMB per year. 
 
Yan Wendou thought the term “urban-village” has been value-laden. With the 
intention to destigmatize the continued negative social construction, he developed 
an alternative spatial metaphor, “new alley action”, to resist against the terms on 
which “urban-village” is offered. However, Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers 
do not want to maximise the impact and significance of their actions by using 
“new alley action” as a mean to address political issues. Instead, he keeps low-key 
in order to avoid getting involved in local politics. As he said, ‘Our motive is no 
more than doing business.’ Yan Wendou is not a do-gooder. Nevertheless, as a 
local activist, he is a social utopianist. In a way, Yan Wendou can be said a “city 
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slicker”, who better understands the nature of changed property values. While 
being talented in the production of a good service, he is talented in the estimation 
of the geographical movements of others. 
 
From the perspective of Yan Wendou, government is inefficient to deal with 
the issue of the regeneration of urban-villages. In contrast to the prepositions of 
“the tragedy of the commons” argument (Hardin, 1968) and prisoner’s dilemma 
metaphor, a point of view developed from an institutional branch of public choice 
argues that common pool resource can be successfully managed by voluntary 
organizations rather than by a coercive state or an outright privatization scheme 
(e.g. Dawes, 1980; Orbell et al., 1988; Ostrom, 1990). This point of view 
emphasizes a concept of human agency in which individuals are able to escape 
apparently inevitable negative consequences resulting from self-interested 
behaviour, take a longer view, organize for their own collective interests, and 
engage in cooperative behaviour that will save the commons. Yan Wendou has a 
much more optimistic view of the capacity of people to create self-governing 
institutions that will provide for the collective good. However, if we push to the 
limit the assertion of Yan Wendou, then, it seems we accept as given many of the 
pluralist doctrines and pluralist perspective of public policy: that conflicts and 
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compromises among competing interests would be resolved. According to 
Foucault (1977, 1991a), subjects are produced in relationship to the larger 
structures they inhabit. It is this active shaping of the self as a subject that flattens 
more difficult question of who should be identified to be empowered, who should 
participate, and to what degree, in decision making.  
 
6.4 The Demise of Local Citizenship and Migrants’ Right to the City – a 
Zero-Sum Game? 
Twenty years have passed by. Almost all of the “urban-villages” remain 
visible, and their persistence cannot be denied. Villages are overflowing with new 
migrants. The high density of these areas and the form of the physical 
environment of the sites engender a sense of difference from rest of the city. 
Though they are seen as derelict areas, their accessibility from the urban area 
makes them ideal sites for socially marginal activities. All these above have, then, 
created a sense of social and spatial isolation, which leads to the creation of a new 
form of urban marginality. The particular physical and social-spatial made-up of 
the urban-villages nonetheless constitute what Longan and Molotch (1987) refer 
to as the “idiosyncratic locational benefits”. The streets where bereft gates stand 
alone in the absence of any walls or fences are always filled with street vendors, 
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shops, and restaurants, such as shops for long-distance phone calls, property 
management, electronics, second hand furniture, cheap clothes, everyday 
necessities, and food – those serving a mixed clientele of villagers and migrants. 
The market logics has become hegemonic and incorporated into “the 
common-sense understanding” that different actors interpret and act upon. 
 
The discourse of the urban-village has, in Fairclough’s (2005b) terms, come to 
be inculcated as a new way of being, new identities, and a new social subject that 
new economic and social formations depend upon. Through the inculcation of this 
discourse, local people have come to ‘own’ this discourse, to position themselves 
inside it, to act, think, talk, and see themselves in terms of it. As Fairclough 
(2005b: 81-82) states, “a stage towards inculcation is rhetorical deployment: local 
people learn the new discourse and use it for certain purposes while at the same 
time self-consciously keeping a distance from it. One of the complexities of the 
dialectics of discourse is the process in which what begins as self-conscious 
rhetorical deployment becomes ‘ownership’ – how people become 
un-self-conscious positioned within a discourse.” The discourse of the 
urban-village is materialised in local people’s bodies, postures, gestures, ways of 
moving, and decision making. Whether people are living and working in the 
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urban-villages, their lives have been touched by the spreading disparate “voices” 
of these commentators. This discursively constituted self is not self passive 
receptors of discourse but strategically and actively engaged in negotiating and 
producing its subjectivities. 
 
It seems that the regeneration of the urban-village is doomed to be a 
redistributive rather than a generative programme, driven by strategies referred to 
by Harvey (2005a) as “accumulation by dispossession” which seeking to transfer 
publicly or commonly held assets and resources into private property. If this 
argument is pursued, an interesting question immediately arises: Is the 
regeneration of the urban-villages for public good or private benefit? This 
question involves issues concerning what normative standards should be used to 
guide or justify decisions taken in urban policy making? What role the public 
policy should play? Who should it serve? What roles the public policy process 
should be assigned? If the multiple and contradictory rights to the city is 
negotiated, are the demise of local citizenship and migrants’ right to the city a 
zero-sum game? 
 
Based on extrapolation from Pareto principle, the argument seems to be a 
familiar one. In the tripartite game among developers, local governments and 
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villagers, who have their own different and divergent interests to advance, what 
should be resorted to as rationales? If policy should serve justice, including 
distributive justice as well as the elimination of oppression, in ways that it meets 
a reasonable standard of fairness, then, how, based on what notions, do we justify 
justice? If (re)distribution justice is contingent on the values of the society and 
the context within which the (re)distribution occurs (Deutsch, 1985; Miller, 1989), 
what kind of institutional design is appropriate, according to what principles? As 
Schneider and Ingram (1997: 49) argue, “the primary challenge to the Pareto 
principle is that it assumes a just distribution of value within the society. To argue 
that actions must make one person better off and no one worse off, by their own 
interpretation, renders as “unjust” all redistributions in society no matter how 
unequal the initial distributions actually are. No matter how unjust the status quo 
happens to be.”  
 
The discussion about both means and ends inevitably involves issues 
concerning the proper range of values that policy should serve, the roles that 
policy and government should play in providing for the supply and distribution of 
public goods, and the policies should be delivered in solving problems. It not 
only explores the specific institutions and actors which the social construct is tied, 
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but also how the problem should be framed, what goals should be pursued, and 
which strategies will be most acceptable in responding to the imbalance of 
different values. It circles around a set of contrasting words: “cost”/“benefit”, 
“disadvantage”/“advantage”, and “negative incentive”/”positive incentive” – not 
only the distribution, comparison, calculation, and conversion of cost and benefit 
based on market prices, but also the calculations of political opportunities and 
risks of officials, interest groups, potential targets, and many other participants 
that may influence or be influenced by the regeneration.  
 
If a regeneration policy emphasizes too much on whether the policy has the 
incentive needed to ensure that self-interest will lead to desired results – the 
concern of the public choice theory which accepts the microeconomic assumption 
that human beings are self-interested utility maximizers, the systematic, logical, 
mathematically oriented deductions from that premise – then, it assumes that 
villagers may well choose to boycott, rather than co-operate with the leadership 
of the collective, if there is no incentives for villagers to participate. Such designs 
not only legitimate this behaviour (Schneider and Ingram. 1997: 50), but also 
reinforce already existing geographies of exclusion, violence and conflict. What it 
signals is, at best that there are weighing and balancing of competing interests of 
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a diverse set of “publics” and at worst that there is no conception of a “public 
interest” that government could or should pursue. 
 
6.5 Conclusions. 
A significant body of literature about urban regeneration has tended to take 
the form of arguments over local people’s feeling about urban regeneration by 
making visible the claims of those all too often portrayed as the “victims” or the 
ways the “active agents” seeking to resist their marginality (Colenutt, 2009). What 
is missing from the picture of many writings about urban regeneration is what 
Scott (1985: 36) refers to as the “everyday forms of resistance” of people which 
are slowly, grindingly, and quietly struggling over land, rents, and taxes in which 
submission and stupidity are often no more than a pose – a necessary tactic on the 
one hand, and their specific goals and targets, which, considering what is going on 
around them, are often quite rational indeed, on the other.  
 
Rather than problematizing too neat a picture of power and powerless, in this 
chapter, I draw on Foucault’s counter-conduct to illustrate diverse reactions to 
practices of dominance that are in-between power and powerless. Whereas the 
constructionist interpretations in previous chapters have focused primarily on the 
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construction of marginality identities by a dominant interest group, this chapter 
engages the ways in which local residents shaped their own identity in particular 
political-economic and cultural contexts, specifically in the context of the 
Guangzhou Municipal Government’s response to the “urban-village problems” in 
2007. This chapter is concerned more with the “villager” as a process of 
self-definition than with pre-ordered “hukou” groupings imposed from outside. Of 
course, the two cannot be totally separated. Situating villagers’ and migrants’ 
activities in the context of the implementation of the IRP, I develop the argument 
that villagers and migrants, as marginal people, are not as powerless as has often 
been suggested. Instead, in exerting control over their lives and actively shaping 
their relationship to the so-called “dominant society”, they are engaging in a 
variety of available strategies and deploying various tactics to resist and/or alter a 
range of policy decisions. 
 
Migrants, such as Yen Wendou and his fellow brothers, are not passive and 
inactive in reacting to the regeneration. Rather, they have been able to reflexively 
adapt and respond to emerging opportunities. Of course Yan Wendou and his 
fellow brothers are not the only group doing this kind of business. For instance, a 
group of migrants from Jiangxi Province also run the business in Yangji Village. 
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Compared with other migrants of villagers, Yan Wendou is relatively more literate, 
articulate, and self-conscious. 
 
The first-hand experiences of living in the urban-villages and the practices of 
Yan Wendou and his fellow brothers reveal that although social life in the 
urban-villages may differ from that that of the outside, it is not socially 
disorganized. Villagers, as a target population in the context of the regeneration of 
the urban-villages, are also a social construction created by politics, culture, 
socialization, and history. Following this, the formal/informal area-based 
networking across and within villagers’ committees is highlighted. There is a 
formal committee meeting that meets frequently to discuss local issues and 
exchange information among production teams. However, the sense of 
community is not just structured formally. There are tight-knit communities of 
villagers in the form of clan-based regimes and different forms of informal social 
network in-between the powerful and the powerless in which information, 
opinions, insights, and gossips – storylines – are exchanged; networks as well as 
strategies are formed. These are the undercurrents of the governmental 
regeneration programmes of the urban-villages that produce unintended outcomes 
and unexpected alignments of local authorities and allies of local residents. 
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Chapter Seven 
Urbanization in China: Contesting in What Ways? 
 
“Attempts to (re)frame the issue may occur at any time. Because social 
construction takes place at all levels, it may be possible for designers to 
(re)construct the current societal conditions in such a way that the issue 
looks quite different than it would have otherwise, and the kinds of policy 
that might seem appropriate may change accordingly (Schneider and 
Ingram, 1997: 77).” 
 
7.1 Introduction. 
This thesis examines the different socio-political and institutional forces 
shaping the urban-villages in Guangzhou. In particular, this thesis focuses on the 
emergence of a discourse of urban change and regeneration that, in the 
Guangzhou context, has provided a socio-political basis, and legitimation, for 
state authorities to pursue specific plans and policies towards the urban-villages. 
By exploring three specific relationships and/or processes, this thesis has 
examined how the urban-village, as a social and political construct, has become 
part of “new stigmatizing topographic lexicon”. The first focuses on the shape of 
the discourse coalition and the “production” of governmental regeneration 
programmes of the urban-villages. The second examines the form of the 
governance that is entwined with, and shaped by, the dynamics that have 
accompanied the implementation of the institutional reform policy, while the third 
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explores the types of individual responses to the governmental regeneration of the 
urban-villages. These are the three themes of this thesis and its order of 
presentation.  
 
The rationale for this thesis is to advance understanding of Chinese urbanism 
through the context of the urban-villages regeneration. In an attempt to extend the 
discussion of “China’s engagement with neoliberalism” or “neoliberalism with 
Chinese characteristics” (see Harvey 2005; Liew 2005; Wu 2008, 2009), this 
thesis engages with recent debates over how to characterise neo-liberalism and its 
value as an academic construct. It is concerned with the documentation of the 
interactions within the broader contexts that the urban-villages exist, and 
considers the internal dynamics, especially the ways local actors of the 
urban-villagers mediate external pressures such as social-economic change into 
internal dynamics of coalition building. 
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by re-visiting the three issues laid out in 
Chapter One about the right to the city, governance, and citizenship relating to the 
urbanism with Chinese characteristics. The remainder of this chapter is comprised 
of four sections. First, it will summarize the empirical findings of the thesis by 
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explicitly addressing the three research questions outlined in Chapter Two. Second, 
it details how the empirical findings add to our conceptual understandings of the 
diverse and contingent nature of urban neoliberalization and neoliberal 
governmentality. Third, by describing the distinctiveness, contribution, and 
limitations of this thesis with reference to other approaches, it suggests additional 
and/or alternative mechanisms or instruments for social intervention and 
engagement, and outlining some practical possibilities for emancipatory forms of 
urban renewal and change. Finally, it closes by outlines some ongoing 
development of the regeneration of urban-villages in Guangzhou, and speculates a 
future research agenda for the phenomenon of the urban-villages per se, the 
contested nature of urbanization in China, and globalized urban neoliberalization. 
 
7.2 The Construction of the Discourses of the Urban-Villages Regeneration. 
In socialist China, the city is seen as the centre of capitalistic industries and 
commerce, which always seeks to take unfair advantage of the peasantry by 
means of loan operations and high taxes, bringing bankruptcy to the rural 
countryside. This urban-rural antagonistic was considered particularly acute in 
China during the Kuomintang period when political control was essentially urban 
based with little consideration given to rural development (Kao, 1963; in Ma, 
332 
1976). Many cities in the years before 1949, when the Kuomintang and foreign 
imperialists operated, were labelled as "consumer-cities" (xiaofei chengshi) by 
Mao Zedong. Their functions were viewed essentially as parasitic rather than 
generative, especially in terms of economic production. In socialist China, the 
consumer-cities are expected to be changed into centres of production, or 
producer-cities (shengchan chengshi).  
 
In the reform era, the political base of the new republic gradually shifted from 
anti-urbanization to the city in the early twentieth century (see Kirkby, 1985; Chan, 
1994). Though ideological fetishes had been swept away, from Deng Xiao Ping’s 
slogan in 1962, “what does it matter if it is a ginger cat or a black cat as long as it 
catches mice?”, “cut off the tail of capitalism” in 1971, the household 
responsibility system (HRS) in 1978, to Deng Xiao Ping’s slogan for “Open 
Door” policy in 1979, “to get rich is glorious”, “Groping the stones while crossing 
the river”, striking the right balance between political ideology and capitalist 
socio-economic reality, or in other words, looking for politically acceptable and 




Cities after socialism faced vast legal economic and social conversion. 
Changes have been accelerated by the explosion of the free market and flows of 
capital, the reintroduction of land rent, privatization, as well as the appearance of 
new actors on the landscape, including local governments, free media, private 
owners and investors, as well as inhabitants and non-government organization 
(NGOs). Because it cannot be understood in terms of the temporary dominance of 
a particular political ideology, a number of authors have introduced concepts to 
capture this contesting nature of urbanization after socialism. Czepczynski (2008), 
for example, explores the transition of the post-socialist cities of Central Europe 
by elaborating Gennep’s (1909) idea of liminality. Following Turner (1967), he 
describes the transition of the post-socialist cities as permanently liminal 
landscape, “no longer typical of the previous regime and planning, but the same 
time quite different from the ones aspired to (Czepczynski, 2008: 113). 
 
A plethora of writings about Chinese urbanism has been framed by deploying 
the terms “transition” and “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Although 
these frameworks are useful, the problem with these framings is that they 
collectively rely on metaphors to describe the not-yet-determined nature. This 
terminological debate is not simply encouraging exercises in re-labelling 
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phenomenon adequately described in other terms. In his locality-based definition, 
Shield (1991: 31) shifts attention away from a concentration on tangible space in 
favour of the non-tangible space of “social spatialisation” to designate the 
ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imaginary of 
cities, government, and spaces, as well as discursive and non-discursive 
interventions in the landscape. This alternative focus provides the subject matter 
for this thesis and the second section of this chapter.  
 
7.3 To Brush the “Strong Discourse” of the Neoliberal Urbanization against 
the Grain. 
Indeed, the Chinese leadership has never espoused neoliberalism as an 
official ideology. China is profoundly different from most post-Soviet and East 
European countries which have undergone an implosion of state, party and 
economy. The CCP and the autocratic state have maintained a close hold on 
economic policy and continued to monopolize political life (see Walker, 2007). 
The elements of neoliberalization or neoliberal shifts of uneven urban 
(re)development, which take both geographical and institutional forms, can also 
be identified in the landscapes of deepening inequalities and entrenched forms of 
social polarization in China. Premised on the argument that the outcome in China 
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has been a particular kind of construction of the market economy which 
interdigitates neoliberal elements with authoritarian centralized control, Harvey 
(2005: 120) argues that the reforms “just happened to coincide with the turn to 
neoliberal solutions in Britain and the United States, and was in part an 
unintended consequence of the neoliberal turn in the advanced capitalist world.” 
Echoing Ong’s (2007: 4) criticism that “Harvey has trouble fitting China into his 
‘neoliberal template’”, Wu (2008) supports the use of neoliberaization to describe 
and theorize the trend of market-oriented accumulation in China. Nevertheless, 
along with a number of scholars, he likewise provides a parallel scrutiny, saying 
that “the restructuring of Chinese cities only partially reflects the activity of 
shared neo-liberal trends (Ma and Wu, 2005: 276)”. Rather than a deliberate 
design, this unintended consequence of the China’s neoliberal turn is not “a 
smooth normalizing shift (from socialism to free market capitalism), but rather 
one deeply rooted in the ‘accumulation regime’, meaning extensive accumulation, 
or state-organized industrialization, as opposed to post-Fordist accumulation 
(ibid.)”. It is “a response to multiple difficulties/crises (political uncertainty and 




These arguments take the form of studies of how “general” processes and 
structures are modified in particular contexts, and fall back into the debate 
between contextualising and law-seeking approaches. At this point, there are 
reasons to question the appropriateness of their ethnocentric prepositions and 
sentiments. Different from the incessant debates of orthodox modernity and 
displacement of modernity, the theorization of neoliberalism partly benefits from 
the increasing recognition of the ways that “geography matters” in the 1980s, in 
which, as Sayer (1988: 255) argues, “what had formerly considered to be general 
structures were themselves geographically specific and context dependent 
phenomena that had mistakenly been treated as general.”  
 
Of course I don’t mean to discuss the incessant debates of the “preliminary 
grammar” of neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; 2002b; Kingfisher, 
2002; Leitner et al., 2007; Peck, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2007). After all, as 
Clarke (2008) and Barnett (2010) argue, the concept of neoliberalism suffers from 
promiscuity, omnipresence, and omnipotence. It is overused, risks becoming the 
next-generation “globalization” concept, and should be retired. Meandering 
around these incessant debates, it seems that the question of “whether 
neoliberalism is able to capture the features of market re-orientation in China, or it 
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is merely a strange Chinese case, deviating from the neoliberalism model?” is 
substituted with the alternative questions of “given the diverse and contingent 
nature of ‘neoliberal governmentality, what do we mean by a different version of 
neoliberalism in the late socialist China (the actually existing neoliberal case)?” 
(Larner, 2003; Sigley, 1996; 2004; Hoffman, 2006; Hoffman et al., 2006), and 
“what do we mean by neoliberalism itself?”  
 
Neoliberalism can be approached theoretically from various viewpoints. It 
can be understood in differing terms. While being razzle-dazzled by the changing 
repertoire of neoliberalism over time and conflict literature about the loose and 
contradiction laden neoliberalism, what draws my attention more is not how to 
represent exhaustive empirical “proof” of the way in which neoliberalism and 
neoliberalization are embodied in the Chinese context, which in one way or 
another is, in term of Said (1995), as a native informant, but Foucaudian accounts 
of neoliberal governmentality which interpret such changes in governance as 
embodiments of particular mentalities of rule: different ways of thinking about 
how to govern populations and individuals. If this is acceptable, then the question 
ceases to be the three questions abovementioned, and becomes “what does this 
neoliberal (re)articulation enable us to understand the existing sites, process, or 
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practice?” – a question that, I think, at least, provides a conceptual vantage point 
to a potentially more productive way forward. 
 
The banner of “building a harmonious society” promises to increase social 
integration and empower the hitherto excluded or marginalized social groups. 
Ironically, the development of Guangzhou under this banner has inclined to the 
value and aesthetic of the urban privileged and excluded the urban deprived. The 
urban-villages have been already recognized as a problem. The issue of the 
urban-villages is one of technique (how to solve this problem?), rather than means 
(how do the urban-villages come to be a problem?). This thesis studies the 
constructive activities of those who declare the urban-villages to be a “problem”. 
This language-oriented approach addressing or redressing the description of 
practices, instead of causes and explanations, puts an emphasis on discursive 
practices in a way that opens up analytical and political possibilities. In contrast to 
the mainstream explanations for the emergence of the urban-villages in China, 
which put emphasis on tracing the sources of this “urban problem” to a 
convergence of social factors, or institutional considerations encapsulated in the 
rural-urban dichotomy, this thesis takes the subject matter into the realm of public 
policy, especially that in post modern era of governance (Richards and Smith, 
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2003), in which the analysis does not assume that there is scientifically 
discoverable truth about efficiency, effectiveness, or justice of public policies. 
Instead, as Schneider and Ingram (1997: 38) argue, “there are simply arguments, 
legitimations, and rationales.” 
 
If governmental innovation existing outside of, or beyond, the reach of the 
governmental is fundamentally Janus-faced (e.g., Swyngedouw, 2005) or even 
Faustian, then, the governmental innovation here is thought of less in terms of 
how to overcome crises, dislocations, and unruliness, and more in terms of how to 
connect spaces and geographical scales – the scale at which a particular 
phenomenon or question is framed geographically (Agnew, 1997) – in an 
alternative way, in which the phenomenon of the urban-villages might take on a 
different aspect and thus require a different or more complex explanation. The 
“emergence” of the urban-villages is itself scale specific with respect to how this 
phenomenon occurs and can be explained. It is socially constructed rather than 
ontologically given.  
 
This is why this thesis is not limited to the denotation and connotations of the 
word “urban-village”, but extends to the discursive field in which the 
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urban-villages as a phenomenon are embedded and the practices it entails. It 
attempts to investigate a spatiotemporally process rather than a fixed and 
homogenous thing. Similar to the call of Blumer (1971), what is needed is a 
fundamental change in conceptualization to reflect a definition and/or 
generalization of the urban-village as a “product of a process of collective 
definition” rather than “objective condition and social arrangement”. Rather than 
using the term “urban-village” as a normative concept, or insisting on the 
self-evident quality of the urban-villages as given objects of intervention, I look at 
the ways in which they were constituted as objects of intervention with an 
associated discourse that carries the authority of state’s statements. This 
process-based analysis focuses on not only the institutions and places but also 
“the spaces in between” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 387). Such an approach has 
been described by Foucault (1980: 117) as genealogy. It is 
 
“a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledge, 
discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to 
a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events 
or runs its empty sameness throughout the course of history.” 
 
The problematic shabby landscape and various social problems of the 
urban-villages diagnosed as the consequence of rural remnants of a past era and 
villages’ backwardness in the urbanization is in fact a statement that mixes the 
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meta-narrative with facts and reverses social and historical causation, in a way 
that these discourses are more like, as Bourdieu (1998) said, the structurally 
over-determined “strong discourses” of the neoliberalism which have behind it all 
the powers of a world of power relations which it helps to make as it is; which are 
so compelling in a way that even their mis-description of the social world can be 
remarked in their self-actualizing nature and their self-evident alignment with the 
primary contours of contemporary political-economic power. 
 
In the discourse of the urban-village, spatial metaphors such as the 
“concentration of poverty” or “lawless zones” disguises the social and political 
processes behind the real problem and helps to provide the justification for 
simplistic spatial solutions to complex social, economic, and political problems. 
This results in them being pathologized and then subject to threats of evictions. 
Thus the focus of this thesis is not to ascertain whether neoliberal rationality is an 
adequate articulation of the phenomenon of the urban-villages or whether the 
phenomenon of the urban-villages is merely a coincidence of the neoliberal 
“heartlands” and what might be the criteria supporting or contesting such an 
assessment, but how it functions as a “politics of truth” (Foucault, 1997b: 67), 
producing new forms of knowledge, inventing different notions and concepts that 
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contribute to the “government” of new domains of regulation and intervention. 
This attention can move us away from grand narratives and teleologies (such as 
developmentalism) toward an analysis of the different spatial-environmental 
causalities and aspects of socio-spatial relations they problematize. This, I think, 
can provide us with a frame to articulate a new vocabulary for defining problems 
and programming solutions, and develop policy scenarios portraying alternative 
futures based on certain assumptions and reflecting different values. 
 
7.4 The Urban-Villages Regeneration: Reflections on a Metaphor. 
Based on fieldwork conducted during 2006 to 2008, the period when there 
was a growing recognition of the issues of the regeneration of the urban-villages 
in China, I examine the social constructions of the phenomenon and the discursive 
articulation of the urban-villages regeneration in Guangzhou. At the moment that 
the fieldwork was conducted, “urban-village” and “regeneration” have become 
words and concepts understood and used in popular and scholarly conversation in 
China. It was a time when the urban-villages were spaces of indeterminacy, whose 
space of analysis was not already defined by geographical entities.  
 
At the time of writing this thesis, mega-events such as Beijing’s Olympic 
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Game in 2008, with its motif “One World, One Dream”, Shanghai’s World Expo 
at the mid of 2010, with its motif “Better City, Better Life”, and Guangzhou’s 
Asian Games at the end of 2010, with its motif “Thrilling Games, Harmonious 
Asia”, are used to provide political as well as economical leverage to the urban 
regeneration in Chinese cities. The Guangzhou Municipal Government declared 
that eight urban-villages would be regenerated before 2010. The regeneration of 
the all 137 urban-villages in Guangzhou will be achieved in ten years. 
 
Following the municipal government’s ambitious statement, some policy 
entrepreneurs propose that the solution is to free up the market, to remove 
restrictions on rural land use, and to allow developer to build where previously 
they have been unable to do so. Some others start to tackle wider problems such 
as hukou reformation and call for the need to take into consideration levels of 
affordable housing for the middle to lower income groups. While the cost of 
housing became increasingly unaffordable, some cities, such as Chongqing in 
Sichuan Province, announced to build public rental housing each year from 2010 
to 2012, for rural to urban migrant workers, new university and college graduates, 
and people from other parts of the mainland. It seems that Guangzhou is able to 
undertake the regeneration of the urban-villages along these lines. However, it is 
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not an easy option. The way that the urban-village regeneration in Guangzhou is 
ambivalent mirrors Guangzhou’s wider position in socioeconomic network in 
China. It’s specific social, economic, and political geographies are not like those 
of Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, which are endowed with relatively stronger 
government authority and power. 
 
There is a criticism to the regeneration of Yangji Village in 2011 about its 
opaque decision-making processes. (Though this criticism was, as usual, 
“harmonized”.) Such debate plays a role in the emergence of contested 
inequalities (Clarke, 2004) – while aiming at the inequality of villagers, assess 
how policies impact different subsections of the population, and which public 
services should address other kinds of inequality as well, are to the fore. 
Nevertheless, villages and the lives of their residents, which have been evaluated 
negatively and represented in homogeneous terms, are yet to be fully explored. In 
terms of the social construction of target population, so far, in many of the studies 
about the urban-villages in China, including this thesis, a number of 
social-discursive categories such as race, class, religion, ethnicity, region, gender, 
and other cleavages differences that have divided society, are hidden from view
79
. 
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These are sources of identification and group solidarity that may serve as 
mobilizing forces and make it possible for government to facilitate compromises 
and produce public policies that are acceptable to the society (Schneider and 




 June 2011, Wang Yang, the Chief Party Secretary of Guangdong 
Province, gave a statement when he visited Florence, Venice, and other cities in 
Italy. As he said: “The demolition-redevelopment should not be the only scheme 
for the regeneration of the urban-villages in Guangzhou. We can choose one 
typical urban-village and preserve it as a trace in the rapid urbanization of 
Guangzhou
80 .” The rhetoric around “preserving a typical urban-village in 
Guangzhou” triggered again the debate of “how to solve the problem of the 
urban-villages”. “How to solve the problem of the urban-villages” belongs to a 
discursive repertoire very different from “What the regeneration of the 
urban-villages is or ought to be”. Compare with the discursive repertoire of the 
urban regeneration in London (see Imrie, Lees, Raco, 2009), for instance, what is 
absent is the “devolution, community, and empowerment” repertoire mobilised in 
the context of UK regeneration. Of course, the rhetoric around “the urban-villages 
                                                 
80
 Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 June 2011. 
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as a problem” seems very distant from the discourses and debates circulated at 
“devolution, community, and empowerment” repertoire. I do not wish to be seen 
to argue that it should transfer the discursive repertoire in other contexts to the 
context of the urban-villages regeneration in China. However, I do think that what 
urban-villages regeneration can imply is an integrated perspective on the problems 
and potentials of the Chinese cities. This may help us to think the question 
concerning the proper form, function and meaning of urbanity in an Asian city. 
 
7.5 Conclusions. 
As rural-urban transitional zones, the urban-villages are, in Bach’s (2007) term, 
“space of exception”. They are legal anomalies of sorts, where the informal and 
the formal intersect, where the public sphere and private sphere imbricate, where 
sovereignty, citizenship, and urban space are renegotiated, where government 
practices are reconfigured, and where governable spaces and bodies are delineated 
and institutionalized. The urban-villages regeneration is conditioned by economic 
and political determinations. It is also shaped by interests of classes, experts, the 
grassroots, and other contending forces, transformed by technology, saturated with 
images, mediated in the news, and constantly appropriated and reproduced in the 
practices of everyday life. It is in the very way that different perceptions are 
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enacted, performed, and subverted by different social actors, in the ongoing and 
practical appropriation of the space that not only the term “urban-village” is 
conceptualized and acquires its very specific meanings and necessitates very 
specific solutions, but also the social meanings and the urban form of the 
“urban-villages” become sedimented. 
 
As a flip side of the glossy pictures of gleaming images that suggest yet 
another global metropolis in the making, the urban-villages in China can be said 
to be one of the new landscapes of global neo-liberalism to decode. De jure, these 
urban-villages are rural; de facto, these urban-villages are urban. They serve an 
intermediate role in conflicts that arise between rural and urban. As an 
idiosyncratic place, they are to voice the anxieties of an age in which the 
urbanization in China produces what it itself cannot recognize. They represent an 
exit option (Hirschman, 1970); a physical manifestation of the rational response of 
people to an unreasonable institution, when the potentials for negotiation – the 
voice option – are impossible. It is in the context that combines political ideology 
with economic reality, rural/urban is not only geographical and physical, but also 
a political rhetoric, in which it comprises a highly dense process of 
institutionalization and historical sedimentation. It formulates people’s 
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imagination of “modernization” and what the “city ought to be”. It is the very 
raison d’etre of the urban-villages in China. 
 
In the rapid process of urbanization in China, economic pragmatism and 
political symbolism conflicted; pre-existing personal ties facilitated capitalist 
ventures (Smart and Smart, 1991; Leung, 1993; Hsing, 1998; Smart and Lin, 
2007). Dominating collective land ownership, ill-defined property rights, and 
ambiguous residence status and the rights of this mixed population are 
profoundly on their ways of laborious negotiation (Zhu, 2002; Ho and Lin, 2003; 
Ho, 2001, 2005). These are sensitive topics addressing “some of society’s most 
pressing social issues and policy questions (Sieber and Stanley, 1988: 55)”. 
Putting these issues into the broader context of urban regeneration globally, these 
are hardly novel issues and have been raised in different ways in diverse body of 
literature subsumed under the label the “urban problem”. They can be both cause 
and effect. When being connected together in the urban-villages regeneration 
controversy in China, however, they are causalized in a certain way to form a 
discourse coalition interacting with localized patterns of institutional practices 
and different scales of activity to frame local-level decision making, in which 
certain storylines are deployed or privileged strategically by different actors, 
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while others become material and structural preconditions to the regeneration of 
the urban-villages in Guangzhou. It is in this complex way that the 
representations of local residents are tied to recent neoliberal representations and 
re-articulation of citizenship, productivity, and accountability, to the extent that 
the landscape of the urban-villages regeneration in China marks one of the very 
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